“Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer: Summary and Critique

“Aspects of a Theory of Bullshit” by Jörg Meibauer first appeared in 2016 in the journal Pragmatics & Cognition (Volume 23, Issue 1, pp. 68–91) and marks a significant contribution to the linguistic and philosophical theorization of deception and insincerity in language.

"Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit"by Jörg Meibauer: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer

“Aspects of a Theory of Bullshit” by Jörg Meibauer first appeared in 2016 in the journal Pragmatics & Cognition (Volume 23, Issue 1, pp. 68–91) and marks a significant contribution to the linguistic and philosophical theorization of deception and insincerity in language. Building upon Harry Frankfurt’s foundational essay On Bullshit, Meibauer deepens the theoretical landscape by proposing that “bullshit” should be understood as a distinct pragmatic category, grounded in speech act theory and implicature analysis. Central to his model is the notion that bullshitting involves insincere assertion, characterized by a loose concern for truth, a misrepresentational intent, and crucially, excessive certainty. This last component—arguably Meibauer’s most original addition—suggests that the bullshitter’s rhetoric is marked by undue epistemic confidence despite lacking adequate concern for factual accuracy. The paper also addresses challenges to Frankfurt’s theory, such as evasive, bald-faced, and bullshit lies, and defends a refined account capable of capturing these nuances through a pragmatic lens. Meibauer’s work is important in literary theory and broader linguistic pragmatics for offering a rigorous typology of deceptive discourse acts, enabling a more precise analysis of communication in political rhetoric, advertising, and even literary texts. By situating “bullshit” alongside categories like irony, metaphor, and hyperbole, the paper broadens the scope of how insincerity and truth-related attitudes shape discourse and reader reception. It also lays foundational groundwork for distinguishing performative and strategic uses of language, making it a valuable resource in the study of narrative voice, authorial stance, and reader manipulation in literature.

Summary of “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer

🧠 1. Definition and Theoretical Foundation

  • Meibauer expands on Harry Frankfurt’s definition of “bullshit” as a form of insincere communication that disregards the truth.
  • Bullshitting is not lying: Unlike lying, it does not require the speaker to know the truth; it is characterized by a lack of concern for whether statements are true or false.
  • “Bullshit, in the Frankfurtian sense, is speech with no concern for the truth” (Meibauer, 2016, p. 68).

🗣️ 2. Bullshit as a Pragmatic Phenomenon

  • Meibauer frames bullshit as a pragmatic category using tools from speech act theory and Gricean implicature.
  • He argues that bullshitting typically occurs in the form of assertions, even though the speaker is not committed to the truth.
  • “Bullshitting is insincere assertion” (p. 73).
  • “Assertions are central to bullshitting, but with a weaker epistemic commitment than is standardly assumed” (p. 74).

⚖️ 3. Distinction from Lying

  • Lies involve a knowledge of the truth and an intent to deceive.
  • Bullshitters may not know or care what is true—they aim to impress or manipulate.
  • “The liar hides the truth, the bullshitter hides the fact that he does not care about the truth” (p. 69).

📢 4. Excessive Certainty as a Marker

  • A novel contribution from Meibauer is the idea that bullshit is marked by exaggerated epistemic certainty.
  • This confidence disguises the speaker’s indifference to the truth.
  • “One typical feature of bullshitting is the use of excessive certainty markers” (p. 75).

🧩 5. Relationship to Other Speech Acts

  • Bullshit is closely related to bald-faced lies, irony, and metaphor, but distinct in intent and function.
  • Meibauer explores these distinctions to develop a typology of insincere discourse.
  • “Bald-faced lies are intended to be false and known to be so by both speaker and hearer… not so with bullshit” (p. 77).

🧱 6. Structural Characteristics of Bullshit

  • Meibauer outlines key features:
    • Speaker pretends to assert a proposition.
    • Speaker is indifferent to the truth.
    • Speaker aims at persuasion or impression management.
    • Speech often includes pseudo-intellectualism or vagueness.
  • “Bullshitting often entails strategic vagueness and the use of stock phrases” (p. 81).

🔍 7. Implications for Discourse Analysis

  • Bullshit is pervasive in political speech, advertising, and public discourse.
  • It challenges conventional models of communication that assume cooperation and sincerity.
  • “Bullshit calls into question the Gricean assumption that speakers aim at maximally informative and cooperative discourse” (p. 86).

📚 8. Relevance for Broader Linguistic and Literary Analysis

  • The paper has significant implications for analyzing:
    • Unreliable narrators
    • Satire and irony
    • Propaganda and rhetorical manipulation
  • Meibauer’s framework enables a more precise analytical vocabulary for discussing insincerity and authorial stance in literature.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer
Theoretical Term/ConceptExplanationReference / Quotation
🧠 Bullshit (Frankfurtian sense)A form of speech where the speaker shows no concern for truth, unlike lying which involves deliberate falsehood.“Bullshit, in the Frankfurtian sense, is speech with no concern for the truth.” (p. 68)
🗣️ Insincere AssertionA statement presented as sincere but lacking genuine epistemic commitment—a defining structure of bullshitting.“Bullshitting is insincere assertion.” (p. 73)
⚠️ Excessive CertaintyA rhetorical strategy where speakers express strong confidence despite having no regard for truth—key to identifying bullshit.“One typical feature of bullshitting is the use of excessive certainty markers.” (p. 75)
📚 Speech Act TheoryThe theoretical lens used to analyze bullshit as a kind of assertive act, despite the speaker’s lack of truth-commitment.“Assertions are central to bullshitting…” (p. 74)
🧩 Gricean ImplicatureBullshit disrupts cooperative conversation by violating Grice’s maxims, especially the Maxim of Quality (truthfulness).“Bullshit calls into question the Gricean assumption…” (p. 86)
🙊 Bald-faced LieA lie that is clearly false and known to be false by all parties, yet socially tolerated—contrasted with bullshit’s indifference to truth.“Bald-faced lies are intended to be false and known to be so…” (p. 77)
🌀 Pseudo-assertionA statement that mimics an assertion but lacks actual belief or knowledge—frequently found in bullshit.“Bullshitting often entails strategic vagueness…” (p. 81)
🎯 Epistemic CommitmentThe speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of their statement; in bullshitting, this is weakened or absent.“Assertions… with a weaker epistemic commitment…” (p. 74)
🎭 Persuasion / Impression ManagementA core function of bullshit: to influence others or craft a certain image of the speaker, regardless of truth.
Contribution of “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer to Literary Theory/Theories

🎭 Narratology: Unreliable Narration and Speaker Intent

  • Meibauer’s concept of insincere assertion is vital for analyzing unreliable narrators, especially those who present themselves as truthful while masking their lack of epistemic commitment.
  • His notion that bullshit involves “weak epistemic commitment” (Meibauer, 2016, p. 74) helps decode characters or narrators who perform sincerity without believing their own claims.
  • 📖 Application: Analysis of literary voices that manipulate the reader, such as in Nabokov’s Pale Fire or Ford’s The Good Soldier.

🌀 Post-Structuralism: Instability of Meaning and Truth

  • The text supports post-structuralist concerns about truth being contingent, performative, and manipulable.
  • Meibauer observes that bullshit flouts Gricean maxims, destabilizing expected truth norms in discourse (p. 86).
  • 📖 Application: Deconstruction of logocentric claims and exploration of ambiguity in authorial voice.

🧩 Pragmatics in Literary Discourse Analysis

  • By grounding bullshit in speech act theory and implicature, Meibauer offers tools for analyzing how characters use language performatively rather than truthfully.
  • “Bullshitting is insincere assertion” (p. 73), particularly useful in identifying manipulative or self-deceptive dialogue in fiction.

🎭 Rhetoric and Reader Response Theory

  • The function of impression management and strategic vagueness aligns with theories of reader manipulation and rhetorical stance.
  • Meibauer writes: “Speaker aims at persuasion or impression management” (p. 81)—a foundation for analyzing how texts guide reader belief or complicity.

🌫️ Ideology Critique and Critical Discourse Analysis

  • Meibauer’s account of bullshit reveals how truth-indifferent language sustains ideological hegemony, especially in political or propagandistic fiction.
  • “Bullshit often entails strategic vagueness and the use of stock phrases” (p. 81)—a critical insight for dissecting ideology in dystopian or authoritarian texts.

🧠 Ethics and Intentionality in Literary Ethics Theory

  • The concept of ethical commitment to truth in speech is central to evaluating moral dimensions of narration.
  • By distinguishing lying from bullshitting, Meibauer clarifies how characters’ epistemic ethics affect narrative trust.
  • “The liar hides the truth, the bullshitter hides that he does not care about the truth” (p. 69).

📣 Satire and Irony Studies

  • Bullshit as a mode of insincere discourse enhances understanding of ironic and satirical narrative tones.
  • His reference to “pseudo-assertion” and overconfident speech markers (p. 75) is crucial for analyzing ironic posturing in works by Swift or Vonnegut.

📚 Metafiction and Self-Reflexivity

  • Theorizing bullshit as discourse unconcerned with truth but obsessed with performance aligns with postmodern metafictional strategies.
  • Meibauer’s view of bullshit as discourse that “pretends to assert a proposition” (p. 81) mirrors self-reflexive narration that performs fictionality.
Examples of Critiques Through “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer
Fiction Title & AuthorBullshit Element IdentifiedApplication of Meibauer’s ConceptsCritique Using In-text Reference
🪖 The Blind Man’s Garden – Nadeem Aslam (Pakistani-British, Indian conflict theme)Ideological Bullshit and Certainty in Faith DiscourseThe characters’ rhetoric—especially Islamist and militarist speech—reflects “excessive certainty markers” and disregard for factual complexity (Meibauer, 2016, p. 75).Religious and military figures often “pretend to assert a proposition” to sustain ideological belief (p. 81).
🪙 The Scent of God – Saikat MajumdarInsincere Assertion in Institutional Militarized ReligionThe protagonist’s elite monastic school experience showcases truth-ambivalent narratives from spiritual authorities—a form of institutional bullshit.Characters flout sincerity and commitment in sacred speech acts, engaging in what Meibauer calls “insincere assertion” (p. 73).
🎖️ Kargil: From Surprise to Victory – General V.P. Malik (semi-fictional narrative framing)Overconfident War RhetoricUses strategic over-certainty in framing India’s military victory—rhetoric aligns with Meibauer’s critique of epistemic overstatement (p. 75).The narrative uses “excessive certainty markers” to construct nationalistic truth, glossing over ambiguity (p. 75).
🔫 The Valley of Masks – Tarun TejpalIdeological Indoctrination and Pseudo-assertionThe protagonist’s role in a violent, cult-like movement reveals systematic use of pseudo-assertions and strategic vagueness (p. 81).Language used by the cult “pretends to assert propositions” rooted in moral certainty, echoing Meibauer’s structure of bullshit (p. 81).
Criticism Against “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer

🔍 Overreliance on Speech Act Theory

  • Meibauer grounds his theory primarily in assertive speech acts, which may exclude or oversimplify more literary, poetic, or metaphorical uses of bullshit.
  • Critics argue that not all bullshit functions through clear illocutionary force—e.g., satire or performance art resists such classification.

🎭 Neglect of Performative and Aesthetic Dimensions

  • The theory underemphasizes the literary or aesthetic use of bullshit, such as in postmodern fiction, where authors deliberately play with sincerity and insincerity.
  • Literary scholars may argue that bullshit can function as artistic ambiguity, not always as a rhetorical or moral failure.

🧠 Assumes a Binary Between Truth and Bullshit

  • While Meibauer refines Frankfurt’s model, he still operates within a binary of truth vs. insincerity, leaving little room for complex epistemic gray zones like irony, parody, or speculative writing.
  • Real-life discourse often blends knowledge, belief, and persuasion—bullshit may not be as categorically distinct as suggested.

🗣️ Narrow Focus on Assertion

  • The model prioritizes assertions as the main carrier of bullshit, possibly ignoring other speech acts like questions, commands, or emotional appeals, which can also function insincerely.

🌍 Lacks Socio-Cultural Contextualization

  • Meibauer’s approach is largely individualistic and formal, focusing on the speaker’s intent rather than institutional or ideological structures that enable bullshit (e.g., political media, nationalism).
  • Critical theorists might call for a broader, discourse-historical analysis.

🌀 Insufficient Engagement with Visual/Multimodal Bullshit

  • In the age of digital misinformation, bullshit often occurs in images, memes, or tone, not just verbal assertions—Meibauer’s framework doesn’t address this.

🧩 Unclear Operational Criteria

  • The line between exaggeration, lying, and bullshitting remains theoretically murky, especially when certainty and sincerity are difficult to measure.
  • Critics argue the framework lacks clear diagnostic tools for identifying bullshit in natural language.
Representative Quotations from “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer with Explanation
#QuotationExplanation
1️⃣“Bullshitting is insincere assertion: the speaker pretends to assert a proposition while not being committed to the truth of what he says.” (p. 73)Meibauer’s core definition. Bullshit mimics genuine assertions but lacks the speaker’s epistemic commitment, which is a foundational breach of sincerity in communication.
2️⃣“One typical feature of bullshitting is the use of excessive certainty markers: the speaker expresses strong commitment to a proposition while actually not caring whether it is true.” (p. 75)Introduces excessive certainty as a key linguistic marker of bullshit—where a speaker uses overconfidence to mask indifference to truth.
3️⃣“The liar hides the truth; the bullshitter hides the fact that he does not care about the truth.” (p. 69)Meibauer paraphrases Frankfurt to distinguish bullshit from lying: liars are oriented toward truth (to negate it), whereas bullshitters are epistemically indifferent.
4️⃣“Assertions are central to bullshitting, but with a weaker epistemic commitment than is standardly assumed in speech act theory.” (p. 74)Meibauer adapts speech act theory, arguing that the form of assertion is preserved in bullshit, but the internal sincerity condition is missing.
5️⃣“Bullshitting often entails strategic vagueness and the use of stock phrases that appear informative but avoid any clear propositional commitment.” (p. 81)This identifies the rhetorical style of bullshit: vague, clichéd, and deliberately evasive, often used to create the illusion of knowledge.
Suggested Readings: “Aspects Of A Theory Of Bullshit”by Jörg Meibauer
  1. Wakeham, Joshua. “Bullshit as a Problem of Social Epistemology.” Sociological Theory, vol. 35, no. 1, 2017, pp. 15–38. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26382904. Accessed 16 June 2025.
  2. Frankfurt, Harry G. “ON BULLSHIT.” On Bullshit, Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 1–68. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7t4wr.2. Accessed 16 June 2025.
  3. Pilgrim, David. “BPS Bullshit.” British Psychology in Crisis: A Case Study in Organisational Dysfunction, edited by David Pilgrim, Karnac Books, 2023, pp. 127–44. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.23338242.11. Accessed 16 June 2025.
  4. Brahms, Yael. Philosophy of Post-Truth. Institute for National Security Studies, 2020. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23537. Accessed 16 June 2025.

“A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer: Summary and Critique

“A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer first appeared in College Composition and Communication, Vol. 59, No. 3 (February 2008), published by the National Council of Teachers of English.

"A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing" by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer

“A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer first appeared in College Composition and Communication, Vol. 59, No. 3 (February 2008), published by the National Council of Teachers of English. This influential article reconsiders the pervasive issue of “bullshit” in academic writing, especially within composition studies, by expanding on Harry Frankfurt’s earlier philosophical treatment. Rather than adopting Frankfurt’s essentialist and rigid definition, the authors propose a more nuanced, graded-category approach, influenced by Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblances” and prototype semantics. They argue that academic bullshit exists on a spectrum—ranging from harmful misrepresentation to rhetorical performance that is sometimes necessary, pedagogically useful, and even ethically constructive. Within literary theory and composition, the article is significant for its exploration of how academic ethos is constructed, and how the boundaries between sincerity, performance, and obfuscation are often blurred. Eubanks and Schaeffer suggest that while academia may be uniquely vulnerable to charges of bullshit, not all such discourse is fraudulent; some forms enable critical engagement, intellectual development, and professional identity formation. The piece ultimately calls for a more discerning and context-aware understanding of bullshit, recognizing its complex role in scholarly communication (Eubanks & Schaeffer, 2008).

Summary of “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer

🔹 Redefining “Bullshit” Beyond Frankfurt

  • The authors critique Harry Frankfurt’s rigid, checklist-style definition of “bullshit” and argue for a more flexible, graded-category approach.
    • Frankfurt defines bullshit as “a misrepresentation of the self—one’s feelings, thoughts, or attitudes” (p. 17).
    • However, the authors propose that bullshit is not an either/or concept but a spectrum: “Like game, bullshit groups together acts that can be quite varied” (p. 32).
    • They draw on Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” to suggest bullshit should be treated as a graded category rather than an essentialist one (p. 32).

🔹 Bullshit as a Rhetorical Phenomenon

  • Bullshit in academic writing is often not about deception, but rhetorical ethos-building.
    • “Prototypical bullshit has to do with a purposeful misrepresentation of self, has the quality of gamesmanship…” (p. 379).
    • The authors stress that academic bullshit is part of a “ludic” rhetorical tradition—one that values play, performance, and reputation (p. 132).
    • Referencing Walter Ong, they argue that such rhetorical behavior is gendered, typically associated with masculine competitiveness (p. 124–125).

🔹 Prototypical vs. Non-Prototypical Bullshit

  • A key conceptual distinction is drawn between different types of bullshit:
    • Prototypical bullshit: exaggerated, insincere, self-promoting discourse that misrepresents reality for rhetorical gain.
      • Example: “Your call is important to us” – “It grates… nobody believes it” (p. 380).
    • Non-prototypical bullshit: stylistic convention, unintentional obfuscation, or identity performance that may still serve valid academic purposes.
      • “Academic writing… may be bullshit, but it is not prototypical bullshit” (p. 384).

🔹 The Bullshit Paradox in Academic Writing

  • Academics are in a contradictory position: they produce writing often accused of being bullshit, yet they value clarity, truth, and rigor.
    • “The academic writer must… prove [claims] according to the conventions of the discipline” (p. 383).
    • Yet these conventions themselves can produce writing that “enhances the ethos” more than it clarifies (p. 383).
    • The article suggests that “academic gamesmanship is liable to the charge of bullshit insofar as the persona… may be completely different from the ‘actual’ disposition of the writer” (p. 384).

🔹 Bullshit in Student Writing

  • Student writing also reflects bullshit in both cynical and developmental forms.
    • William Perry’s “bullster” writes without reading—offering “relevancies, however relevant, without data” (p. 65).
    • More troubling is the “competent but insincere cooperation” seen in Jasper Neel’s “anti-writing,” where students follow form but show “disregard for the truth” (p. 85).
    • This type of bullshit “aims to get by with something worse than a lie: disengagement” (p. 386).

🔹 Bullshit as Pedagogical Reality and Opportunity

  • The authors conclude that benign bullshit is part of academic development and genre acquisition.
    • “Productive sort of bullshit… ultimately produces better thought and better selves” (p. 387).
    • They caution, however, against the “gravitational pull” of prototypical bullshit (p. 384).
    • Teachers must remain vigilant, guiding students away from cynical manipulation and toward sincere engagement: “To do that, we need… a more precise understanding of how what bullshit is varies” (p. 386).

🔹 Bullshit as a Structural and Institutional Issue

  • The article shows how academia’s incentive systems (tenure, publishing, specialization) structurally encourage bullshit.
    • “Professional rewards come from academic reputation, and academic reputation comes from publication” (p. 383).
    • Even earnest academic writing “may be a variant sort of bullshit—bullshit on the edge of the category” (p. 384).

🔹 Bullshit and Intra-Academic Policing

  • Bullshit is also a rhetorical weapon used within academic turf wars.
    • “Theoretical frameworks probably provoke more cries of ‘Bullshit!’ than any other academic praxis” (p. 385).
    • Accusing another scholar of bullshit can be “an argumentum ad hominem that aims to excommunicate” (p. 385).
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer
🧠 Theoretical Term/Concept📖 Explanation📎 Reference (In-Text Citation)
Graded Category / Non-Prototypical BullshitBullshit is not binary but exists on a spectrum. Many instances in academic writing are not prototypical but fall within a broader, more benign zone.“Bullshit is a graded category… not to say what is or isn’t bullshit but to distinguish what is prototypical” (p. 376); “Bullshit… on the edge of the category” (p. 384).
Prototype Semantics / Constructed SelfBased on cognitive science, this theory argues that categories have central (prototypical) and peripheral members. Relatedly, identity and ethos are rhetorically shaped, not fixed.“Prototype semantics… may exhibit features to greater or lesser degrees” (p. 376); “The self is constructed out of bullshit” (p. 377).
Ethos Construction / Prototypical BullshitBullshit often involves constructing a false or exaggerated persona. In its most recognizable form, it’s intentional, self-promoting, and gamesmanlike.“The bullshitter attempts to… create an ethos…” (p. 377); “Prototypical bullshit has to do with a purposeful misrepresentation of self” (p. 379).
Ludic Rhetoric / Academic GamesmanshipAcademic writing is often performative and competitive, like a rhetorical game. Writers build credibility within disciplinary constraints to succeed professionally.“Bullshit may be essential to… what Walter Ong calls ‘ludic’” (p. 378); “Academic gamesmanship… tone of the competent… expert” (p. 384).
Anti-Writing / Student BullshitStudent writing may reflect disengagement or superficial cooperation with academic norms, either through bluffing (bullstering) or empty compliance.“Writing that follows the conventions… but conveys ‘I care nothing about the truth’” (p. 386); “The bullster… interpretation by guesswork” (p. 385).
Argumentum ad HominemAccusations of academic bullshit can be weaponized rhetorically to exclude certain scholars or approaches from academic legitimacy.“To call something ‘Bullshit!’… argues that the text does not merit a place in the academy” (p. 385).
Contribution of “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer to Literary Theory/Theories

🧠 1. Poststructuralism & Constructivist Theories of the Self

  • Contribution: The article supports a view of identity as constructed rather than essential, aligning with poststructuralist ideas of subjectivity.
    • “Some contemporary scholars might deny… that there is a pre-existing self to which the bullshitter is not true. They might say that the self is bullshit. It is constructed out of bullshit” (p. 377).
  • Implication: The notion of rhetorical identity aligns with thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, challenging stable notions of authorial sincerity and authenticity.

🧬 2. Rhetorical Theory and Ethos

  • Contribution: Eubanks and Schaeffer expand classical rhetorical theory—particularly the Aristotelian concept of ethos—by showing how academic ethos can be performative, strategic, and even deceptive.
    • “The bullshitter attempts to misrepresent himself or herself, that is, to create an ethos that implies a character that the speaker does not possess” (p. 377).
  • Implication: In literary theory, this supports an analysis of texts and authorship as performative acts, not transparent self-expressions.

🌀 3. Prototype Theory and Linguistic Semantics

  • Contribution: The article introduces prototype semantics (from cognitive linguistics) into literary and rhetorical theory, enriching how categories like “bullshit” or “literature” are evaluated.
    • “Bullshit is a graded category… one task is not to say what is bullshit and what is not but to distinguish what is prototypical bullshit from what is not” (p. 376).
  • Implication: Literary theorists can apply graded categories to analyze genres, textual ambiguity, and hybrid forms without strict binaries.

🎭 4. Performance Theory

  • Contribution: Bullshit is reframed as gamesmanship or rhetorical performance, linking to Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical theories and Judith Butler’s performativity.
    • “Bullshit may be essential to the kind of rhetorical situation that Walter Ong calls ‘ludic’… these situations could be called ‘games’ and the behavior appropriate to them called ‘gamesmanship’” (p. 378).
  • Implication: Academic and literary discourse are viewed as stage-managed performances, challenging assumptions of sincerity or objectivity in interpretation and criticism.

⚔️ 5. Feminist Literary Criticism

  • Contribution: The article acknowledges that the masculine, ludic nature of rhetorical games (including bullshitting) is embedded in academic discourse and writing norms.
    • “Bullshit… is almost exclusively a male game” (p. 379); “It is surely no accident that so many influential critiques of academic argument have come from a feminist perspective” (p. 379).
  • Implication: Reinforces feminist critiques of academic discourse as gendered and exclusionary, validating the push toward more inclusive and ethical writing practices.

🧾 6. Genre Theory

  • Contribution: It reframes academic writing as a genre bound by institutional conventions that may foster bullshit—not as deviance but as structural necessity.
    • “Even good academic writing… may be bullshit” (p. 384); “Academic publication… aims to create an ethos that will result in tangible rewards” (p. 383).
  • Implication: Enhances literary theory’s understanding of how genre functions rhetorically, especially in institutional and professional contexts.

📚 7. Institutional Critique & Critical Theory

  • Contribution: The article critiques the academic institution itself for structurally incentivizing bullshit through systems of tenure, peer review, and scholarly competition.
    • “Professional rewards come from academic reputation, and academic reputation comes from publication… a particularly rich field for bullshit” (p. 383).
  • Implication: Supports the critical theory tradition (e.g., Habermas, Bourdieu) in exposing the ideological and material functions behind academic discourse.

🤹 8. Reader-Response and Audience Theory

  • Contribution: The essay emphasizes that judgments about “bullshit” are audience-dependent and context-specific.
    • “What they really mean is that the writing does not appropriately address them” (p. 382); “It matters who is making the judgment” (p. 382).
  • Implication: Underscores the active role of the reader in assigning value and meaning—core to reader-response theory.

💬 9. Metacriticism

  • Contribution: The article itself is a metacritique of academic discourse, exposing its self-contradictions, performativity, and institutional constraints.
    • “If academic writing is bullshit, then bullshit is what we teach” (p. 374).
  • Implication: Challenges literary theorists to critically reflect on their own practices and disciplinary assumptions.

Examples of Critiques Through “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer
📘 Title ️ Author🔍 Theoretical Lens from Eubanks & Schaeffer🧠 Critical Commentary using Bullshit Theory
🇮🇳🔥 Operation Fox-HuntSiddhartha ThoratPrototypical Bullshit / Ethos PerformanceGlorifies Indian military and RAW operations with an almost mythic ethos. Embodies what Eubanks & Schaeffer call a “purposeful misrepresentation of self” (p. 377)—a polished, idealized state persona.
🕵️‍♂️💣 The Karachi DeceptionShatrujeet NathConstructed Self / Graded Category of BullshitFrames Pakistan as a lawless space and valorizes Indian operatives with moral clarity. This form of action-thriller rhetoric fits a “nonprototypical” but graded bullshit category (p. 384).
⚔️🔥 Operation HellfireSiddhartha ThoratLudic Rhetoric / Military GamesmanshipThe action-thriller tone mirrors “gamesmanship”—a competitive, hyper-masculine rhetorical mode discussed by Ong and reframed as bullshit by the authors (p. 378–379).
🕶️🎯 Operation JinnahShiv AroorBullshit as Strategic Narrative / Rhetorical NationalismBlends nationalistic conviction with fictional intelligence warfare. Aims to “get away with something” rhetorically (p. 380), projecting India’s moral superiority in high-stakes global intrigue.
Criticism Against “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer

Over-Normalization of Bullshit

  • Criticism: The authors risk normalizing bullshit by suggesting it is often benign or inevitable in academic writing.
  • Concern: This may blur the ethical distinction between strategic rhetoric and intellectual dishonesty.
  • E.g., the argument that “benign bullshit… produces better selves” (p. 387) could be misused to excuse poor scholarship.

🔍 Lack of Clear Boundaries

  • Criticism: The concept of bullshit as a graded category makes it difficult to apply in real academic assessment.
  • Concern: By avoiding a firm line, the authors complicate the task of evaluating when rhetoric crosses into problematic territory.
  • Frankfurt’s call for “decisiveness” is rejected, but critics might argue this renders the concept too vague to regulate.

👓 Masculine Bias in Rhetorical Framing

  • Criticism: Although the essay acknowledges Ong’s insight that bullshit is a “masculine game,” it arguably does not go far enough in critiquing this gender bias.
  • Concern: The piece risks reinforcing a gendered view of rhetoric without fully interrogating its implications for feminist or inclusive pedagogies.

🧩 Insufficient Engagement with Power Structures

  • Criticism: The essay critiques individual performances and stylistic conventions more than systemic academic inequalities.
  • Concern: It underplays how institutional bullshit is tied to publishing metrics, elitism, and exclusionary discourse norms.

📉 Neglect of Student Impact

  • Criticism: The discussion of student “bullshit” risks condescension or underestimation of the pressures students face.
  • Concern: Descriptions of “bullsters” and “anti-writing” may frame students too harshly, ignoring the structural constraints on their agency.

📚 Limited Theoretical Dialogue

  • Criticism: The article focuses heavily on Frankfurt and cognitive semantics, with limited engagement with broader critical theory.
  • Concern: The discussion could be enriched by deeper references to discourse theory, Bourdieu, or postcolonial critiques of academic language.

🔄 Circularity in Definition

  • Criticism: The authors reject checklist definitions but still rely on a prototype that often loops back to the same traits—misrepresentation, ethos inflation, gamesmanship.
  • Concern: Critics may argue this makes the article circular in logic, using bullshit to define bullshit.
Representative Quotations from “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer with Explanation
🔖 Quotation💬 Explanation
🌀 “If academic writing is bullshit, then bullshit is what we teach.” (p. 374)This statement critiques how writing instruction inherently legitimizes academic discourse practices, even if they are perceived as insincere or excessive. It reflects the authors’ central concern that teaching academic writing might perpetuate problematic forms.
🎭 “Bullshit is disconnected from the truth in a way that lying never is.” (p. 55)Drawing from Frankfurt, this underscores that bullshit isn’t necessarily false, but unconcerned with truth, making it more insidious than a lie, which at least acknowledges truth’s presence.
🧠 “Bullshit may be essential to the kind of rhetorical situation that Walter Ong calls ‘ludic.’” (p. 378)The authors suggest that academic writing functions like a rhetorical game, where manipulation and self-representation are structured parts of discourse.
🧩 “There are prototypical and nonprototypical instances of bullshit.” (p. 376)Introducing a graded category of bullshit, this quote invites readers to consider bullshit on a spectrum rather than as a binary, allowing for more nuanced evaluations.
📢 “The prototype of bullshit is not just at the center of the category; it is the category’s center of gravity.” (p. 384)This metaphor explains how prototypical examples shape perceptions of the entire category, pulling even mild instances toward the stigma of the prototype.
🎓 “Academic publication is also coy about its argumentative-ludic character.” (p. 383)This reflects how scholarly writing masks its competitive and strategic nature beneath a veneer of objective neutrality.
🤖 “Compositionists may be in the most peculiar and complicated spot of all.” (p. 374)Because they teach and study writing, compositionists face a double bind: participating in and critiquing the very conventions they’re implicated in.
⚠️ “The phrase ‘academic bullshit’ thus presents a double insult to academics.” (p. 375)It suggests not only disregard for truth but also implicates the scholar personally, harming both credibility and character.
🛠️ “Bullshit that ultimately produces better thought and better selves.” (p. 387)This quote defends the pedagogical value of bullshit when understood as a developmental tool, especially in academic apprenticeship.
🧾 “To call something ‘Bullshit!’ argues that the text does not merit a place in the academy.” (p. 384)Here, bullshit becomes a rhetorical weapon used to police ideological boundaries in academic discourse.
Suggested Readings: “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing” by Philip Eubanks and John D. Schaeffer
  1. McComiskey, Bruce. “Post-Truth Rhetoric and Composition.” Post-Truth Rhetoric and Composition, University Press of Colorado, 2017, pp. 1–50. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1w76tbg.3. Accessed 15 June 2025.
  2. Eubanks, Philip, and John D. Schaeffer. “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing.” College Composition and Communication, vol. 59, no. 3, 2008, pp. 372–88. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20457010. Accessed 15 June 2025.
  3. Fredal, James. “Rhetoric and Bullshit.” College English, vol. 73, no. 3, 2011, pp. 243–59. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25790474. Accessed 15 June 2025.
  4. BRINKEMA, EUGENIE. “Psychoanalytic Bullshit.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 1, 2007, pp. 61–79. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25670644. Accessed 15 June 2025.