“Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly: Summary and Critique

Introduction: “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

Table of Contents

“Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly first appeared in Film International, Issue 53 (2009). The article critically examines post-human hybridity in Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991) and RoboCop (1987), focusing on the intersection of cyborg identity, abjection, and post-human theory. Pheasant-Kelly situates her analysis within theoretical frameworks drawn from Jean Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum and Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection, highlighting how cyborgs disrupt stable categories of subjectivity, body, and identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 54–55). The article emphasizes that cyborgs occupy an ambiguous position between human and machine, a hybridity that raises questions of selfhood, mortality, and embodiment. Through close readings of scenes where bodily boundaries are transgressed—such as the T101’s self-exposure of its metallic skeleton or Murphy’s traumatic rebirth as RoboCop—the analysis links cinematic representations of cyborgs to broader cultural anxieties surrounding death, technology, and medical science (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–62). Importantly, the study contributes to literary and cultural theory by extending Kristeva’s concepts of abjection beyond horror into science fiction, thereby reinforcing the cyborg as a key post-human figure that unsettles distinctions between subject and object, human and machine. This makes the article significant for scholarship on posthumanism, film theory, and literary criticism more broadly, particularly in how cultural texts negotiate identity at the boundaries of the human.

Summary of “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

🔹 Introduction: Cyborgs and the Post-Human

Pheasant-Kelly situates the cyborg as a central post-human figure in science fiction cinema.
Unlike aliens in Star Wars (1977), cyborgs emphasize the human-machine interface, blurring distinctions between human subjectivity and technological embodiment (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

She draws on Baudrillard’s simulacrum and Kristeva’s abjection to explain how cyborgs destabilize boundaries (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

Quote:
“Boundary maintenance is integral to the coherent subject, both in relation to repression of corporeal abjection and to the preservation of ego” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

🔹 Post-Humanism and Theoretical Framework

References key thinkers: Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999), Badmington (2000), Bell (2007).

Post-humanism challenges distinctions between human and non-human, organism and machine.
Hayles argues that the post-human privileges information over embodiment, treating the body as “an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3).
Post-human hybridity raises cultural anxieties about technology, evolution, and identity.

🔹 Abjection and Kristeva’s Theory

Abjection = disturbance of identity, order, and boundary (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4).
Cyborgs embody abjection because they are “in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4).
Films like Terminator 2 and RoboCop foreground the abject body through violent, traumatic transformations (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–61).

Quote:
“The abject has this dialectical appeal, being both repulsive yet alluring” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).

🔹 Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991)

T101 learns human morality and culture from John Connor—highlighting post-human subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
Scenes of bodily violation (cutting his arm, CPU removal, torn flesh) emphasize the abject hybridity of flesh and machine.

T101 adopts human signifiers—language (“no problemo”), gestures (“thumbs-up”), and empathy (“I know now why you cry”).
T1000 represents fluid abjection: unstable, boundaryless, feminized, and lacking subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 59–60).

Quote:
“The T1000 has no clear boundary and becomes integrated with objects and surfaces with which it comes into contact” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60).

🔹 RoboCop (1987)

Murphy’s violent death and rebirth as RoboCop reflects traumatic abjection and the erasure of subjectivity.
Controlled by OCP’s directives, RoboCop parallels the infantile state within the maternal semiotic chora (Kristeva, 1984).
Identity resurfaces through flashbacks, gestures (gun-twirling), and the mirror stage, signaling self-recognition (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).

The final reclaiming of the name “Murphy” represents the impossibility of repressing identity.

Quote:
“Like Terminator 2, RoboCop demonstrates the impossibility of repressing identity within the post-hybrid body” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).

🔹 Medical and Cultural Anxieties

Cyborg imagery reflects real-world anxieties about organ transplants, brain death, and medical technologies (Blank, 2001; Lock, 2002).

Cyborgs embody cultural fears of death’s ambiguity—patients on life support, comatose states, and identity loss (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 62–63).
The hybrid body becomes a metaphor for biomedical uncertainty and ethical dilemmas.

🔹 Conclusion: Identity and Post-Human Hybridity

Cyborg films like T2 and RoboCop explore the tensions between humanity and technology, showing that while cyborgs may be post-human, they are “not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).

Abjection provides a critical framework to analyze subjectivity, hybridity, and cultural anxieties in post-human cinema.

Quote:
“The cybernetic organism may be post-human but is not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

🔑 Term / Concept	Definition & Explanation	Example from the Article
🤖 Cyborg	A hybrid entity combining human and machine, central to post-humanism debates. Cyborgs embody the tension between natural identity and artificial construction.	In RoboCop (1987), Murphy undergoes “total body prosthesis,” becoming a cyborg whose human memories resurface despite corporate programming (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
🌐 Post-Humanism	The theoretical stance that human identity is no longer fixed but interwoven with technology, cybernetics, and non-human agents (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999).	T101 in Terminator 2 acquires human morals and behavior from John Connor, reflecting the fusion of human and machine subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
🌀 Abjection	From Kristeva (1982): that which disturbs boundaries between subject/object, self/other. Abjection provokes both horror and fascination.	The scene where T101 cuts open his arm to reveal the metal skeleton beneath bloody flesh is an abject moment of hybridity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
📡 Simulacrum	Baudrillard’s (1994) idea of the dominance of the copy over the original—where representation replaces reality.	In Blade Runner (1982), cited as context, questions about Deckard’s humanity reflect the indistinguishability of human and artificial identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).
⚖️ Boundary Maintenance	The effort to preserve identity and subjectivity through stable borders between body/mind, human/machine.	In T2, the CPU removal scene blurs the line between human vulnerability and machine mechanics, dramatizing identity at risk (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–59).
🧩 Subjectivity	The formation of selfhood and personal identity. Cyborg films dramatize the instability of subjectivity under technological hybridity.	RoboCop’s mirror recognition scene where he sees his face and recalls his name “Murphy” signals the reassertion of subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
⚔️ Masculinity & Gendered Identity	The role of gender in cyborg representation. Often tied to the muscular T101 vs. the fluid, feminized T1000.	Tasker (1993) argues that the T1000’s “terrifying fluidity” represents feminization, contrasting with T101’s solid masculinity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).
👶 Semiotic Chora	Kristeva’s (1984) concept of the pre-linguistic, maternal realm of sounds/gestures, opposed to the paternal Symbolic (structured language and order).	RoboCop’s infantile diet of baby food and his initial inability to speak reflect a regression to the semiotic stage (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
🪞 Mirror Stage	Lacan’s (1993) idea that identity forms when a subject recognizes itself in the mirror, establishing ego.	RoboCop’s recognition of himself in the mirror scene signifies the reclaiming of his human identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
⚰️ Death & Medical Anxiety	Post-human films reflect anxieties over brain death, organ transplants, and the ambiguity of the boundary between life and death.	In RoboCop, Murphy’s death and mechanical resurrection embody debates over “real death” in the medical world (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 62–63).

Contribution of “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly to Literary Theory/Theories

🤖 Post-Humanism

Pheasant-Kelly situates T2 and RoboCop within debates on cyborgs and technological identity, drawing from Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999), and Bell (2007).

The article shows how human and machine boundaries blur: the T101 becomes “more human” through John Connor’s teaching of morals and empathy (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
Contributes to literary/posthuman theory by demonstrating that cinematic texts negotiate philosophical questions of humanity and evolution, not just technological spectacle.

Quote:
“The posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 56).

🌀 Abjection (Kristevan Psychoanalysis)

Applies Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror (1982) to science fiction cinema, extending abjection beyond horror into post-human identity studies.
Shows cyborgs as abject hybrids, disturbing order and identity:
- T101’s bloody arm-cutting scene reveals flesh + machine (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
- T1000’s fluid form exemplifies abjection through instability and ambiguity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60).
Contribution: Expands abjection to analyze how cultural texts use bodily boundaries to dramatize subjectivity and hybridity.

Quote:
“Abjection arises in ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

🪞 Psychoanalytic Theory (Lacan & Subjectivity)

Draws on Lacan’s Mirror Stage to explain how cyborgs reclaim identity.
In RoboCop, Murphy’s recognition of his face in the mirror signifies a return of subjectivity after abjection (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
Contribution: Shows how cinema enacts psychosexual development through cyborg narratives.

Quote:
“Murphy’s self-recognition is an important stage in assuming his previous identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).

⚖️ Cultural Theory & Simulacrum (Baudrillard)

Engages Baudrillard’s (1994) concept of simulacrum, where copies dominate originals.
Example: Blade Runner (1982) raises questions of identity by making it unclear whether Deckard is human or replicant (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

Contribution: Positions cyborg cinema as part of postmodern cultural critique, destabilizing authenticity and originality.

Quote:
“One of the central questions raised by the film is the nature of Deckard’s identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

⚔️ Gender Theory / Feminist Film Theory

Engages with Yvonne Tasker (1993) and Christine Cornea (2007) on cyborg masculinities.

Shows how T2 contrasts the solid masculinity of T101 with the “terrifying fluidity” of the feminized T1000 (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).
Contribution: Moves away from a purely gendered reading, reorienting cyborg analysis toward abjection and subjectivity, enriching feminist/posthuman debate.

Quote:
“The updated Terminator is typified by a lack of the bodily definition that is so important to the masculinity of the bodybuilder” (Tasker, 1993, p. 83, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).

⚰️ Biopolitics & Medical Humanities

Connects cyborg abjection to medical and ethical debates: organ transplants, life-support, brain death, and identity loss.
Example: RoboCop dramatizes anxieties of “real death,” echoing Blank’s (2001) concerns about defining death in medical science (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).
Contribution: Brings science fiction into dialogue with biopolitical and medical humanities discourse, extending literary theory toward applied ethics.

Quote:
“Real cyborgs, such as those patients on life-support machines, represent life perpetually on the brink of death” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).

✅ Overall Contribution

Pheasant-Kelly’s article advances literary theory by:
- Extending Kristevan abjection into post-human studies.
- Applying psychoanalytic frameworks (Lacan, Kristeva) to cinematic cyborg identity.
- Reframing feminist/gender debates toward abjection and subjectivity.
- Linking post-humanism with biopolitical anxieties of medical culture.
The article establishes cyborg cinema as a site where cultural theory, psychoanalysis, gender studies, and post-humanism intersect.

Examples of Critiques Through “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

📚 Work & Author	🔎 Critique/Engagement through Pheasant-Kelly (2009)
🤖 *Donna Haraway – A Cyborg Manifesto* (1991)**	– Haraway views the cyborg as a figure of liberation beyond human/animal/machine boundaries. – Pheasant-Kelly acknowledges this but critiques its utopianism, showing instead how films like T2 and RoboCop reveal the trauma, abjection, and instability of post-human hybridity. – Example: T101 is not just a liberated hybrid but a figure of corporeal abjection (cutting open his arm, exposing metal and blood) (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59). – Contribution: Brings Haraway’s theory into psychoanalytic dialogue with Kristeva.
🌐 *N. Katherine Hayles – How We Became Posthuman* (1999)**	– Hayles emphasizes the primacy of informational patterns over embodiment in post-humanism. – Pheasant-Kelly critiques this by stressing that embodiment and corporeal abjection remain central in cyborg cinema. – Example: RoboCop’s diet of baby food and mutilated body highlight material flesh as unavoidable, not accidental (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 61–62). – Contribution: Counters Hayles’ abstraction with a focus on the visceral and bodily reality of cyborgs.
🌀 *Julia Kristeva – Powers of Horror* (1982)**	– Kristeva defines abjection as “what disturbs identity, system, order” (p. 4). – Pheasant-Kelly extends this beyond horror into sci-fi/post-human narratives. – Example: T1000’s fluid form and gender ambiguity embody the abject’s instability (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60). – Critique: While Kristeva ties abjection to the maternal/feminine body, Pheasant-Kelly shows it also arises in technological and cybernetic bodies.
⚖️ *Jean Baudrillard – Simulacra and Simulation* (1994) + Yvonne Tasker – Spectacular Bodies (1993)**	– Baudrillard: Simulacrum erases the distinction between copy and original. Pheasant-Kelly accepts this in Blade Runner but critiques it by emphasizing corporeal difference in T2 and RoboCop, where human/machine boundaries are dramatized, not erased (2009, p. 55). – Tasker: Reads cyborgs through gender/masculinity (T101’s muscular solidity vs. T1000’s feminized fluidity). Pheasant-Kelly critiques this narrow lens, shifting focus from gender to abjection and subjectivity (2009, pp. 57–58). – Contribution: Moves beyond gendered spectacle or postmodern loss of reality, insisting on psychoanalytic depth of cyborg identity.

Criticism Against “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

🔹 Over-Reliance on Psychoanalysis

Heavy dependence on Kristeva’s abjection and Lacanian theory may limit interpretive diversity.
Critics may argue that post-humanism could be equally (or better) explained through technological, cultural, or materialist approaches rather than psychoanalytic ones.
The article risks imposing psychoanalytic categories onto films rather than letting cinematic texts generate new theoretical insights.

🔹 Neglect of Political/Economic Contexts

While it references medical and cultural anxieties, the analysis underplays industrial, political, and capitalist forces shaping cyborg imagery.
RoboCop especially is a satire of corporate capitalism and militarization, but Pheasant-Kelly emphasizes abjection and subjectivity over socio-political critique.

🔹 Gender Analysis Overshadowed

Although Pheasant-Kelly cites Tasker and Cornea, the article explicitly states it “moves away” from gendered analyses (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).

Critics might argue this sidelines important feminist and queer readings, especially since cyborg bodies are deeply tied to gender fluidity, masculinity, and femininity.

🔹 Narrow Film Corpus

Focuses almost exclusively on Terminator 2 (1991) and RoboCop (1987).
While these are canonical, critics could argue that a broader range of films (e.g., Ghost in the Shell, The Matrix, Ex Machina) would provide more comprehensive insights into post-human identity.

🔹 Theoretical Overlap / Lack of Originality

The article leans heavily on existing theorists (Kristeva, Haraway, Hayles, Baudrillard) without offering a fully distinct framework of its own.
Its contribution may be seen as application of theory to film, rather than producing new theoretical innovations.

🔹 Limited Engagement with Audience Reception

The reading assumes meaning is located in the text/film, but does not explore how audiences interpret cyborgs or how cultural contexts shape reception.

Critics might argue that a reception studies approach could enrich the analysis of cyborg subjectivity.

Representative Quotations from “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly with Explanation

🔑 Quotation	✍️ Explanation
🤖 “Boundary maintenance is integral to the coherent subject, both in relation to repression of corporeal abjection and to the preservation of ego” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).	Explains that subjectivity depends on stable boundaries between body/mind, human/machine — cyborgs threaten this stability.
🌀 “Abjection arises in ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).	Central theoretical anchor: cyborgs embody abjection because they occupy liminal, hybrid states.
🌐 “The posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation… embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 56).	Highlights contrast between abstract posthuman theory and Pheasant-Kelly’s stress on corporeal embodiment in film.
⚔️ “The updated Terminator is typified by a lack of the bodily definition that is so important to the masculinity of the bodybuilder” (Tasker, 1993, p. 83, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).	Shows how feminist/gender theory frames T101’s masculinity in contrast to T1000’s fluidity.
🩸 “As the T101 peels back the flesh, the now skeletal hand… provides a source of fascination and horror, both for Dyson’s family, and also for the spectator” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).	Example of abjection — grotesque mixing of flesh and metal, provoking simultaneous disgust and attraction.
👶 “Robocop’s prescribed diet of liquefied food, ‘a rudimentary paste’ that ‘tastes like baby food’, consolidates his semiotic, infantile status” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).	Connects cyborg identity to Kristeva’s semiotic chora, infantilization, and loss of subjectivity.
🪞 “Murphy’s self-recognition is an important stage in assuming his previous identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).	Refers to Lacan’s Mirror Stage — RoboCop recognizing himself restores subjectivity after abjection.
⚰️ “Real cyborgs, such as those patients on life-support machines, represent life perpetually on the brink of death” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).	Expands cinematic cyborg discourse into biopolitical/medical humanities, linking to debates about brain death.
🔄 “Like Terminator 2, Robocop demonstrates the impossibility of repressing identity within the post-hybrid body” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).	Suggests that despite technological programming, human identity resurfaces — subjectivity cannot be erased.
🧩 “The cybernetic organism may be post-human but is not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).	Key conclusion: Cyborgs destabilize boundaries but still negotiate identity and subjectivity, not pure loss of self.

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