Day: June 25, 2025

🧠 Doxasticism vs. Non-Doxasticism in Faith

• Doxasticism (DOX) holds that “faith that p” necessarily entails belief that p.

“Necessarily, faith that p is accompanied by belief that p.” (Scott, 2020, p. 1)

• Non-doxasticism challenges this, allowing faith without belief—only acceptance, assent, or trust in p.
• Catalysts for non-doxasticism include William Alston (1996), who proposed that “faith does not require belief but merely acceptance,” and Cohen (1992), who distinguished acceptance as a pragmatic, voluntary stance.

📚 The Rise of Non-Doxastic Theories

• Non-doxasticism has gained dominance due to:
  • Its compatibility with faith amid doubt (Howard-Snyder, 2013).
  • Alston’s empirical observation that “many sincere Christians are accepters, not believers” (Alston, 2007, p. 136).
  • Its strategic value in defending faith from accusations of irrationality by avoiding evidential demands of belief.

⚖️ The Dilemma for Non-Doxasticism

Scott introduces a philosophical dilemma based on three key assumptions:

1. (BN) Belief Norm of Assertion:

“In asserting p, the speaker should believe that p.” (Bach, 2010, p. 131)

2. (BS) Bullshit Definition:

“Asserting an indicative sentence without believing it to be true or believing it to be false is, prima facie, bullshitting.” (Scott, 2020, p. 3)

3. (AF) Affirmation Norm in Faith:

“A speaker may affirm a religious proposition r if that speaker has faith that r.” (Scott, 2020, p. 4)

💣 Horn 1: Religious Bullshit (Non-Doxasticism-A)

• If affirmations of faith are assertions, but don’t involve belief, they violate BN and become bullshit.
• Scott writes, “Non-doxasticism-A has the consequence of legitimising what is, prima facie, religious bullshit” (p. 5).
• Frankfurt’s notion of bullshit applies here: it’s not lying, but speaking with “indifference to the truth” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 54).
• Assertoric honesty, a proposed solution, fails:
  • It reintroduces belief as a norm for affirming faith.
  • It conflicts with religious practice, which doesn’t distinguish acceptance from belief in speech acts (cf. Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 56).

🎭 Horn 2: Hermeneutic Fictionalism (Non-Doxasticism-B)

• Alternatively, if affirmations are not assertions, they may be quasi-assertions (Burgess, 1983)—like statements in fiction.
• This yields hermeneutic religious fictionalism: the faithful speak “as if” they believe, without actual belief.
• Scott warns this is “a substantive, contentious and little explored theory about religious discourse” (p. 2).
• But this creates problems:
  • Logical tension: e.g., affirming (1) and (5) but rejecting (6) looks illogical (p. 6).
  • Paradoxical utterances become acceptable:

“God exists but I don’t believe it.” (p. 6)

🧠 Imagination ≠ Faith

• Can faith be like imagination?
  • Imagination explains logical discipline in fiction.
  • But propositional faith behaves differently:
    • Faith prompts action, unlike imagination (Festinger et al., 1956).
    • Faith implies truth-commitment; imagination doesn’t.
    • Faith resists inconsistency more than imagination does.

“Propositional faith seems to behave more like belief.” (Scott, 2020, p. 7)

🛠️ Responses to the Dilemma

1. Against Non-Doxasticism-A:
   • Adding emotions or desires (e.g. desiring that p) fails to prevent bullshitting.
   • Frankfurt’s objection stands: desire doesn’t fix norm violation (p. 8).
2. Defending Non-Doxasticism-B:
   • Religious affirmations as confession, praise, or prayer (D.Z. Phillips, Derrida, Marion).
   • But this strategy falters:
     • Many affirmations don’t occur in liturgical contexts.
     • Raises interpretive challenges (e.g. what does denying “God is benevolent” mean if it’s just praise?).

🧩 Conclusion

• Michael Scott’s central contribution is to shift the faith debate into the realm of speech act theory and semantic integrity.
• He reveals non-doxasticism’s linguistic and ethical costs, urging a reconsideration of belief’s role in faith.
• The paper challenges religious philosophy to reckon with the implications of language, assertion, and sincerity.

“Non-doxasticism, while epistemologically attractive, may either undermine the integrity of religious speech or reduce it to a kind of fictionalist performance.” (paraphrased)

🧾 1. Contribution to Speech Act Theory in Religious Discourse

• Applies norms of assertion to literary/religious utterances, connecting linguistic acts with ethical and epistemic standards.
• Builds on Williamson’s (2000) idea that assertion is norm-governed, like rule-based games.

“The speech act, like a game and unlike the act of jumping, is constituted by rules.” (Scott, 2020, p. 3)

• Challenges literary and theological critics to consider when religious language is assertion, confession, or something else—expanding the domain of speech act theory in literary contexts.

🧠 2. Challenges Fictionalism in Religious Language (Hermeneutic and Revolutionary)

• Introduces a philosophy of language dilemma into religious discourse:
  Is faith speech truth-committed assertion or fictional, quasi-assertion?
• Connects to hermeneutic fictionalism—a concept common in literary theory, suggesting that religious utterances are akin to fictional storytelling or narrative play.

“Hermeneutic fictionalists propose that speakers already are not committed to believing what they affirm in the discourse.” (Scott, 2020, p. 6)

• Calls into question the literary assumption that fictional language is harmlessly performative, by comparing it to epistemic negligence or bullshitting in serious discourse.

💩 3. Frankfurtian Bullshit and Literary Integrity

• Integrates Frankfurt’s theory of bullshit to critique religious/literary statements lacking truth-commitment.
  • Suggests that fiction-like faith affirmations in religious literature can risk the ethical decay of discourse.

“What the bullshitter says is not guided by a proper concern with what is true… Bullshit is a greater enemy of truth than lies are.” (Frankfurt, 2005; Scott, 2020, p. 3)

• Raises literary-theoretical questions about the moral status of literary speech that appears “true-like” but is not truth-directed.

📚 4. Contribution to Theories of Fiction and Imagination

• Engages deeply with imaginative discourse, drawing from Currie, Ravenscroft, Sainsbury, and Sinhababu.
• Challenges literary models that equate faith with imagination, by pointing to logical and motivational differences.

“In contrast, propositional faith seems to behave more like belief.” (Scott, 2020, p. 7)

• Argues that faith-driven discourse is more truth-regulated than imaginative fiction, with logical constraints and real-world implications—a key distinction often blurred in literary treatments of belief systems.

🗣️ 5. Contributions to Religious Language Games (Wittgensteinian Analysis)

• Builds on Wittgenstein’s insights into religious forms of life by noting how actual believers affirm propositions without meta-linguistic reflection.

“One does not tend to find a religious disagreement where one speaker affirms a religious proposition and the other says ‘Well, possibly.’” (Wittgenstein, 1966; Scott, 2020, p. 5)

• Encourages literary theorists to examine the ritual, communal, and pragmatic norms governing faith-language, rather than treating it as merely propositional or expressive.

📖 6. Ethical Critique of Postmodern Playfulness in Religious Language

• Challenges Derridean and Marionian views that religious affirmations are like poetic praise or mystical language.

“These theories provide no roadmap for how to interpret affirmations… where there is no identified addressee.” (Scott, 2020, p. 8)

• Warns that such postmodern non-doxastic interpretations can obscure truth-claims in religious literature, undermining sincerity, inferential coherence, and ethical responsibility.

🔗 7. Interdisciplinary Bridge Between Analytic Philosophy and Literary Theory

• Offers a rare analytic intervention in domains usually governed by continental and theological hermeneutics.
• Invites literary theorists to adopt analytic tools (assertion norms, bullshit analysis, inferential logic) to evaluate the rhetoric of belief in literature and theology.
• Shows how literary theory can benefit from precision in evaluating sincerity, faith, and truthfulness in narrative discourse.

❗ Over-Reliance on Norms of Assertion

• Scott presupposes that the belief norm (BN) governs all meaningful assertions, including religious ones.
• Critics may argue that religious discourse operates under alternative norms—such as expressive, communal, or symbolic functions—not reducible to propositional belief.

This risks a category error: applying the logic of scientific assertion to spiritually performative utterances.

🧩 Limited Treatment of Non-Western or Non-Propositional Faith

• The article focuses almost entirely on Christian propositional faith, neglecting embodied, mystical, or non-discursive traditions (e.g., Eastern spiritualities, indigenous practices).
• Such traditions may express faith through ritual, story, or silence, not propositional affirmation, making the dilemma less applicable.

🧠 Underestimation of the Role of Imagination and Narrative

• Scott downplays the cognitive sophistication of imaginative faith, assuming it lacks inferential discipline or truth concern.
• However, philosophers like Currie and Sainsbury show that imaginative discourse can maintain logical order and sincerity, even without literal belief.

🔄 False Dilemma Between Bullshit and Fictionalism

• The core argument rests on a binary dilemma: either faith statements are bullshit (if asserted without belief) or fictionalism (if quasi-asserted).
• Critics may argue for a third option: expressivist or non-doxastic sincerity, where one expresses trust or existential commitment without propositional belief.

🧬 Neglect of Emotional and Volitional Dimensions of Faith

• Scott reduces faith to either belief or acceptance, overlooking desire, hope, affective trust, and practical orientation, which many theologians (e.g., Kierkegaard, Evans) argue are essential to faith.
• Thus, the model may be too narrow to account for the psychological and existential richness of faith.

🧘 Insensitivity to Liturgical and Performative Language

• In religious rituals, faith expressions (e.g., “Christ is risen”) often function like performatives or communal affirmations, not individual assertions.
• Scott treats all affirmations as potentially deceptive unless belief is present, ignoring the social-linguistic reality of religious practice.

🧱 Philosophical Rigour vs. Practical Faith

• While analytically sharp, the article may fail to appreciate the lived reality of faith communities, where doubt, metaphor, and narrative are not epistemic failures but spiritual depth.
• The critique risks being seen as academically rigorous but pastorally tone-deaf.