June 20, 2025 - English Studies

“Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic: Summary and Critique

“Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic first appeared in Philosophia in 2018. In this influential article, Sarajlic argues that bullshit is not merely an offense against truth—as Harry Frankfurt famously proposed—but more profoundly an offense against reason.

Introduction: “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic

“Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic first appeared in Philosophia in 2018. In this influential article, Sarajlic argues that bullshit is not merely an offense against truth—as Harry Frankfurt famously proposed—but more profoundly an offense against reason. Departing from Frankfurt’s intention-centered definition and G.A. Cohen’s text-centered critique, Sarajlic presents a richer conceptual framework, emphasizing the speaker’s deliberate use of vague or vacuous assertions within persuasive contexts to undermine listeners’ ability to form reason-based judgments. His key contribution lies in formulating normative theses that distinguish between first-order (intentional) and second-order (unintentional or duped) bullshit, clarifying that bullshit requires not just epistemic vacuity but also strategic intent. Sarajlic stresses that while liars falsify propositions, bullshitters obscure rational foundations altogether—thus impeding epistemic agency and moral autonomy. This reconceptualization has major implications in literary theory and discourse analysis, where meaning, speaker intent, and reader response are central. By focusing on pragmatic function and communicative asymmetry, Sarajlic enhances our understanding of rhetorical manipulation, aligning his critique with broader concerns in ethics, critical theory, and the politics of language.

Summary of “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic

🧠 1. Conceptual Reframing of Bullshit

Core Thesis: Bullshit is not primarily an offense against truth (as per Frankfurt), but against reason—the rational process by which people form beliefs and justify actions (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 1).
Redefinition: Sarajlic proposes that bullshit consists of assertions lacking truth-value, made intentionally to persuade or manipulate (p. 2).

Contextual Necessity: Bullshit requires an intentional communicative context where the speaker seeks to influence the listener’s actions or beliefs, not merely to misinform (p. 10).

🔍 2. Frankfurt vs. Cohen: Competing Definitions

Frankfurt’s View (Speaker-Centered):
- Bullshit arises from indifference to truth.
- It is a mental-state-based concept: the speaker doesn’t care whether what they say is true or false (Frankfurt, 2005; Sarajlic, 2018, p. 3).

Cohen’s View (Text-Centered):
- Bullshit is a property of propositions or texts themselves, not of speaker intention.
- Criteria: unclarifiable clarity, speculative or logically weak assertions (Cohen, 2002; Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 4–5).

Sarajlic’s Critique:
- Argues against both extremes: bullshit is not only speaker- or text-based.
- Instead, bullshit is rooted in pragmatic intent and epistemic asymmetry (p. 11).

⚖️ 3. Normative Theses on Bullshit

Sarajlic articulates four normative theses about bullshit to refine the definition:

📌 Thesis 1: Intentional Context

Bullshit must occur in a persuasive context where the speaker uses assertions to move the listener toward a conclusion or action (p. 11).

📌 Thesis 2: Strategic Ambiguity

Contrary to Frankfurt, the bullshitter does care about truth—but deliberately avoids it to manipulate reasoning (p. 13).

Vagueness serves to mask weak arguments, not due to indifference but strategic evasion.

📌 Thesis 3: Context Constitutes Bullshit

Isolated propositions are insufficient; intentions, speaker identity, and consequences matter (p. 17).
Introduces first-order bullshit (deliberate) vs. second-order bullshit (sincerely believed but originally deceptive content) (p. 17).

📌 Thesis 4: Offense Against Reason

Bullshit disrupts the construction of reasons—while liars offer false reasons, bullshitters offer none at all, undermining rational deliberation (p. 25).
Uses Skorupski’s framework of practical reason to show how bullshit fails epistemic accessibility and disrupts action justification (Skorupski, 2010; Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 25–26).

🧱 4. Bullshit vs. Lying: Moral Economy

Frankfurt’s Moral View: Bullshit is worse than lying because it shows total disregard for truth (Frankfurt, 2005; p. 20).

Webber’s Counterpoint: Lying is worse because it damages the speaker’s credibility more (Webber, 2013; p. 21).
Sarajlic’s Response:
- Bullshit can be more blameworthy because it dodges accountability, preserves deniability, and exploits epistemic inequalities (p. 22).
- It causes deeper harm by corrupting rational discourse over time (p. 26).

🧭 5. Epistemic and Social Consequences

Disruption of Reasoning: Bullshit replaces argument with semantic noise, disabling the audience’s capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood (p. 28).
Emotional Exploitation: It exploits biases (e.g., confirmation bias, risk aversion), fostering irrational belief formation (Taylor, 2006; Sarajlic, 2018, p. 28).

Erosion of Democratic Discourse: Prolonged exposure to bullshit impairs public reasoning, making societies more susceptible to manipulation and populism (Law, 2011; p. 30).

🤝 6. Respect and Epistemic Inequality

Lying: Violates mutual truth-telling norms but respects the listener’s rational capacity (p. 31).
Bullshitting: Disrespects the listener’s status as an epistemic equal by implying they are not capable of evaluating reasons (p. 32).

Bullshit is often paternalistic, demanding epistemic submission without offering justifications (p. 33).

✅ 7. Final Definition and Implication

“Bullshit is an act of communication by which the speaker, without the mutual suspense of the aim to communicate truth, intentionally makes assertions that have no truth-value in order to hamper the listener’s ability to construct relevant epistemic and practical reasons…” (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 35)

Importance: This definition emphasizes intent, epistemic disruption, and moral culpability.

Sarajlic argues for reassessing bullshit as morally and conceptually significant, particularly in a post-truth society.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic

🧾 Theoretical Term	📘 Explanation & Citation
🎯 Bullshit	A communicative act in which the speaker intentionally makes assertions with no truth-value to mislead the listener’s reasoning process and influence beliefs or actions. It is a violation of rational discourse rather than just truthfulness. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 2)
🧠 Practical Reason	A framework (from Skorupski) where actions are justified through reasons (π), at a time (t), for an agent (X), leading to an action (ψ). Bullshit disrupts this structure by inserting non-assessable claims. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 25; Skorupski, 2010)
🔍 Epistemic Field	The set of facts accessible to an agent through knowledge or inquiry at a given time. For a reason to be valid, its proposition must lie within this field. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 26)
🧩 First-order Bullshit	Deliberately fabricated bullshit by a speaker to manipulate or deceive. It is the most morally and analytically significant form of bullshit. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 17)
🪞 Second-order Bullshit	Statements lacking truth-value that are sincerely believed or repeated by someone unaware of their original deceptive purpose. Less blameworthy but still epistemically flawed. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 17)
⚖️ Moral Economy of Bullshit	The ethical evaluation of bullshit: unlike lies, bullshit evades accountability, undermines trust, and corrupts public reasoning. (Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 20–30)
📉 Epistemic Asymmetry	A condition where a speaker holds more knowledge or authority, and uses that perceived superiority to obscure truth or mislead, particularly in persuasive contexts. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 13)
🧱 Constructed Reasons	A properly formed reason links understandable propositions to actions. Bullshit breaks this logical structure, leading listeners to act without valid justification. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 25)
🚫 Offense Against Reason	Sarajlic’s core claim: bullshit is not just about lying, but about disabling the audience’s capacity to reason. It’s a deeper epistemic violation than simple falsehood. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 2)
👑 Epistemic Paternalism	When bullshit implies that listeners cannot think for themselves, encouraging deference to unearned authority instead of critical reasoning. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 33)

Contribution of “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic to Literary Theory/Theories

🧠 1. Reader-Response Theory

Sarajlic highlights how context, intention, and interpretation determine whether a proposition is bullshit, echoing reader-response theory’s claim that meaning is constructed through reception.
A statement’s bullshit status depends not only on content but on the interpretive role of the audience, e.g., Deepak Chopra’s tweets may seem profound or vacuous based on the reader’s context.
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 17–18)

The concept of second-order bullshit (where a duped listener repeats vacuous claims) reinforces the idea that readers may reconstruct and circulate meaning they did not originate.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 17)

🧱 2. Structuralism and Semiotics

The distinction between truth-value and sentence structure (e.g., Pennycook’s examples) supports a semiotic analysis of bullshit as syntactically correct but semantically hollow.
Bullshit operates on the level of signifiers detached from referents (cf. Frege’s sense/reference distinction), destabilizing the usual function of language.
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 6–7; Frege, 1948)

This aligns with structuralist critiques of how language systems produce meaning independently of empirical reference.

📉 3. Postmodernism and Critical Theory

Sarajlic critiques G.A. Cohen’s use of French postmodern philosophy (e.g., Derrida, Baudrillard) as examples of bullshit, suggesting their opacity can obscure rational meaning.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 6; Sokal & Bricmont, 1998)
The article reinforces concerns in critical theory about obscurantism, pseudo-profundity, and ideological manipulation in academic and literary discourse.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 17; Ivankovic, 2016)

🎭 4. Rhetorical and Discourse Theory

Sarajlic’s work contributes to rhetorical theory by showing how bullshit functions as a manipulative mode of persuasion—replacing sound reasoning with persuasive vagueness.
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 10–13)
It reveals how speakers exploit discourse structures to appear rational while subverting the logic of argument, a topic central to discourse ethics and analysis.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 26)

⚖️ 5. Ethical Criticism (Moral Literary Theory)

The article offers a new framework for evaluating ethical dimensions of language in literature and speech: lies violate truth, but bullshit violates reason and autonomy.
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 30–33)

This helps refine ethical criticism of texts that may persuade through manipulation, especially in political or ideological narratives (e.g., populism or propaganda).

👁️ 6. Pragmatics and Speech Act Theory

Builds on Austin’s constative vs. performative distinction to argue that bullshit occupies a unique pragmatic space: constative in form, performative in effect.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 8; Austin, 1962)
Expands speech act theory by showing that bullshit asserts premises in order to drive actions, thus linking propositional structure with pragmatic manipulation.
(Sarajlic, 2018, p. 11)

📣 7. Ideology and Cultural Criticism

The paper shows how bullshit operates ideologically, especially in contexts where epistemic asymmetry is weaponized (e.g., advertisers, influencers, pseudo-experts).
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 13–14; Taylor, 2006)
It aligns with cultural criticism in analyzing how power structures create discourses that evade accountability while shaping public belief.

🧍‍♂️ 8. Narrative Ethics and Voice

Through analysis of speaker-intention and epistemic control, the article contributes to narrative theory by exploring the ethical stance of narrators and characters who may bullshit.
(Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 30–32)

This is relevant in literature where the narrator’s credibility is ambiguous, and actions are based on manipulative or vacuous justifications.

Examples of Critiques Through “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic

📘 Literary Work	🔍 Critique Through Sarajlic’s Theory
🎭 The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald	Jay Gatsby’s reinvention of self and grand narratives about his past reflect first-order bullshit—intentional assertions without concern for factual truth but aimed at persuasion (e.g., to win Daisy). Gatsby constructs a bullshit-based identity that manipulates social perception. (Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 17–19)
🎪 Waiting for Godot by Samuel Beckett	The repetitive, vague dialogue of Vladimir and Estragon borders on second-order bullshit—meaningless assertions repeated sincerely without critical reflection. The play highlights the breakdown of reason construction in language, aligning with Sarajlic’s thesis on epistemic vacuity. (Sarajlic, 2018, p. 17)
🎭 Death of a Salesman by Arthur Miller	Willy Loman’s persistent self-delusions (e.g., being “well-liked”) illustrate epistemic paternalism and offense against reason. His language promotes a distorted version of success that prevents rational reflection in his family, mirroring Sarajlic’s concern about the moral harms of bullshit. (Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 30–33)
🌀 Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand	The novel’s absolutist ideological declarations, lacking empirical grounding and conveyed through exalted characters, can be critiqued as pseudo-profound bullshit—rhetorically potent but epistemically thin. It reflects epistemic asymmetry, where the author asserts superiority over readers’ reasoning. (Sarajlic, 2018, pp. 13–14; Pennycook et al., 2016)

Criticism Against “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic

⚖️ 1. Overemphasis on Intention May Limit Analytical Scope

Sarajlic argues that bullshit must involve intentional use of vacuous assertions to mislead or persuade.
Critics might argue this narrows the concept too tightly, excluding unintentional bullshit that still has harmful rhetorical impact (e.g. political discourse, bureaucratic language).

It risks neglecting systemic or institutional bullshit that operates without clear individual intent.

🔍 2. Dismissal of Frankfurt’s Indifference Thesis Is Too Swift

While Sarajlic refutes Frankfurt’s idea that bullshit stems from indifference to truth, some might argue he undervalues the pragmatic neutrality that defines much bullshit in practice.

Indifference may still explain why bullshit persists even without a persuasive goal—e.g., empty academic jargon.

📚 3. Cohen’s Text-Centered Definition Deserves More Credit

Sarajlic critiques Cohen’s focus on the text itself, yet Cohen’s structural criteria (unclarifiable clarity, speculative excess) still hold analytical power, especially in literary and theoretical critique.
Relying heavily on context and speaker may undermine the ability to assess texts independently, which is often necessary in literature and media studies.

📉 4. Distinction Between Bullshit and Lying May Be Blurred

Sarajlic tries to maintain a clear difference between the liar and the bullshitter, yet real-life examples often blur this line.
A speaker might both lie and bullshit in layered ways—e.g., populist rhetoric—making Sarajlic’s neat classification difficult to apply in practice.

🧩 5. Limited Engagement with Non-Western or Non-Analytic Perspectives

The article draws primarily on analytic philosophy (Frankfurt, Cohen, Skorupski, etc.).
Critics may point out the lack of engagement with rhetorical, postcolonial, or feminist theories, where language and truth are situated within broader power structures.
This potentially limits the universality of his conceptual framework.

📢 6. Vulnerability to the “Bullshit as Style” Problem

Sarajlic treats bullshit as a moral and logical failure, but ignores stylistic or cultural uses where bullshit-like language plays a creative or subversive role (e.g., satire, metafiction, surrealism).

Critics may argue that not all bullshit is bad, and that the article lacks nuance in recognizing aesthetic or resistant functions.

Representative Quotations from “Bullshit, Truth, and Reason” by Eldar Sarajlic with Explanation

🔖 Quotation	💬 Explanation
🎯 “Bullshit is not an offense against truth, but against reason.” (p. 2)	This is the article’s core thesis. Sarajlic reframes bullshit not as simple disregard for truth (à la Frankfurt), but as a disruption of rational justification.
🧩 “Bullshit pertains to assertions expressed within an intentional context, in which the speaker wishes to persuade the listener…” (p. 11)	Introduces Thesis 1, emphasizing intentionality in bullshit. Unlike random nonsense, bullshit is embedded in strategic communication.
🪞 “A proposition without truth-value, when asserted without actors who wish to employ it to serve a role in persuasion, is rarely considered bullshit.” (p. 11)	Sarajlic distinguishes bullshit from mere confusion. If there’s no persuasive motive, vacuous speech may not count as bullshit.
👑 “The bullshitter assumes an epistemically asymmetric position towards his listeners…” (p. 17)	Highlights epistemic power dynamics. Bullshitters often leverage authority or knowledge gaps to avoid scrutiny.
⚖️ “While the liar offers false reasons, the bullshitter offers no reason at all.” (p. 25)	Thesis 4: A key moral distinction. Bullshit destroys the possibility of reasoned evaluation, unlike lies, which at least offer contestable claims.
🚫 “Bullshit is the product of both: the speaker’s intentions and the character of the claims he makes.” (p. 20)	Sarajlic refines Frankfurt’s theory: intention alone is insufficient; bullshit must also involve content that lacks truth-value.
📉 “Bullshitting allows one to dodge any responsibility for assertions.” (p. 24)	Emphasizes bullshit’s strategic advantage—it provides plausible deniability, making it more insidious than lying in some cases.
🧠 “The bullshitter’s communicative act will satisfy the syllogistic form of reason, but its substance will be lacking.” (p. 27)	Illustrates how bullshit mimics rational discourse while emptying it of real content, misleading audiences through form alone.
🌀 “Bullshit exploits the audience’s innate foibles such as confirmation bias, self-deception, aversion to risk…” (p. 28)	Sarajlic links bullshit to cognitive psychology, showing how it manipulates non-rational aspects of human reasoning.
📚 “Not every proposition without truth-value is bullshit… There must be a bullshitter.” (p. 35)	Final definition: context, intention, and consequence must coalesce. This excludes sincere nonsense or poetic ambiguity from being classified as bullshit.

“Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck: Summary and Critique

“Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit” by Hans Maes and Katrien Schaubroeck first appeared in Bullshit and Philosophy, edited by Gary Hardcastle and George Reisch, published in 2006 by Open Court (pp. 171–182).

Introduction: “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

“Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit” by Hans Maes and Katrien Schaubroeck first appeared in Bullshit and Philosophy, edited by Gary Hardcastle and George Reisch, published in 2006 by Open Court (pp. 171–182). This influential essay builds upon Harry Frankfurt’s seminal work On Bullshit by critically engaging with its premises and extending the philosophical investigation into bullshit as a multifaceted cultural and epistemic phenomenon. While Frankfurt defined bullshit as speech characterized by a lack of concern for the truth and a deceptive stance about that indifference, Maes and Schaubroeck argue that this account is overly narrow. They expand the taxonomy of bullshit by identifying three distinct types: (1) Frankfurtian bullshit—driven by indifference to truth, (2) Cohenian bullshit—exemplified by impenetrably obscure academic discourse, and (3) pseudoscientific bullshit—which is sincere but epistemically flawed due to poor logic and disregard for empirical standards. Importantly, they challenge the normative assumption that all bullshit is morally or intellectually pernicious, suggesting instead that certain forms (like casual banter or social politeness) can foster human warmth and sociability. This nuanced approach contributes to literary theory and philosophy by reframing bullshit not merely as a moral lapse but as a complex discursive practice shaped by context, intention, and communicative goals. The essay remains vital in cultural criticism and literary studies for its implications on authenticity, sincerity, and the ethics of communication in literature and beyond.

Summary of “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 1. Introduction: Extending Frankfurt’s Analysis

The essay responds to the popularity of Harry Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit” by both endorsing and extending his core thesis.
Maes and Schaubroeck argue that Frankfurt’s definition is limited: it only explains one kind of bullshit among many “flowers in the lush garden of bullshit” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 323).

They propose an enriched typology that adds nuance and explores bullshit’s evaluative complexity—i.e., not all bullshit is bad.

🔹 2. Frankfurt’s Definition of Bullshit

Frankfurt defines bullshit as characterized by indifference to the truth:
“a lack of connection to a concern with truth – [an] indifference to how things really are” (✶Frankfurt, p. 33).
A bullshitter is unlike a liar: the liar knows the truth but distorts it, while the bullshitter doesn’t care whether what they say is true or not.

Bullshit involves deception about one’s epistemic stance, not about facts per se:
“What he cares about is what people think of him” (✶Frankfurt, p. 18).
Frankfurt makes a sharp distinction between bull sessions (exploratory and unconstrained by truth but not deceptive) and actual bullshit (which entails a pretense) (✶Frankfurt, p. 38).

🔹 3. Critique of Frankfurt – Two Key Revisions

a. Pretence is not essential

The authors challenge Frankfurt’s insistence on pretence: not all bullshit involves fakery.

Case in point: Fania Pascal’s remark to Wittgenstein, “I feel just like a dog that has been run over,” lacks pretence but is still labeled bullshit due to her indifference to the truth (✶Pascal, 1984, p. 29).
Conclusion: “A mere indifference to the truth is apparently all that is needed” for bullshit.

b. Bullshit can be benign or even good

Not all bullshit is harmful or morally reproachable:
- Comforting words in painful moments,
- Social politeness (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6),
- Casual banter (✶Ishiguro, 1999, pp. 257–258),
- Witty epigrams by Oscar Wilde (✶Maes & Schaubroeck).

Thus, bullshit can promote social cohesion and warmth, even if not concerned with truth.

🔹 4. Cohen’s Response: Academic Bullshit

G.A. Cohen critiques Frankfurt for ignoring another kind of bullshit found in academia: unclear, unclarifiable writing.
His test: “Add or subtract a negation sign… if plausibility is unaffected, it’s likely bullshit” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 333).

Cohen-bullshit = sincere but obscure, impenetrable prose with no clear connection to truth—often seen in certain academic or continental philosophical texts.

🔹 5. A Third Kind: Pseudoscientific Bullshit

Neither Frankfurt’s nor Cohen’s model adequately explains pseudoscientific bullshit (e.g., astrology, water crystals, chakra kits).
Characteristics:
- Producers are not indifferent to truth—they sincerely believe in their claims.
- Their work is not unclarifiable—often it is quite specific and literal.
Authors propose a third kind defined by:
- Insensitivity to evidence and
- Logical fallacies (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 333).

This category is especially dangerous due to its impact on public health, science, and politics.

🔹 6. Final Takeaway: A Pluralist Theory of Bullshit

The authors outline three main types:
1. Frankfurt-bullshit: Indifference to truth, often hidden.
2. Cohen-bullshit: Obscure and unclarifiable academic writing.
3. Pseudoscientific bullshit: Specific, sincere, but epistemically flawed.
They call for a more nuanced evaluation, noting that bullshit is not monolithic in origin, form, or moral weight.

“Bullshit” may at times be socially necessary, linguistically rich, and even charming—a fact Frankfurt underestimates.

📚 Key Quotations

“Bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.” (✶Frankfurt, p. 61)
“The explicandum that attracted his interest is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit.” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 323)

“A bit of bullshit from time to time might even be a good thing.” (✶Maes & Schaubroeck)
“If I say, ‘How nice to see you,’ you know perfectly well that this is not meant as a report of my true feelings.” (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6)

Theoretical TermsTheoretical Terms/Concepts in “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 Term/Concept	📘 Explanation	🔖 Reference
✴ Frankfurtian Bullshit	A form of discourse defined by an indifference to the truth and accompanied by pretence; the speaker is unconcerned with how things really are but aims to appear otherwise.	Frankfurt defines bullshit as speech marked by a “lack of connection to a concern with truth” and deception about this indifference (Frankfurt, On Bullshit, p. 33, 54).
✴ Pretence	The act of concealing one’s disregard for the truth—this pretence is, for Frankfurt, what distinguishes bullshit from non-bullshit talk such as joking or speculation.	Frankfurt asserts that bullshit involves “misrepresentation of what one is up to,” making pretence an “indispensably distinctive characteristic” (Frankfurt, p. 54).
✴ Bull Session	Informal, playful discussions that are unconstrained by truth but lack any pretence; participants are not committed to their statements, which makes it unlike true bullshit.	Frankfurt distinguishes bull sessions by noting “there is no pretence that [a connection between belief and statement] is being sustained” (Frankfurt, p. 38).
✴ Cohenian Bullshit	A category of bullshit that results not from insincerity but from a text’s unclarifiable obscurity; typical of certain academic or philosophical writings.	Cohen describes bullshit as “unclarifiable unclarity,” particularly in texts that are “incapable of being rendered unobscure” (Cohen, Deeper into Bullshit, p. 333).
✴ Unclarifiable Unclarity	A type of obscurity in writing that cannot be corrected without changing the meaning; it renders discussion of truth irrelevant.	Cohen explains that when a text remains plausible even after adding or subtracting a negation, “one may be sure that one is dealing with bullshit” (Cohen, p. 333).
✴ Benign Bullshit	Bullshit that serves social or emotional purposes—such as politeness or small talk—rather than intending to deceive; it is tolerated or even appreciated in many contexts.	Nagel argues polite formulae like “How nice to see you” are not dishonest because “the conventions that govern them are generally known” (Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, p. 6).
✴ Pseudoscientific Bullshit	Sincere but flawed speech that lacks empirical rigor and logical validity, such as astrology or pseudomedical claims; it does not fit Frankfurt or C

Contribution of “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck to Literary Theory/Theories

📚 1. Reader-Response Theory

Contribution: Emphasizes the interpretive variability of bullshit depending on the audience’s expectations and tolerance.

Details:
- Wittgenstein’s rejection of Fania Pascal’s remark shows that what counts as bullshit can vary based on reader/hearer disposition (✶p. 5).
- Frankfurt calls Wittgenstein’s reaction “absurdly intolerant,” suggesting that interpretation depends heavily on context and reception (✶p. 31).
- This aligns with reader-response theorists like Stanley Fish, who stress that meaning is not fixed, but generated in the encounter between text and reader.

🧠 2. Pragmatics & Speech Act Theory

Contribution: Refines understanding of illocutionary force in literary and everyday language.
Details:
- The distinction between lying and bullshitting hinges on the speaker’s intention and relation to truth, which directly connects to Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts (✶p. 4).
- Example: The 4th of July orator doesn’t lie, but presents a performative act of fakery—“What he cares about is what people think of him” (✶p. 18).
- Polite expressions like “How nice to see you” are explored as non-informative, socially strategic utterances (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6).

🌀 3. Postmodern Theory

Contribution: Engages with the plurality and instability of meaning, especially in relation to academic and pseudoscientific discourse.
Details:
- Cohenian bullshit critiques the deliberate obscurity of poststructuralist/continental texts, revealing how meaning becomes unanchored (✶p. 9–10).
- The essay exposes how bullshit thrives in the postmodern condition, where truth, clarity, and meaning are no longer fixed points.
- The very fact that bullshit can be “benign” or “neutral” echoes Lyotard’s distrust of grand, moralizing truth claims (✶p. 8).

📏 4. Ethics of Representation in Literary Criticism

Contribution: Challenges traditional views of veracity and sincerity in literary and public discourse.

Details:
- Frankfurt’s idea that “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies” (✶p. 61) raises ethical stakes in representation—particularly in fiction and rhetoric.
- Maes and Schaubroeck question whether a concern for truth should always govern discourse, a central issue in narrative ethics (✶p. 8–9).
- The evaluation of Oscar Wilde’s “brilliant examples of bullshit” (✶p. 8) reframes performative, non-literal language as ethically complex rather than merely deceptive.

🔮 5. Critical Theory & Ideology Critique

Contribution: Illuminates how bullshit serves ideological purposes in advertising, politics, and pseudoscience.
Details:
- Frankfurt locates bullshit in “advertising, public relations, and politics,” where statements aim to manipulate rather than inform (✶p. 22).
- Maes and Schaubroeck add pseudoscientific discourse as another ideological terrain: astrology, numerology, etc., promote false epistemologies under sincere guises (✶p. 10–11).
- This echoes Althusserian notions of ideological state apparatuses that circulate truth-like discourse to maintain power structures.

🗣️ 6. Dialogism (Bakhtinian Literary Theory)

Contribution: Recognizes bullshit as dialogic, context-sensitive language that shifts meaning through interaction.
Details:
- The discussion on bull sessions and casual bullshit (e.g., Pascal’s remark or social banter) shows how language meaning emerges in social contact (✶p. 6–7).
- These instances align with Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia—multiple speech types coexisting within discourse, not all aiming at truth.
- Bullshit, in this light, becomes a genre of social language use, co-shaped by speaker and listener.

🧪 7. Epistemic Criticism

Contribution: Pushes for a literary epistemology that assesses not only what is said but how truth is treated in discourse.

Details:
- The three kinds of bullshit (Frankfurtian, Cohenian, Pseudoscientific) map how different discourses relate to evidence, clarity, and truthfulness (✶p. 11).
- This serves as a model for critiquing literary and theoretical texts that may appear profound but lack epistemic accountability.
- Echoes epistemic critics like Linda Alcoff or Miranda Fricker, who examine power, knowledge, and credibility in speech.

Examples of Critiques Through “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 Poem	🧠 Bullshit Type	📘 Critique Through Maes & Schaubroeck	🔖 Reference from Article
✴ “My President” by Tracy K. Smith	✴ Frankfurtian Bullshit (subverted)	Uses political praise language ironically. The poem critiques rather than participates in bullshit. Shows awareness of political performance and insincerity.	“What [the bullshitter] cares about is what people think of him. He wants them to think of him as a patriot” (p. 4).
✴ “Poem” by Frank O’Hara	✴ Benign Bullshit	Casual language and scattered topics show indifference to truth, yet serve a social and aesthetic function. This is bullshit, but non-deceptive and playful.	“Bull sessions… unconstrained by a concern with truth… but with no pretence involved” (p. 3).
✴ “Introduction to Poetry” by Billy Collins	✴ Cohenian Bullshit (mild satire)	Satirizes academic analysis of poetry, implying critics often over-interpret and obscure meaning. Mocks the unclarifiable unclarity often found in literary theory.	“Unclarifiable texts… are incapable of being rendered unobscure… they constitute a kind of bullshit” (p. 10).
✴ “The Second Coming” by W. B. Yeats (classic)	✴ Cohenian Bullshit	Dense symbolism, prophetic tone, and philosophical vagueness mark it as an example of poetic abstraction that risks interpretive bullshit.	“Texts that are obscure and unclarifiable… represent a distinct kind of academic bullshit” (p. 10).

Criticism Against “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

❗ Overextension of the Concept of Bullshit

Critique: The authors expand Frankfurt’s concept too broadly by removing pretence as an essential condition of bullshit.
Issue: By allowing any speech that is indifferent to truth (even sincere or casual) to be called “bullshit,” they risk diluting the term into vagueness.

Example: Labeling expressions like “I feel like a dog that’s been run over” as bullshit (per the Wittgenstein example) stretches the definition to include everyday, benign utterances.

❗ Collapse of the Distinction Between Bullshit and Ordinary Speech

Critique: The paper blurs the boundary between bullshit and casual, non-truth-committed talk such as jokes, metaphors, or expressions of emotion.

Consequence: This leads to a slippery slope where poetic, humorous, or empathetic language might be unfairly delegitimized.
Concern: Critics may argue this pathologizes ordinary human communication under the banner of philosophical critique.

❗ Insufficient Criteria for Evaluating Pseudoscientific Bullshit

Critique: While the authors identify pseudoscientific bullshit as a third type, they provide no detailed framework for analyzing it.

Gap: The lack of theoretical development makes their treatment of pseudoscientific bullshit underdeveloped compared to Frankfurtian or Cohenian types.
Quote: “These effects certainly warrant further investigation… But this is not the right place to carry out this investigation.” (p. 11)

❗ Inconsistent Handling of Intentionality

Critique: The paper waffles on whether the speaker’s intention matters in defining bullshit.

Contradiction: While Frankfurt places emphasis on the speaker’s indifference and concealment, Maes & Schaubroeck sometimes ignore intention entirely (e.g., bull sessions and poetic metaphors).
Effect: This inconsistency creates ambiguity: Is bullshit defined by mindset, effect, or structure?

❗ Undermines Frankfurt’s Moral Critique

Critique: By accepting forms of benign or even “positive” bullshit, the authors weaken Frankfurt’s ethical stance that bullshit is a grave threat to truth and reason.

Implication: They potentially normalize or excuse bullshit under certain social circumstances (e.g., comforting lies, polite phrases, “banter”).
Challenge: Critics may argue this relativism erodes the civic and epistemic urgency behind Frankfurt’s warning.

❗ Ambiguity in Classifying Bullshit in Literature

Critique: The paper doesn’t clearly differentiate between rhetorical style, artistic ambiguity, and academic bullshit in cultural texts.

Risk: The overlap between poetic license and bullshit becomes dangerously vague, risking misuse in literary criticism.

Representative Quotations from “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck with Explanation

🔖 Quotation	📘 Explanation
1. “Bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”	This emphasizes the unique threat posed by bullshit: it erodes the foundations of truth-seeking by disregarding truth altogether, unlike lies, which at least engage with it.
2. “The bullshitter is not trying to deceive anyone concerning American history. What he cares about is what people think of him.”	Illustrates how the bullshitter prioritizes impression management over factual content—particularly relevant in political rhetoric and performative nationalism.
3. “An unclarifiable text is not only obscure but is incapable of being rendered unobscure… one may be sure that one is dealing with bullshit.”	From Cohen’s critique: academic or philosophical language that cannot be clarified or paraphrased becomes epistemically void, exemplifying intellectual bullshit.
4. “Pretence is not an essential ingredient of bullshit.”	The authors challenge Frankfurt by arguing that indifference to truth alone—without deceptive intent—can qualify as bullshit, as in metaphorical or careless expressions.
5. “Bullshit is not always a bad thing… it can be a source of human warmth.”	Offers a sociolinguistic defense of some forms of bullshit, such as humor, banter, or comforting talk, which serve valuable interpersonal and emotional purposes.
6. “Polite formulae are a sine qua non of a stable society… Polite bullshit is often to be preferred to truthful expressions of hostility.”	Drawing on Thomas Nagel, the authors show how socially accepted insincerity (e.g., small talk) can sustain civility and protect against conflict.
7. “Pseudoscientists… are not indifferent to the truth… Cohen’s and Frankfurt’s definitions do not apply.”	Points to a major gap: pseudoscientific bullshit is committed to false claims but often sincerely—posing a new category not captured by Frankfurt or Cohen.
8. “Wittgenstein found Pascal’s indifference to the truth intolerable… Pascal was playing fast and loose with the facts.”	Reflects on Wittgenstein’s rigid demand for truth even in metaphor, contrasting with most people’s tolerance for expressive or figurative speech.
9. “The very term ‘bull session’ is most likely an abbreviation or sanitized version of ‘bullshit session’.”	Undermines Frankfurt’s sharp distinction between bull sessions and bullshit, suggesting they may lie on a spectrum of truth-indifference.
10. “It is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.”	Ends with a pragmatic epistemic stance: cautioning against rigid literalism and highlighting the practical value of intuitive or approximative truth.

Day: June 20, 2025