“Conceptual Metaphor and Abstract Thought” by John Vervaeke & John M. Kennedy: Summary and Critique

🔍 1. Critique of Reductionism in Conceptual Metaphor Theory

• The authors argue that grounding all abstract thought in embodied metaphor leads to reductionism:

“The abstract matter… is being reduced to a more primitive material” (p. 215).

• They challenge the idea that metaphors fully govern abstract thought, stating:

“The target domain must have considerable premetaphoric structure to constrain the metaphoric selection of features” (p. 217).

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🧠 2. Premetaphoric Structure of Abstract Concepts

• Abstract domains are not blank slates; they influence how metaphors are applied:

“If the target domain were a conceptual blank slate… it is unclear why we would adopt or offer one metaphor over any other” (p. 217).

• The authors emphasize that metaphoric mapping is guided by prior conceptual understanding.

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🔄 3. Limits of Metaphor as Cognitive Explanation

• Metaphors do not constitute understanding; they enhance or highlight certain aspects:

“The example can be written… as a literal class inclusion statement” (p. 218).
“Our sense… constrains which source domain is chosen for a metaphor” (p. 219).

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🔍 4. Metaphor as Reformatting, Not Origin

• Instead of generating new concepts, metaphors reorganize or reframe existing ideas:

“A metaphor helps to structure pertinent properties in the desired order of salience” (p. 225).
“This structure helps to translate… into a more declarative format” (p. 225).

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🌐 5. Role of Spatial Mapping Beyond Embodiment

• Spatial metaphors are not solely derived from sensorimotor experience; they function as cognitive tools:

“Spatial relations are multimodal and therefore allow for the integration of information” (p. 223).
“Spatial relations… foster the noticing of higher-order invariants and patterns” (p. 223).

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🧰 6. Procedural Knowledge as a Basis for Metaphor

• Understanding abstract domains often relies on procedural, not declarative, knowledge:

“Procedural knowledge… plays a key role” (p. 224).
“Much of this information is encoded procedurally” (p. 225).

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🌀 7. Problems with Conceptual Blending Theory

• The authors reject blending theory as theoretically vague and unfalsifiable:

“Mental space theory can explain everything and thereby really explain nothing” (p. 228).
“Nothing could falsify it” (p. 228, citing Gibbs, 2001).

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🎭 8. Metaphor Evokes Experience, Not Literal Meaning

• Metaphors trigger cognitive responses rather than merely mapping literal features:

“What the metaphor ‘brings to the fore is the kind of emotions, comparisons, and expectations'” (p. 141, quoting Ritchie).
“The metaphor makes its target more vivid… not by content but by experience” (p. 225).

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✨ 9. Metaphor Supports but Does Not Define Abstract Thinking

• Metaphors are powerful cognitive aids, but abstract thought precedes and constrains them:

“Conceptual metaphor does not actually seem to be doing most of the important work in conceptual innovation” (p. 220).
“Metaphor… does not constitute the basis for understanding argument” (p. 219).

Cognitive Literary Theory

• 🧭 Challenges to Embodiment-Centric Readings: The article critiques Lakoff & Johnson’s claim that abstract thought is almost entirely derived from embodied metaphor, arguing instead for premetaphoric and cognitive structures that resist full reduction (p. 213–215, 217).
• 🧠 Highlights the Role of Procedural Knowledge: It introduces the importance of procedural cognition—nonverbal, ineffable know-how—in metaphor comprehension, providing a broader base for understanding narrative and poetic metaphor (p. 224–226).
• 📊 Supports Spatial-Cognitive Processing in Texts: By demonstrating how spatial mappings facilitate meaning, the article aligns with how readers interpret spatial-temporal relations in literary texts (p. 223–224).

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🔍 Metaphor Theory (within Literary Studies)

• 💥 Critique of Conceptual Metaphor Theory’s Circularity: The article warns that metaphor theories relying only on recurring metaphor families risk becoming unfalsifiable, weakening literary-critical claims (p. 216–217).
• 🪞 Reasserts the Agency of Target Domains: It emphasizes that target concepts (e.g., “argument,” “love”) are not passive recipients of metaphorical structure—they constrain and reshape metaphors themselves (p. 217–218).
• 🌱 Introduces Transmetaphoric Innovation: The authors explore how novel metaphors emerge from dissatisfaction with existing ones, which is essential for understanding literary creativity and metaphorical innovation in poetry and fiction (p. 219–221).

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⚖️ Post-Structuralism / Deconstruction

• ❌ Unsettles Binary Oppositions in Metaphor Source–Target Relations: The article resists the strict hierarchy between source (embodied) and target (abstract), opening space for a non-linear, recursive interplay between domains (p. 220–222).
• 📉 Disrupts Foundations of “Literal vs. Metaphorical”: The critique of direct/indirect knowledge distinctions challenges assumptions about literalism—a key target in deconstructionist critiques (p. 221–222).

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🧬 Narratology & Semiotics

• 🧩 Promotes Multimodal Understanding: Drawing on spatial and procedural mappings, the article connects with narrative structures and how they encode abstract concepts like agency, causality, and time (p. 223–224).
• 🎭 Acknowledges Salient Performative Impact of Metaphors: The discussion of metaphor “experience” (Ritchie’s term) is akin to reader-response theories that emphasize metaphor’s affective engagement (p. 141–142).

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🧠 Philosophy of Language & Hermeneutics

• 🧱 Emphasizes Preconceptual Constraints in Meaning: Meaning is not only projected from metaphors but also arises from prior, often procedural, structures in thought, echoing hermeneutic emphasis on the “already-understood” (p. 217; p. 220).
• 🔄 Reframes Understanding as a Bidirectional Process: Rather than a unidirectional flow from metaphor to meaning, the article posits a dynamic interaction—deeply resonant with Gadamerian hermeneutics (p. 220–223).

• ⚖️ Overemphasis on Reductionism Claim
  While Vervaeke & Kennedy argue conceptual metaphor theory is overly reductionist, they may oversimplify the nuanced positions of Lakoff & Johnson, especially by focusing on extreme interpretations and downplaying the flexibility built into the theory.

“We argue that in fact [Ritchie] did not escape the problem” (p. 215)

• 🔁 Neglect of Embodiment’s Empirical Base
  The authors criticize the embodiment hypothesis as insufficient, yet they do not engage deeply with empirical evidence from neuroscience and psycholinguistics that supports embodied cognition (e.g., Gibbs, 2003).

Their challenge to embodiment relies more on logical critique than empirical falsification.

• 🔍 Ambiguity in Defining Procedural Knowledge
  The concept of procedural knowledge is central to their alternative, yet they do not offer a clear operational definition or method for measuring it in metaphor comprehension. This makes their theory difficult to test or apply consistently.

“Procedural similarity probably plays a significant role…” (p. 225)

• 🌀 Dismissal of Conceptual Blending Is Incomplete
  Their critique of conceptual blending theory is valid in parts (e.g., lack of falsifiability), but they overlook blending theory’s success in modeling novel metaphors and creative linguistic constructions, especially in poetry and narrative.

“Conceptual blending theory… fails as a theoretical framework” (p. 227)

• 🔄 Possible Circularity in Pre-Metaphoric Structure Argument
  Their claim that metaphor relies on pre-existing cognitive structures risks its own circularity: how are these premetaphoric understandings formed if not through metaphorical language itself, especially in early cognition?

“Initial independence sets up the opportunity for metaphor” (p. 220)

• 🧩 Philosophical Tension in ‘Literal vs Metaphoric’ Distinction
  They rely on the literal/metaphoric divide to argue against metaphor theory but this dichotomy has been widely challenged as unstable in both literary theory and cognitive science (e.g., Davidson, 1978; Black, 1979).

“Literal aspects… have played a significant role…” (p. 218)

• ⚙️ Limited Scope of Application
  While their model works well in certain scientific or analytic contexts, it may struggle to explain the cultural, affective, and poetic depth of metaphor in literature and myth, where embodied metaphor often flourishes.
• ❌ Dismisses Metaphor’s Generative Role Too Quickly
  By positioning metaphors as interpretive rather than generative, they underplay how metaphors can create new understanding, not just shape or reflect existing structures.

“The metaphor… does not constitute the basis for understanding argument.” (p. 219)