“Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck: Summary and Critique

Introduction: “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

Table of Contents

“Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit” by Hans Maes and Katrien Schaubroeck first appeared in Bullshit and Philosophy, edited by Gary Hardcastle and George Reisch, published in 2006 by Open Court (pp. 171–182). This influential essay builds upon Harry Frankfurt’s seminal work On Bullshit by critically engaging with its premises and extending the philosophical investigation into bullshit as a multifaceted cultural and epistemic phenomenon. While Frankfurt defined bullshit as speech characterized by a lack of concern for the truth and a deceptive stance about that indifference, Maes and Schaubroeck argue that this account is overly narrow. They expand the taxonomy of bullshit by identifying three distinct types: (1) Frankfurtian bullshit—driven by indifference to truth, (2) Cohenian bullshit—exemplified by impenetrably obscure academic discourse, and (3) pseudoscientific bullshit—which is sincere but epistemically flawed due to poor logic and disregard for empirical standards. Importantly, they challenge the normative assumption that all bullshit is morally or intellectually pernicious, suggesting instead that certain forms (like casual banter or social politeness) can foster human warmth and sociability. This nuanced approach contributes to literary theory and philosophy by reframing bullshit not merely as a moral lapse but as a complex discursive practice shaped by context, intention, and communicative goals. The essay remains vital in cultural criticism and literary studies for its implications on authenticity, sincerity, and the ethics of communication in literature and beyond.

Summary of “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 1. Introduction: Extending Frankfurt’s Analysis

The essay responds to the popularity of Harry Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit” by both endorsing and extending his core thesis.
Maes and Schaubroeck argue that Frankfurt’s definition is limited: it only explains one kind of bullshit among many “flowers in the lush garden of bullshit” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 323).

They propose an enriched typology that adds nuance and explores bullshit’s evaluative complexity—i.e., not all bullshit is bad.

🔹 2. Frankfurt’s Definition of Bullshit

Frankfurt defines bullshit as characterized by indifference to the truth:
“a lack of connection to a concern with truth – [an] indifference to how things really are” (✶Frankfurt, p. 33).
A bullshitter is unlike a liar: the liar knows the truth but distorts it, while the bullshitter doesn’t care whether what they say is true or not.

Bullshit involves deception about one’s epistemic stance, not about facts per se:
“What he cares about is what people think of him” (✶Frankfurt, p. 18).
Frankfurt makes a sharp distinction between bull sessions (exploratory and unconstrained by truth but not deceptive) and actual bullshit (which entails a pretense) (✶Frankfurt, p. 38).

🔹 3. Critique of Frankfurt – Two Key Revisions

a. Pretence is not essential

The authors challenge Frankfurt’s insistence on pretence: not all bullshit involves fakery.

Case in point: Fania Pascal’s remark to Wittgenstein, “I feel just like a dog that has been run over,” lacks pretence but is still labeled bullshit due to her indifference to the truth (✶Pascal, 1984, p. 29).
Conclusion: “A mere indifference to the truth is apparently all that is needed” for bullshit.

b. Bullshit can be benign or even good

Not all bullshit is harmful or morally reproachable:
- Comforting words in painful moments,
- Social politeness (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6),
- Casual banter (✶Ishiguro, 1999, pp. 257–258),
- Witty epigrams by Oscar Wilde (✶Maes & Schaubroeck).

Thus, bullshit can promote social cohesion and warmth, even if not concerned with truth.

🔹 4. Cohen’s Response: Academic Bullshit

G.A. Cohen critiques Frankfurt for ignoring another kind of bullshit found in academia: unclear, unclarifiable writing.
His test: “Add or subtract a negation sign… if plausibility is unaffected, it’s likely bullshit” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 333).

Cohen-bullshit = sincere but obscure, impenetrable prose with no clear connection to truth—often seen in certain academic or continental philosophical texts.

🔹 5. A Third Kind: Pseudoscientific Bullshit

Neither Frankfurt’s nor Cohen’s model adequately explains pseudoscientific bullshit (e.g., astrology, water crystals, chakra kits).
Characteristics:
- Producers are not indifferent to truth—they sincerely believe in their claims.
- Their work is not unclarifiable—often it is quite specific and literal.
Authors propose a third kind defined by:
- Insensitivity to evidence and
- Logical fallacies (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 333).

This category is especially dangerous due to its impact on public health, science, and politics.

🔹 6. Final Takeaway: A Pluralist Theory of Bullshit

The authors outline three main types:
1. Frankfurt-bullshit: Indifference to truth, often hidden.
2. Cohen-bullshit: Obscure and unclarifiable academic writing.
3. Pseudoscientific bullshit: Specific, sincere, but epistemically flawed.
They call for a more nuanced evaluation, noting that bullshit is not monolithic in origin, form, or moral weight.

“Bullshit” may at times be socially necessary, linguistically rich, and even charming—a fact Frankfurt underestimates.

📚 Key Quotations

“Bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.” (✶Frankfurt, p. 61)
“The explicandum that attracted his interest is just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit.” (✶Cohen, 2002, p. 323)

“A bit of bullshit from time to time might even be a good thing.” (✶Maes & Schaubroeck)
“If I say, ‘How nice to see you,’ you know perfectly well that this is not meant as a report of my true feelings.” (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6)

Theoretical TermsTheoretical Terms/Concepts in “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 Term/Concept	📘 Explanation	🔖 Reference
✴ Frankfurtian Bullshit	A form of discourse defined by an indifference to the truth and accompanied by pretence; the speaker is unconcerned with how things really are but aims to appear otherwise.	Frankfurt defines bullshit as speech marked by a “lack of connection to a concern with truth” and deception about this indifference (Frankfurt, On Bullshit, p. 33, 54).
✴ Pretence	The act of concealing one’s disregard for the truth—this pretence is, for Frankfurt, what distinguishes bullshit from non-bullshit talk such as joking or speculation.	Frankfurt asserts that bullshit involves “misrepresentation of what one is up to,” making pretence an “indispensably distinctive characteristic” (Frankfurt, p. 54).
✴ Bull Session	Informal, playful discussions that are unconstrained by truth but lack any pretence; participants are not committed to their statements, which makes it unlike true bullshit.	Frankfurt distinguishes bull sessions by noting “there is no pretence that [a connection between belief and statement] is being sustained” (Frankfurt, p. 38).
✴ Cohenian Bullshit	A category of bullshit that results not from insincerity but from a text’s unclarifiable obscurity; typical of certain academic or philosophical writings.	Cohen describes bullshit as “unclarifiable unclarity,” particularly in texts that are “incapable of being rendered unobscure” (Cohen, Deeper into Bullshit, p. 333).
✴ Unclarifiable Unclarity	A type of obscurity in writing that cannot be corrected without changing the meaning; it renders discussion of truth irrelevant.	Cohen explains that when a text remains plausible even after adding or subtracting a negation, “one may be sure that one is dealing with bullshit” (Cohen, p. 333).
✴ Benign Bullshit	Bullshit that serves social or emotional purposes—such as politeness or small talk—rather than intending to deceive; it is tolerated or even appreciated in many contexts.	Nagel argues polite formulae like “How nice to see you” are not dishonest because “the conventions that govern them are generally known” (Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, p. 6).
✴ Pseudoscientific Bullshit	Sincere but flawed speech that lacks empirical rigor and logical validity, such as astrology or pseudomedical claims; it does not fit Frankfurt or C

Contribution of “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck to Literary Theory/Theories

📚 1. Reader-Response Theory

Contribution: Emphasizes the interpretive variability of bullshit depending on the audience’s expectations and tolerance.

Details:
- Wittgenstein’s rejection of Fania Pascal’s remark shows that what counts as bullshit can vary based on reader/hearer disposition (✶p. 5).
- Frankfurt calls Wittgenstein’s reaction “absurdly intolerant,” suggesting that interpretation depends heavily on context and reception (✶p. 31).
- This aligns with reader-response theorists like Stanley Fish, who stress that meaning is not fixed, but generated in the encounter between text and reader.

🧠 2. Pragmatics & Speech Act Theory

Contribution: Refines understanding of illocutionary force in literary and everyday language.
Details:
- The distinction between lying and bullshitting hinges on the speaker’s intention and relation to truth, which directly connects to Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts (✶p. 4).
- Example: The 4th of July orator doesn’t lie, but presents a performative act of fakery—“What he cares about is what people think of him” (✶p. 18).
- Polite expressions like “How nice to see you” are explored as non-informative, socially strategic utterances (✶Nagel, 2002, p. 6).

🌀 3. Postmodern Theory

Contribution: Engages with the plurality and instability of meaning, especially in relation to academic and pseudoscientific discourse.
Details:
- Cohenian bullshit critiques the deliberate obscurity of poststructuralist/continental texts, revealing how meaning becomes unanchored (✶p. 9–10).
- The essay exposes how bullshit thrives in the postmodern condition, where truth, clarity, and meaning are no longer fixed points.
- The very fact that bullshit can be “benign” or “neutral” echoes Lyotard’s distrust of grand, moralizing truth claims (✶p. 8).

📏 4. Ethics of Representation in Literary Criticism

Contribution: Challenges traditional views of veracity and sincerity in literary and public discourse.

Details:
- Frankfurt’s idea that “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies” (✶p. 61) raises ethical stakes in representation—particularly in fiction and rhetoric.
- Maes and Schaubroeck question whether a concern for truth should always govern discourse, a central issue in narrative ethics (✶p. 8–9).
- The evaluation of Oscar Wilde’s “brilliant examples of bullshit” (✶p. 8) reframes performative, non-literal language as ethically complex rather than merely deceptive.

🔮 5. Critical Theory & Ideology Critique

Contribution: Illuminates how bullshit serves ideological purposes in advertising, politics, and pseudoscience.
Details:
- Frankfurt locates bullshit in “advertising, public relations, and politics,” where statements aim to manipulate rather than inform (✶p. 22).
- Maes and Schaubroeck add pseudoscientific discourse as another ideological terrain: astrology, numerology, etc., promote false epistemologies under sincere guises (✶p. 10–11).
- This echoes Althusserian notions of ideological state apparatuses that circulate truth-like discourse to maintain power structures.

🗣️ 6. Dialogism (Bakhtinian Literary Theory)

Contribution: Recognizes bullshit as dialogic, context-sensitive language that shifts meaning through interaction.
Details:
- The discussion on bull sessions and casual bullshit (e.g., Pascal’s remark or social banter) shows how language meaning emerges in social contact (✶p. 6–7).
- These instances align with Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia—multiple speech types coexisting within discourse, not all aiming at truth.
- Bullshit, in this light, becomes a genre of social language use, co-shaped by speaker and listener.

🧪 7. Epistemic Criticism

Contribution: Pushes for a literary epistemology that assesses not only what is said but how truth is treated in discourse.

Details:
- The three kinds of bullshit (Frankfurtian, Cohenian, Pseudoscientific) map how different discourses relate to evidence, clarity, and truthfulness (✶p. 11).
- This serves as a model for critiquing literary and theoretical texts that may appear profound but lack epistemic accountability.
- Echoes epistemic critics like Linda Alcoff or Miranda Fricker, who examine power, knowledge, and credibility in speech.

Examples of Critiques Through “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

🔹 Poem	🧠 Bullshit Type	📘 Critique Through Maes & Schaubroeck	🔖 Reference from Article
✴ “My President” by Tracy K. Smith	✴ Frankfurtian Bullshit (subverted)	Uses political praise language ironically. The poem critiques rather than participates in bullshit. Shows awareness of political performance and insincerity.	“What [the bullshitter] cares about is what people think of him. He wants them to think of him as a patriot” (p. 4).
✴ “Poem” by Frank O’Hara	✴ Benign Bullshit	Casual language and scattered topics show indifference to truth, yet serve a social and aesthetic function. This is bullshit, but non-deceptive and playful.	“Bull sessions… unconstrained by a concern with truth… but with no pretence involved” (p. 3).
✴ “Introduction to Poetry” by Billy Collins	✴ Cohenian Bullshit (mild satire)	Satirizes academic analysis of poetry, implying critics often over-interpret and obscure meaning. Mocks the unclarifiable unclarity often found in literary theory.	“Unclarifiable texts… are incapable of being rendered unobscure… they constitute a kind of bullshit” (p. 10).
✴ “The Second Coming” by W. B. Yeats (classic)	✴ Cohenian Bullshit	Dense symbolism, prophetic tone, and philosophical vagueness mark it as an example of poetic abstraction that risks interpretive bullshit.	“Texts that are obscure and unclarifiable… represent a distinct kind of academic bullshit” (p. 10).

Criticism Against “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck

❗ Overextension of the Concept of Bullshit

Critique: The authors expand Frankfurt’s concept too broadly by removing pretence as an essential condition of bullshit.
Issue: By allowing any speech that is indifferent to truth (even sincere or casual) to be called “bullshit,” they risk diluting the term into vagueness.

Example: Labeling expressions like “I feel like a dog that’s been run over” as bullshit (per the Wittgenstein example) stretches the definition to include everyday, benign utterances.

❗ Collapse of the Distinction Between Bullshit and Ordinary Speech

Critique: The paper blurs the boundary between bullshit and casual, non-truth-committed talk such as jokes, metaphors, or expressions of emotion.

Consequence: This leads to a slippery slope where poetic, humorous, or empathetic language might be unfairly delegitimized.
Concern: Critics may argue this pathologizes ordinary human communication under the banner of philosophical critique.

❗ Insufficient Criteria for Evaluating Pseudoscientific Bullshit

Critique: While the authors identify pseudoscientific bullshit as a third type, they provide no detailed framework for analyzing it.

Gap: The lack of theoretical development makes their treatment of pseudoscientific bullshit underdeveloped compared to Frankfurtian or Cohenian types.
Quote: “These effects certainly warrant further investigation… But this is not the right place to carry out this investigation.” (p. 11)

❗ Inconsistent Handling of Intentionality

Critique: The paper waffles on whether the speaker’s intention matters in defining bullshit.

Contradiction: While Frankfurt places emphasis on the speaker’s indifference and concealment, Maes & Schaubroeck sometimes ignore intention entirely (e.g., bull sessions and poetic metaphors).
Effect: This inconsistency creates ambiguity: Is bullshit defined by mindset, effect, or structure?

❗ Undermines Frankfurt’s Moral Critique

Critique: By accepting forms of benign or even “positive” bullshit, the authors weaken Frankfurt’s ethical stance that bullshit is a grave threat to truth and reason.

Implication: They potentially normalize or excuse bullshit under certain social circumstances (e.g., comforting lies, polite phrases, “banter”).
Challenge: Critics may argue this relativism erodes the civic and epistemic urgency behind Frankfurt’s warning.

❗ Ambiguity in Classifying Bullshit in Literature

Critique: The paper doesn’t clearly differentiate between rhetorical style, artistic ambiguity, and academic bullshit in cultural texts.

Risk: The overlap between poetic license and bullshit becomes dangerously vague, risking misuse in literary criticism.

Representative Quotations from “Different Kinds And Aspects Of Bullshit” By Hans Maes And Katrien Schaubroeck with Explanation

🔖 Quotation	📘 Explanation
1. “Bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are.”	This emphasizes the unique threat posed by bullshit: it erodes the foundations of truth-seeking by disregarding truth altogether, unlike lies, which at least engage with it.
2. “The bullshitter is not trying to deceive anyone concerning American history. What he cares about is what people think of him.”	Illustrates how the bullshitter prioritizes impression management over factual content—particularly relevant in political rhetoric and performative nationalism.
3. “An unclarifiable text is not only obscure but is incapable of being rendered unobscure… one may be sure that one is dealing with bullshit.”	From Cohen’s critique: academic or philosophical language that cannot be clarified or paraphrased becomes epistemically void, exemplifying intellectual bullshit.
4. “Pretence is not an essential ingredient of bullshit.”	The authors challenge Frankfurt by arguing that indifference to truth alone—without deceptive intent—can qualify as bullshit, as in metaphorical or careless expressions.
5. “Bullshit is not always a bad thing… it can be a source of human warmth.”	Offers a sociolinguistic defense of some forms of bullshit, such as humor, banter, or comforting talk, which serve valuable interpersonal and emotional purposes.
6. “Polite formulae are a sine qua non of a stable society… Polite bullshit is often to be preferred to truthful expressions of hostility.”	Drawing on Thomas Nagel, the authors show how socially accepted insincerity (e.g., small talk) can sustain civility and protect against conflict.
7. “Pseudoscientists… are not indifferent to the truth… Cohen’s and Frankfurt’s definitions do not apply.”	Points to a major gap: pseudoscientific bullshit is committed to false claims but often sincerely—posing a new category not captured by Frankfurt or Cohen.
8. “Wittgenstein found Pascal’s indifference to the truth intolerable… Pascal was playing fast and loose with the facts.”	Reflects on Wittgenstein’s rigid demand for truth even in metaphor, contrasting with most people’s tolerance for expressive or figurative speech.
9. “The very term ‘bull session’ is most likely an abbreviation or sanitized version of ‘bullshit session’.”	Undermines Frankfurt’s sharp distinction between bull sessions and bullshit, suggesting they may lie on a spectrum of truth-indifference.
10. “It is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.”	Ends with a pragmatic epistemic stance: cautioning against rigid literalism and highlighting the practical value of intuitive or approximative truth.

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