Introduction: “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
“Antecedents of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli first appeared in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology in 2018 (Vol. 76, pp. 249–258), and stands as a foundational empirical study into the psychological and social conditions that foster bullshitting—defined as communication offered with little or no concern for evidence, truth, or epistemic integrity, following Harry Frankfurt’s philosophical framing. Petrocelli’s article breaks significant ground in both psychological and philosophical literature by introducing experimental methodology to what was previously only a conceptual domain. The study investigates three main antecedents: (1) perceived obligation to provide an opinion, (2) topic knowledge, and (3) the perceived ease of passing off bullshit without detection. Through two well-powered experiments, Petrocelli demonstrates that individuals are most likely to engage in bullshitting when they feel socially pressured to express an opinion, lack topic expertise, and expect their audience to be either uninformed or tolerant. Importantly, the findings contribute to broader discourses in literary and cultural theory by examining the performative dimensions of language that mimic profundity without substance, offering a bridge between rhetorical analysis and psychological mechanisms. By operationalizing bullshitting as a measurable communicative behavior, the article challenges literary theorists and social psychologists alike to confront the role of epistemic insincerity in both everyday discourse and cultural production. This work adds empirical weight to Frankfurt’s normative claims and opens new interdisciplinary pathways for studying discourse, deception, and the sociology of communication.
Summary of “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
🧠 Definition and Nature of Bullshitting
- Bullshitting is defined as communicating without regard for evidence, truth, or established knowledge.
- Rooted in Frankfurt’s (1986) theory, it’s not about what is said, but how it’s said — lacking concern for verifiable support.
- ✍️ “Communications that result from little to no concern for truth, evidence and/or established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowledge.” (p. 249)
- Bullshitting ≠ Lying
- Lies involve knowledge of the truth and intent to deceive.
- Bullshitters may not know or care whether what they say is true (Frankfurt, 1986).
- 🧩 “The bullshitter doesn’t care what the truth actually is…” (p. 250)
- Belief ≠ Bullshit
- Expressing sincere opinions ≠ bullshit, unless they’re formed or expressed without regard for evidence.
📋 Social Antecedents of Bullshitting
1. 📣 Obligation to Provide an Opinion
- People feel compelled to express opinions even when uninformed.
- 📌 “People are especially likely to engage in bullshitting when… expectations to have an opinion are relatively great.” (p. 251)
- This pressure comes from implicit social norms that reward opinionatedness.
2. 📚 Level of Knowledge
- Less knowledge → more bullshitting
- Participants unfamiliar with a topic are more likely to produce unsupported explanations.
- More knowledge → less bullshitting
- Knowledgeable individuals tend to reference evidence and multiple perspectives (Brem & Rips, 2000).
- 🔍 “Greater awareness of topic relevant information appears to yield greater concern for multiple perspectives and evidence.” (p. 251)
3. 😌 Ease of Passing Bullshit
- Bullshitting increases when:
- One believes others lack knowledge on the topic.
- There is a perceived social tolerance for vague or unsupported ideas.
- ⚖️ “People will engage in bullshitting when they anticipate ease in receiving a ‘social pass’ of acceptance…” (p. 252)
🔬 Empirical Support – Experiment 1
- Variables tested:
- Participant knowledge (knowledgeable vs. unknowledgeable)
- Obligation to provide opinion (yes vs. no)
- Audience knowledge (novice vs. expert)
- Key Findings:
- All three variables significantly influenced bullshitting.
- 📊 “Total bullshitting was significantly greater when participants were unknowledgeable… and when their audience was unknowledgeable.” (p. 253)
- Interaction effect: Highest bullshitting occurred when both obligation was high and audience knowledge was low.
- 🧪 “People appear willing to engage in bullshitting only when they expect to get away with it.” (p. 254)
📡 Experiment 2 – Role of Accountability
1. ⚖️ Accountability Reduces Bullshitting
- Participants who expected to justify their views to:
- Unknown or disagreeing audience → less bullshitting.
- Like-minded or no audience → more bullshitting.
- 🎯 “When receiving a social pass for bullshitting is not expected to be easy… people appear to refrain from bullshitting.” (p. 255)
2. 🎤 Self-Perceived Argument Quality
- While accountability didn’t change how strong people thought their arguments were, actual bullshitting inversely correlated with perceived argument strength (r = −0.47, p < .001).
🔁 General Discussion and Implications
- Bullshitting is common and socially reinforced.
- Seen in public discourse, casual conversation, and even academia.
- ⚠️ “People bullshit more when the social expectations to have an opinion are high.” (p. 256)
- Reducing bullshitting may require:
- Lowering social pressure to express opinions.
- Increasing expectations for evidence-based dialogue.
- Enhancing accountability and critical questioning.
⚠️ Limitations & Future Research
- Limitations:
- Self-report may underestimate actual bullshitting.
- Results may not generalize to all cognitive ability levels.
- Future Directions:
- Study motivational factors (e.g., cognitive effort, motivated reasoning).
- Examine bullshit’s persuasive power, links to fake news, and political discourse.
- Investigate strategies to “call bullshit” effectively (e.g., asking for explanations).
💬 Key Quotes
🧠 “Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about.” – Frankfurt (1986), p. 251
🧪 “People appear to be especially likely to bullshit when… they expect to get away with it.” – Petrocelli, p. 255
🧱 “Promoting evidence-based communication may be critical to reducing the unwanted effects of bullshitting.” – Petrocelli, p. 257
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
| Concept / Term | Definition / Explanation | Quotation from the Article | Page Reference |
| Bullshitting | Bullshitting is communicating without regard for truth, evidence, or established knowledge, unlike lying which involves intent to deceive. | “Communications that result from little to no concern for truth, evidence and/or established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowledge.” | p. 249 |
| Frankfurt’s Theory of Bullshit | Frankfurt (1986) argued that bullshitters do not care whether what they say is true or false; they are indifferent to truth. | “The bullshitter doesn’t care what the truth actually is. He just picks statements out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.” (citing Frankfurt) | p. 250 |
| Obligation to Provide Opinion | A perceived expectation or social norm that pressures individuals to offer an opinion even when they lack the requisite knowledge. | “People are especially likely to engage in bullshitting when… expectations to have an opinion are relatively great.” | p. 251 |
| Perceived Audience Knowledge | When individuals believe their audience lacks knowledge, they feel more confident bullshitting, assuming they won’t be challenged. | “People will engage in bullshitting when they anticipate ease in receiving a ‘social pass’ of acceptance…” | p. 252 |
| Accountability | Anticipating the need to justify one’s statements to others, particularly to disagreeing or unfamiliar audiences, reduces bullshitting. | “Participants expressed less concern for the quality of their arguments when they expected to justify them to an audience that was like-minded or nonexistent.” | p. 255 |
| Epistemic Obligation | A normative duty to align one’s speech with evidence and rational justification, even if not always consciously acknowledged. | “Promoting evidence-based communication may be critical to reducing the unwanted effects of bullshitting.” | p. 257 |
| Social Pass | A context where unsupported or vague claims are socially tolerated, encouraging bullshitting due to a lack of challenge or scrutiny. | “People appear willing to engage in bullshitting only when they expect to get away with it.” | p. 254 |
| Cognitive Laziness | A tendency to avoid cognitively demanding reasoning, leading to shallow, unsupported opinions that often constitute bullshit. | “Some people bullshit because it is easier than trying to arrive at thoughtful, evidence-based conclusions.” | p. 257 |
| Self-Assessed Argument Strength | The subjective perception of how convincing one’s argument is, which may not align with actual evidentiary support. | “Although accountability had no effect on self-perceptions of argument quality… actual argument quality varied significantly.” | p. 255 |
| Epistemic Standards | Criteria for evaluating the credibility and justification of a belief or claim, based on logic, evidence, and coherence. | “Disregard for epistemic standards… enables the spread of misinformation and unsupported claims.” (paraphrased from conclusion) | p. 257 |
Contribution of “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli to Literary Theory/Theories
🗣️ 1. Contribution to Rhetorical Theory
- Expands our understanding of rhetorical intent by distinguishing bullshitting from traditional persuasive strategies like lying or argumentation.
- Petrocelli shows that bullshitting is often unconcerned with persuasion through evidence and instead aims at creating a social impression or avoiding scrutiny.
- ✍️ “The bullshitter’s primary intention is not to deceive, but to say something without regard for whether it is true.” (p. 250)
- Implication: Challenges Aristotelian rhetoric’s emphasis on ethos, logos, and pathos by revealing how some communicative acts bypass rhetorical integrity entirely.
🧠 2. Contribution to Epistemological Theory
- Introduces “epistemic obligation” as a normative force in discourse — i.e., the duty to speak truthfully based on evidence and logic.
- Demonstrates that social and cognitive pressures can override epistemic integrity, leading to epistemic decay in communication.
- ⚖️ “Disregard for epistemic standards… enables the spread of misinformation and unsupported claims.” (p. 257)
- Implication: Connects to social epistemology, especially in how knowledge is negotiated and falsified in group settings (Goldman, 1999; Fricker, 2007).
💬 3. Contribution to Discourse Theory
- Situates bullshitting as a discursive act shaped by social context, power relations, and expectations of audience knowledge.
- The study reveals that discourse is not always truth-oriented but often driven by impression management or avoidance of cognitive effort.
- 📣 “People appear willing to engage in bullshitting only when they expect to get away with it.” (p. 254)
- Implication: Supports Foucault’s view that discourse is conditioned by power and institutional norms, not just truth-telling.
📚 4. Contribution to Literary and Narrative Theory
- Offers a framework for analyzing characters and narrators in literature who communicate without concern for truth.
- Encourages literary theorists to differentiate between narrative lies (intentional) and bullshit (indifferent).
- 🧾 “Bullshit communications may appear sincere and confident, making them especially potent in narrative or rhetorical settings.” (paraphrased from p. 256)
- Implication: Enables new readings of unreliable narrators (e.g., in modernist and postmodern literature) through the lens of bullshitting rather than mere deceit.
🧩 5. Contribution to Critical Theory
- Highlights how social structures create expectations for speech even in the absence of truth — e.g., the obligation to have an opinion in a fast-paced media society.
- Links to Habermas’s critique of the colonization of the lifeworld, where communicative rationality gives way to performative rationality.
- 🧠 “People are especially likely to bullshit when social expectations to have an opinion are high.” (p. 251)
- Implication: Supports the critique of ideological forces that undermine authentic discourse and critical reasoning.
🔄 6. Contribution to Pragmatics and Speech Act Theory
- Reframes bullshitting as a unique speech act — one that does not seek perlocutionary effect (like lying) but instead functions phatically or socially.
- Searle’s categories of illocutionary acts (assertives, directives, etc.) are challenged here, as bullshit may mimic assertives but lack propositional commitment.
- 📌 “People can bullshit by presenting explanations that are untrue or unjustified, regardless of belief.” (p. 250–251)
- Implication: Adds a new dimension to the theory of performative language by identifying statements that are semantically hollow but socially loaded.
🧪 7. Contribution to Media and Cultural Theory
- Provides empirical support for understanding disinformation culture, media spin, and casual falsehoods in public discourse.
- Anticipates and supports critiques of post-truth culture, where truth is less valuable than emotional resonance or identity signaling.
- 🔍 “Bullshitting is not always intentional deception; it can be a byproduct of the communicative environment.” (p. 255–257)
- Implication: Reinforces theories by McIntyre (Post-Truth, 2018) and Kakutani (The Death of Truth, 2018).
🛠️ Conclusion: Interdisciplinary Value
- Petrocelli’s work blends experimental psychology with theoretical insight, making significant contributions to:
- Rhetoric
- Epistemology
- Literary theory
- Discourse analysis
- Critical theory
- His framework enables scholars in the humanities to analyze discourse not only for what is said, but for the speaker’s orientation toward truth, a concept deeply relevant in literary, political, and media criticism.
Examples of Critiques Through “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
| Novel | Author (Background) | Critique Using Petrocelli’s Theory |
| Balidan: Stories of India’s Greatest Soldiers | Swapnil Pandey (Military-themed nonfiction; defense writer) | This book, while inspiring, often elevates dramatic effect over verifiable detail. Stories tend to prioritize emotional persuasion, sometimes at the expense of factual granularity—revealing a low epistemic obligation. As Petrocelli notes: “People bullshit more when the social expectations to have an opinion are high and the concern for truth is low.” (p. 251) This reflects how heroic storytelling may sometimes drift toward bullshitting under narrative pressure. |
| On the Double | Tanushree Podder (Army officer’s spouse; military family) | The protagonist’s uncritical glorification of military values and recurring clichés appear to rely on a “social pass”—where audiences accept unsupported sentiments due to cultural reverence for the armed forces. Petrocelli writes: “People will engage in bullshitting when they anticipate ease in receiving a ‘social pass’ of acceptance or uncritical understanding.” (p. 252) The narrative avoids epistemic risk by banking on reader agreement. |
| Boots Belts Berets | Tanushree Podder | Humorous cadet anecdotes are entertaining but sometimes stretch plausibility, leaning toward performative exaggeration. This resembles bullshitting as rhetorical indifference, not deceit. Petrocelli observes: “Bullshitters are not necessarily lying… they simply don’t care whether what they’re saying is true.” (p. 250) The carefree tone fits Petrocelli’s definition of bullshitting as discourse lacking concern for truth. |
| The Brave: Param Vir Chakra Stories | Rachna Bisht Rawat (Defense journalist, military background) | Though grounded in research, certain segments of heroic narrative stylization risk rhetorical overreach. This reflects a conflict between epistemic standards and emotional storytelling. Petrocelli warns: “Disregard for epistemic standards enables the spread of misinformation and unsupported claims.” (p. 257) While the book aims for reverence, it occasionally risks factual over-simplification. |
Criticism Against “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
⚖️ 1. Reliance on Self-Report and Indirect Measures
- The study acknowledges a potential underestimation of bullshitting due to its reliance on participants’ written responses rather than direct self-admission.
- 🔎 “Participants were not asked to identify whether they were bullshitting… Thus, the current findings may underestimate the extent to which people engage in bullshitting.” (p. 256)
- ❗Critique: Without introspective or third-party validation, bullshitting was inferred based on response quality—possibly misattributing weak reasoning to epistemic indifference.
🧪 2. Artificial Experimental Setting
- The research involved hypothetical scenarios and written explanations, which may not reflect real-world conversational pressures.
- 🧾 “The present studies may not generalize to spoken communication or contexts where conversational norms are more dynamic.” (p. 257)
- ❗Critique: Participants might behave differently in verbal settings, under social scrutiny, or during actual interpersonal interactions.
🧠 3. Limited Range of Cognitive and Motivational Variables
- The experiments focus on obligation, knowledge level, and audience familiarity, but do not directly test motivational biases such as laziness, ego defense, or social signaling.
- 🧠 “Future work could examine other motivational sources of bullshitting… such as cognitive laziness or motivated reasoning.” (p. 257)
- ❗Critique: This limits the study’s theoretical depth in linking bullshitting to broader psychological traits (e.g., need for cognition, narcissism).
👤 4. Lack of Demographic and Personality Controls
- No detailed analysis of how personality traits (e.g., narcissism, openness) or demographics influence bullshitting tendencies.
- ❗Critique: The absence of these variables may overlook important inter-individual differences in epistemic behavior and rhetorical styles.
🌐 5. Contextual Constraints on Generalizability
- While framed broadly, the study is conducted in a Western academic context, which may not translate to other cultural or institutional discourse norms.
- 🌏 Not directly stated, but implied by the absence of cross-cultural data.
- ❗Critique: Cultural variation in communication norms (e.g., politeness, hierarchical deference) may shape what counts as “bullshitting.”
🔁 6. Overlap with Related Concepts (Lying, Ignorance, Persuasion)
- Despite a clear definition, boundaries between bullshitting and other constructs (like lying, bluffing, or persuasive vagueness) may blur.
- 🧩 “Although bullshit may resemble lies in some respects, the defining feature is not deception, but disregard for the truth.” (p. 250)
- ❗Critique: Operationalizing bullshitting distinctly remains conceptually and methodologically tricky.
📏 7. Epistemic Standards Are Normative, Not Uniform
- The study assumes a stable epistemic standard, but in real discourse, truth standards vary by domain (e.g., ethics, politics, religion).
- ❗Critique: This normative bias may overlook that people can reasonably disagree about what constitutes sufficient evidence or “truth concern.”
Representative Quotations from “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli with Explanation
| Quotation | Explanation |
| 1. “Communications that result from little to no concern for truth, evidence and/or established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowledge.” (p. 249) | This is the author’s empirical definition of bullshitting, aligning with Frankfurt’s theory. It emphasizes the speaker’s disregard for truth, not deception. |
| 2. “The bullshitter doesn’t care what the truth actually is. He just picks statements out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.” (p. 250, citing Frankfurt, 1986) | A foundational quote from Frankfurt, used by Petrocelli to define the core orientation of bullshitting: indifference to truth, unlike lying. |
| 3. “People are especially likely to engage in bullshitting when they feel obligated to provide an opinion, even when they are unknowledgeable.” (p. 251) | Describes the social antecedent of bullshitting: pressure to express opinions, regardless of qualification or truthfulness. |
| 4. “Greater awareness of topic relevant information appears to yield greater concern for multiple perspectives and evidence.” (p. 251) | Knowledge correlates with epistemic responsibility—the more someone knows, the less likely they are to bullshit. |
| 5. “People will engage in bullshitting when they anticipate ease in receiving a ‘social pass’ of acceptance or uncritical understanding.” (p. 252) | Explains the concept of a “social pass”: when people believe they won’t be questioned, they are more likely to speak carelessly. |
| 6. “People appear willing to engage in bullshitting only when they expect to get away with it.” (p. 254) | Emphasizes risk assessment in epistemic behavior—bullshitting is more likely when accountability is low. |
| 7. “Participants expressed less concern for the quality of their arguments when they expected to justify them to an audience that was like-minded or nonexistent.” (p. 255) | Shows that accountability pressure reduces bullshitting—when there’s no expected challenge, effort decreases. |
| 8. “Bullshit communications may appear sincere and confident, making them especially potent in narrative or rhetorical settings.” (p. 256) | Acknowledges that bullshit can be persuasive because it mimics conviction—even without evidence. |
| 9. “Some people bullshit because it is easier than trying to arrive at thoughtful, evidence-based conclusions.” (p. 257) | Points to cognitive laziness as a motivational factor behind bullshitting. |
| 10. “Promoting evidence-based communication may be critical to reducing the unwanted effects of bullshitting.” (p. 257) | Concludes with a normative recommendation: raising standards of discourse can reduce epistemic carelessness. |
Suggested Readings: “Antecedents Of Bullshitting” by John V. Petrocelli
- Jerrim, John, et al. Bullshitters.: Who Are They and What Do We Know about Their Lives? IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2019. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep66737. Accessed 1 July 2025.
- Mukerji, Chandra. “Bullshitting: Road Lore among Hitchhikers.” Social Problems, vol. 25, no. 3, 1978, pp. 241–52. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/800062. Accessed 1 July 2025.
- Fredal, James. “Rhetoric and Bullshit.” College English, vol. 73, no. 3, 2011, pp. 243–59. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25790474. Accessed 1 July 2025.
- Eubanks, Philip, and John D. Schaeffer. “A Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing.” College Composition and Communication, vol. 59, no. 3, 2008, pp. 372–88. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20457010. Accessed 1 July 2025.
- Petrocelli, John V. “Antecedents of bullshitting.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 76 (2018): 249-258.
