“I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman: Summary and Critique

Introduction: “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

“I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman first appeared in The European Journal of Women’s Studies in 2003. In this article, Tatman interrogates the theological underpinnings of Donna Haraway’s concept of the cyborg, arguing that Haraway’s reliance on Christian metaphors—such as incarnation, salvation history, apocalypse, and the Garden of Eden—renders the cyborg less a radical break from tradition and more a rearticulation of Christian soteriological myths. Tatman suggests that despite Haraway’s insistence that the cyborg is “outside salvation history” (Haraway, 1991a, p. 150), the figure paradoxically echoes the role of a savior, blending theological imagery with technological modernity. By situating the cyborg within the Christian symbolic universe, Tatman reveals the extent to which notions of apocalypse, divine transcendence, and redemption continue to structure even ostensibly posthuman imaginaries (Tatman, 2003, pp. 52–54). Her critique matters for literature and literary theory because it underscores how theological narratives persist within feminist and posthuman discourse, raising questions about the boundaries between myth, metaphor, and materiality. In literary studies, Tatman’s essay expands the interpretive horizon of cyborg theory by showing how religious tropes shape narratives of technology, embodiment, and liberation, thus complicating Haraway’s vision of the cyborg as a wholly secular and emancipatory figure.

Summary of “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

1. Haraway’s Cyborg and Christian Theology

Tatman argues that Donna Haraway’s cyborg imagery is deeply indebted to Christian theological metaphors, despite Haraway’s claims of radical rupture.
Haraway repeatedly uses terms such as “incarnation,” “salvation history,” “apocalypse,” and “Garden of Eden” (Tatman, 2003, p. 51).

These references signal that the cyborg may not exist “outside salvation history,” as Haraway claims, but is instead tightly coupled with Western Christian symbolic traditions (p. 52).

2. Cyborg as a Savior-Figure

Tatman contends that Haraway’s cyborg assumes a soteriological role, functioning like a modern savior.
She asks whether Haraway is “offering cyborgs as the saviours of the 21st century” and argues that indeed, cyborgs are imagined as liberators for the marginalized and despised (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).

This parallels Christian salvation narratives, where divine figures intervene on behalf of the oppressed.

3. Problematic Theological Dependence

Haraway asserts that the cyborg is “outside salvation history” and “without innocence” (Haraway, 1991a, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 52).
Yet Tatman demonstrates that Haraway paradoxically places the cyborg in the Garden, albeit without God’s omniscient gaze (Tatman, 2003, p. 53).

This shows an inescapable reliance on theological frameworks, even in supposedly post-theological discourse.

4. The Origin Story of Cyborgs

Contrary to Haraway’s insistence that cyborgs lack an origin story, Tatman traces their genesis to the 19th century, linking them to:
- Heilsgeschichte (salvation history),
- The Industrial Revolution, and
- Marxist thought (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).
This “trinitarian union” situates cyborgs within both technological and theological histories, undermining their supposed mythic autonomy.

5. Apocalypse and Eschatology

Tatman highlights Haraway’s neglect of the epistemological aspects of apocalypse, focusing only on its teleological “end” dimension.
Apocalyptic texts, she notes, were written by and for the oppressed, revealing divine mysteries rather than literal predictions of doom (Tatman, 2003, p. 56).
Haraway’s cyborgs inherit this apocalyptic heritage, becoming “apocalyptic creatures – not by choice, but by birthright” (p. 57).

6. Cyborgs as Diasporic and God-like

Cyborgs, Tatman writes, are diasporic beings with no homeland and no covenant with God, but nonetheless resemble God in their omnipresence and technological power (Tatman, 2003, pp. 58–59).
Haraway herself admits that “modern machinery is an irreverent upstart god, mocking the Father’s ubiquity” (Haraway, 1991a, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 59).
Thus, cyborgs function as a new incarnation of divinity, even while rejecting the transcendent Father God.

7. Salvation by Cyborg vs. Salvation by God

Tatman argues that the “cyborg incarnation” mirrors Christian salvation history rather than escaping it.
Both assume:
- (a) a human need for salvation, and
- (b) salvation occurring in historical time (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).

Haraway’s insistence that cyborgs are outside salvation history, Tatman suggests, is undermined by her continual use of theological language (p. 60).

8. The Danger of Indifference

Tatman concludes that the gravest danger of cyborgs is not their non-innocence, but their inherited capacity for indifference (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).
She contrasts this with the metaphor of “sin,” which preserves passion and embodied humanity: “The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate” (p. 63).

For survival, Tatman insists, it may be the sinner—embodied, passionate humanity—rather than the indifferent cyborg, that saves us in the end.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

Term/Concept	Reference	Detailed Explanation
Cyborg (🤖)	“What do you get when you combine three biotech companies, a handful of patents, and a Noah’s Ark full of cloned animals? . . . Farmers are already cloning prized cows and pigs, a practice that will balloon if, as expected, the Food & Drug Administration approves the marketing of milk and meat from clones later this year.” (Weintraub and Keenan, 2002: 94), but central to Tatman’s analysis: “I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	The cyborg is a central hybrid figure in Donna Haraway’s work, representing beings that are part animal, part machine, blurring boundaries between natural and artificial. Tatman argues that Haraway’s cyborg is ontologically dependent on Christian theological metaphors, portraying it as a savior-like entity outside traditional salvation history but ironically tied to it. It lacks an origin story in the Western sense, is without innocence, and is situated in a non-innocent Garden of Eden. Cyborgs are diasporic, non-innocent creatures born from the Industrial Revolution, salvation history, and Marxist thought, capable of subverting or enacting apocalypse, embodying irreverent gods, and potentially indifferent like the monotheistic God. Tatman prefers the “sinner” over the cyborg for its passionate, embodied humanity that might ensure survival.
Ontology (🧠)	“Two years ago there were still some people who were fascinated, shocked and excited and concerned by Haraway’s bold claim that ‘we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology’; that we humans are ‘creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted’.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	Ontology refers to the nature of being or existence. In the article, Tatman explores how Haraway’s cyborg ontology—defining human existence as hybrid animal-machine entities—is dependent on Christian theological frameworks like salvation history and transcendent God. This dependency reveals a “tight coupling” between cyborgs and Western Christian symbols, making cyborgs not truly outside theological narratives but ontologically linked to concepts of incarnation, apocalypse, and divine indifference. Tatman critiques this as problematic from a feminist theological perspective, suggesting cyborg ontology inherits godly traits like omnipotence and indifference, potentially leading to disembodied, passionless existence.
Salvation History (Heilsgeschichte) (📜)	“To begin with, ‘salvation history’ is the English translation of the German term Heilsgeschichte, a uniquely Christian theological term which, unlike cyborgs-according-to-Haraway, does have an origin story.” (Tatman, 2003: 55)	Salvation history, or Heilsgeschichte, is a 19th-century Christian theological concept originating from J.C. von Hofmann, viewing history as a progressive divine intervention toward salvation of the elect. Tatman links it to the Industrial Revolution and eschatology, arguing Haraway’s cyborg, despite claims of being outside it, is inseparably tied to this narrative. Cyborgs emerge from this history combined with machines and Marxist revolution, embodying progress (smooth or violent) and apocalyptic ends. This dependency matters as it positions cyborgs within a Christian framework of divine action in history, yearning for salvation, and potential indifference, contrasting Haraway’s blasphemous myth.
Apocalypse (💥)	“Haraway appreciates the fact that they are about The End, but not the fact that they are also about knowledge, knowledge that does not end when the story does, if it does.” (Tatman, 2003: 56)	Apocalypse means revelation or unveiling, a subcategory of eschatology involving symbolic, cataclysmic imagery of end times, not meant literally but as divine truth for the oppressed. Tatman traces its Jewish roots and Christian inheritance, noting its 19th-century resurgence amid industrial fears. Haraway uses it to describe cyborgs subverting “the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust,” but Tatman argues cyborgs are apocalyptic creatures by birthright, capable of enacting or virtualizing ends. This matters as it ties cyborgs to theological hopes/fears of final judgment, progress, and destruction, potentially satisfying curiosity through virtual apocalypses to avoid real ones, but risking godly indifference.
Salvation (✝️)	“The notion of ‘salvation by cyborg’ is of course rather different from that of ‘salvation by God’, but it seems to me that both sorts of salvation assume (a) a human need for it, and (b) that salvation must (or has, or will, or just possibly might) happen in history.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	Salvation refers to deliverance from sin or harm, often through divine intervention in Christian theology. Tatman critiques Haraway’s “cyborg soteriology” as a problematic savior-myth akin to salvation by Christ, offering liberation for the marginalized but dependent on theological models like incarnation and history. Cyborgs are positioned as 21st-century saviors, subverting apocalypse, but inheriting needs for historical salvation and godly traits. This feminist theological issue highlights assumptions of human need for salvation in history, potentially leading to colonization-like missionary zeal, with Tatman favoring sinful passion over cyborg indifference for true regeneration.
Second Coming (🔄)	“Cyborgs seem to be quite stubbornly attached to it, perhaps even more stubbornly attached to this particular rubbish-strewn garden than those who dream of ‘the Second Coming and their being raptured out of the final destruction of the world’.” (Tatman, 2003: 54)	The Second Coming is the eschatological return of Christ for final judgment and salvation. Tatman metaphorically equates cyborgs to this, as incarnate gods present on earth, omnipotent yet impotent in alleviating suffering, racing toward immortality via technology. Cyborgs embody this through destructive capabilities and hopes for technological miracles restoring Eden. This dependency on Christian models matters as it reveals cyborgs’ non-innocence, enacting god-tricks and temptations of omnipotence, potentially forcing conversions like missionaries, but also offering potential for subverting real apocalypses through virtual ones.
Sin (😈)	“The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate, and as capable of acting on their passion, their desire.” (Tatman, 2003: 61)	Sin represents human non-innocence, fleshliness, passion, and capacity for harm in Christian theology. Tatman contrasts cyborg non-innocence (indifferent, disembodied) with sinfulness (passionate, embodied), arguing Haraway’s cyborgs inherit godly indifference as “Our Father’s sin.” Preferring to be a “sinner than a cyborg,” Tatman suggests nurturing the sinful human animal—desire-seeking and responsive—for survival, as it counters cyborg apathy in facing suffering. This critiques cyborg ontology’s theological ties, emphasizing passion over technological detachment.
Incarnation (👥)	“Although Haraway writes that ‘the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,’ lacking an ‘origin story in the Western sense,’ and ‘completely without innocence’, she nonetheless situates cyborgs in ‘the Garden’, albeit a Garden lacking the omniscient gaze of a transcendent God.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	Incarnation is the theological concept of divine becoming flesh, as in Christ. Tatman argues Haraway’s “cyborg incarnation”—merging organism and machine—is not outside salvation history but dependent on it, making cyborgs irreverent gods incarnate. This tight coupling reveals ontological links to transcendent God, with cyborgs enacting Second Coming-like presence, but risking indifference and omnipotence. It matters as it positions cyborgs within Christian narratives of divine embodiment, blending flesh/technology in a blasphemous yet faithful myth.
Garden of Eden (🌳)	“Nevertheless, I would suggest that unless a cyborg can imagine, and can imagine in horrifying detail, ‘returning to [silicon] dust’, then there is no sense in Haraway’s desire ‘to see if cyborgs can subvert the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust’, no sense to her affirmation that cyborgs might weave something other than ‘a shroud for the day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends salvation history’.” (Tatman, 2003: 53)	The Garden of Eden symbolizes original innocence and paradise before the Fall in Christian myth. Haraway places cyborgs in a non-innocent Garden without transcendent God or expulsion, rejecting return to dust. Tatman sees paradox: cyborgs’ attachment to this “rubbish-strewn garden” ties them to theological origins, yearning for restoration via technology. This dependency highlights cyborgs’ non-innocence and potential to perceive any place as garden, but risks apocalyptic destruction or indifferent salvation.
Transcendent God (☁️)	“It is clear that she is not advocating faith in a transcendent, omnipotent and very masculine Father God.” (Tatman, 2003: 53)	Transcendent God is the omnipotent, omniscient, indifferent monotheistic deity above history. Tatman argues Haraway’s rejection of this “god-trick” (all-seeing illusion) still ontologically ties cyborgs to it, as they embody godly traits like space-viewing and ubiquity. Cyborgs are made in this God’s image, irreverent upstarts mocking yet inheriting indifference. This matters in revealing cyborgs’ positive relation to theology, potentially leading to disembodied apathy rather than passionate response.
God-trick (🎭)	“She is particularly disdainful of the all-seeing god-trick in ‘Situated Knowledges’.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	The god-trick is Haraway’s term for the illusion of objective, all-seeing knowledge like a transcendent God. Tatman notes Haraway forbids it but cyborgs commit it daily via technology (e.g., satellites). This dependency on theological models exposes cyborgs’ temptations toward immortality and omnipotence, within salvation history, risking indifference and colonization.
Blasphemy (⚡)	“With these words Donna Haraway begins ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’: This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. . . . Blasphemy protects one from the Moral Majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. . . . At the center of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.” (Tatman, 2003: 52-53)	Blasphemy is irreverent speech against sacred things, which Haraway uses faithfully in her cyborg myth to protect from internal moralism while insisting on community. Tatman sees it as Haraway’s strategy, making cyborgs blasphemous saviors welcoming to outcasts, echoing Christian narratives but subverting them. This ironic faith reveals deep theological dependency, enabling liberation myths but tied to salvation history.
Eschatology (⏳)	“There is thus a strongly eschatological dimension to Heilsgeschichte, or a concern with last or end times.” (Tatman, 2003: 55)	Eschatology is the study of end times, emerging in the 19th century amid industrial changes. Tatman links it to Heilsgeschichte and apocalypse, arguing cyborgs’ origins in this era make them eschatological beings obsessed with progress and ends. This matters as it positions cyborgs within Christian fixations on “The End,” potentially subverting real apocalypses through virtual ones.
Diaspora (🌍)	“It is awfully curious to me that she writes that, for cyborgs, ‘the task is to survive in the diaspora’.” (Tatman, 2003: 58)	Diaspora refers to dispersed peoples without homeland, like Jews post-Temple destruction. Tatman applies it to cyborgs as placeless, email-addressed beings without divine covenant or promised land. This ties cyborgs to Jewish apocalyptic traditions, making survival in dispersion their key task, delighting in temporary homes, potentially cultivating gardens anywhere but risking indifference.
Soteriology (🛡️)	“I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)	Soteriology is the study of salvation. Tatman critiques Haraway’s cyborg as a soteriological figure, offering salvation by technology akin to Christ, problematic for feminists due to patriarchal ties. Cyborgs address human woundedness with regeneration dreams, but within salvation history, tempting god-like goals and enacting missionary colonization.

Contribution of “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman to Literary Theory/Theories

1. Feminist Theory and Posthumanism

Tatman critiques Haraway’s cyborg as a feminist icon by situating it within Christian soteriological frameworks.
Contribution: She challenges the posthuman feminist claim that the cyborg transcends traditional narratives, arguing instead that Haraway’s “cyborg soteriology” mirrors problematic structures of salvation theology (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).

This reorients feminist theory to acknowledge that supposedly radical metaphors may still be constrained by patriarchal-religious traditions.

2. Literary Theology (Religion in Literary Criticism)

Tatman demonstrates that Haraway’s texts are unintelligible without their theological references: “take away these theological/religious concepts, and I suggest one is left with practically no meaningful content whatsoever” (Tatman, 2003, p. 53).
Contribution: She integrates theological hermeneutics into literary/posthuman criticism, showing that literary theory must account for the persistence of Christian metaphors in cultural texts—even when deployed ironically.

This strengthens the theoretical bridge between theology and literature, situating cyborg discourse in the tradition of Heilsgeschichte (salvation history).

3. Critical Theory (Frankfurt School / Marxist Dimensions)

Tatman links cyborg origins to the Industrial Revolution, Marxist critique, and salvation history as a “trinitarian union” (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).
Contribution: This Marxist-inflected reading positions the cyborg as both a product of industrial capitalism and a myth of historical progress, thereby embedding Haraway’s myth in ideology critique.

In literary theory, this expands cyborg studies beyond feminist identity politics into a critique of capitalism, technology, and historical materialism.

4. Apocalyptic and Eschatological Narratives

Tatman shows that Haraway’s cyborg inherits the apocalyptic imagination, becoming an “apocalyptic creature – not by choice, but by birthright” (Tatman, 2003, p. 57).
Contribution: She reads the cyborg as part of apocalyptic narrative traditions in literature, aligning it with genres of revelation, catastrophe, and redemption.

For literary theory, this situates the cyborg alongside symbolic structures of eschatology and apocalypse, reinforcing Catherine Keller’s argument that apocalypse “metabolizes within us and outside of ourselves” (Keller, 1996, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 57).

5. Poststructuralism and Deconstruction

Tatman identifies paradoxes in Haraway’s insistence that the cyborg is outside salvation history, arguing: “The lady protests too much, methinks” (Tatman, 2003, p. 60).
Contribution: This deconstructive gesture reveals how Haraway’s discourse remains entangled in what it denies—illustrating Derrida’s principle that exclusions still carry traces of what they reject.

Thus, Tatman contributes to poststructuralist literary theory by exposing the cyborg as a text haunted by Christian metaphysical binaries.

6. Diaspora and Cultural Identity Theory

Tatman reframes the cyborg as a diasporic creature, with “no homeland” and only an “email address” as its permanent identity marker (Tatman, 2003, p. 58).
Contribution: This adds a diaspora studies dimension to literary theory, connecting the cyborg to displacement, hybridity, and fractured belonging.

It opens cyborg discourse to postcolonial literary analysis by aligning cyborg ontology with migrant and diasporic subjectivities.

7. Ethics, Embodiment, and Affect Theory

Tatman contrasts the metaphor of the sinner (embodied, passionate, desiring) with the cyborg’s indifference: “What scares me the most about cyborgs is… our Godly and technological capacity for indifference” (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).
Contribution: She extends affect theory and embodiment studies by foregrounding passion, desire, and flesh as ethical correctives to technological abstraction.

This positions literary theory to consider how metaphors of sin and salvation preserve embodied humanity in contrast to disembodied, indifferent cyborg logics.

Examples of Critiques Through “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

Poem	Critique Through Tatman’s Lens
“The Second Coming” – W. B. Yeats	Yeats’s apocalyptic imagery of the beast “slouching toward Bethlehem” resonates with Tatman’s claim that cyborgs inherit apocalyptic birthright (Tatman, 2003, p. 57). The poem’s eschatological dread mirrors the cyborg-God as a destructive, indifferent force. ⚡🔥👁️
“God’s Grandeur” – Gerard Manley Hopkins	Hopkins celebrates divine immanence in nature, but Tatman would critique this reliance on salvation history and covenantal imagery. She’d argue that cyborg discourse similarly recycles theological metaphors, even when claiming rupture. 🌿✝️✨
“The Waste Land” – T. S. Eliot	Eliot’s fragmented modernist text echoes Tatman’s concern with diaspora and loss of sacred origins. Just as Tatman calls cyborgs diasporic creatures without homeland (p. 58), Eliot portrays cultural exile and yearning for restoration through myth and ritual. 🌍💔🌀
“Dover Beach” – Matthew Arnold	Arnold laments the decline of faith, which parallels Tatman’s critique of the indifference of cyborgs. The poem’s “eternal note of sadness” reflects her warning that technological-cyborg identities risk losing passion, embodiment, and human sinfulness (p. 63). 🌊😔🕯️

Criticism Against “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

⚡ Over-Theologizing Haraway

Tatman arguably overstates the role of Christian theology in Haraway’s cyborg theory.
Critics may argue that Haraway’s use of terms like salvation, apocalypse, or Garden is largely metaphorical and ironic, not evidence of ontological dependence.

Tatman risks collapsing playful metaphor into theological determinism.

🔄 Paradox of Deconstruction

Tatman critiques Haraway for being unable to escape salvation history but simultaneously uses Haraway’s own metaphors against her.
This could be seen as a circular critique—accusing Haraway of entanglement while reinforcing the same entanglement through Tatman’s own reading.

📜 Historical Essentialism

Tatman links cyborg origins to a “trinitarian union” of salvation history, Industrial Revolution, and Marxist thought (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).

Critics might see this as overly essentialist and historically reductive, ignoring non-Western and non-Christian traditions that shape technological imaginaries.

🌀 Neglect of Posthuman Potential

By emphasizing theological entrapment, Tatman downplays Haraway’s radical feminist potential of the cyborg as a tool of resistance and hybridity.
Her reading risks flattening cyborg discourse into theology, leaving little space for posthuman or queer futurities.

🌍 Eurocentric Framing

Tatman situates cyborg identity primarily in Western Christian symbolic systems.
Critics may argue this neglects global, pluralistic, and indigenous perspectives on technology, embodiment, and myth.

❤️ Preference for “Sinner” Over Cyborg

Tatman concludes that “the sinner, not the cyborg, may save us” (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).

This metaphor risks romanticizing human sinfulness while underestimating technological embodiment as a site of passion and agency.
Critics may view this as a nostalgic retreat into theological humanism.

Representative Quotations from “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman with Explanation

Quotation	Explanation
“What do you get when you combine three biotech companies, a handful of patents, and a Noah’s Ark full of cloned animals? . . . Farmers are already cloning prized cows and pigs, a practice that will balloon if, as expected, the Food & Drug Administration approves the marketing of milk and meat from clones later this year.” (🧬) (Weintraub and Keenan, 2002: 94, cited in Tatman, 2003: 51)	This opening quotation sets a provocative tone by linking biotechnology and cloning to biblical imagery (Noah’s Ark, milk and honey). Tatman uses it to question whether technological advancements fulfill or distort sacred promises, framing the cyborg as a modern, unsettling reality that challenges traditional notions of creation and divine providence, introducing her critique of Haraway’s cyborg as a quasi-theological entity.
“Two years ago there were still some people who were fascinated, shocked and excited and concerned by Haraway’s bold claim that ‘we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology’.” (🤖) (Tatman, 2003: 52, citing Haraway, 1991a: 150)	Tatman highlights Haraway’s assertion that cyborgs define human existence as hybrid animal-machine entities. She notes the fading shock value, suggesting society’s growing indifference to cyborgization, setting up her argument that Haraway’s cyborg is deeply tied to Christian theological frameworks, despite claims of being outside them, revealing an ontological dependency on salvation history.
“I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (🛡️) (Tatman, 2003: 52)	Tatman positions Haraway as a prophetic figure whose cyborg vision offers a salvation narrative akin to Christian soteriology, problematic for feminists due to patriarchal theological ties. She critiques the cyborg as a savior-figure that assumes a human need for historical salvation, potentially replicating oppressive dynamics like missionary colonization.
“Although Haraway writes that ‘the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,’ lacking an ‘origin story in the Western sense,’ and ‘completely without innocence’, she nonetheless situates cyborgs in ‘the Garden’.” (👥) (Tatman, 2003: 52, citing Haraway, 1991a: 150, 151, 157)	This quote critiques Haraway’s paradoxical claim that cyborgs exist outside salvation history while placing them in a theological Garden of Eden. Tatman argues this reveals a “tight coupling” with Christian narratives, as cyborgs embody an incarnation-like merging of flesh and machine, undermining Haraway’s attempt to divorce them from theological origins and highlighting their non-innocent, god-like traits.
“This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification.” (⚡) (Tatman, 2003: 52-53, citing Haraway, 1991a: 149)	Quoting Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Tatman underscores the blasphemous nature of Haraway’s cyborg myth, which takes theological concepts seriously to subvert them. This irony enables a feminist liberation narrative but ties cyborgs to Christian frameworks, as blasphemy requires engagement with the sacred, making cyborgs both subversive and dependent on theology.
“To begin with, ‘salvation history’ is the English translation of the German term Heilsgeschichte, a uniquely Christian theological term which, unlike cyborgs-according-to-Haraway, does have an origin story.” (📜) (Tatman, 2003: 55)	Tatman introduces Heilsgeschichte, contrasting Haraway’s claim that cyborgs lack an origin story. She argues cyborgs are born from 19th-century salvation history, Industrial Revolution, and Marxist thought, linking them to Christian narratives of divine progress, positioning cyborgs within a theological framework of historical salvation, challenging their supposed independence.
“First, apocalyptic literature is, as a genre, strange. Characterized by richly symbolic language, including a great deal of cataclysmic ‘natural’ upheaval and bloody confrontations between good and evil, such texts are not meant to be taken literally.” (💥) (Tatman, 2003: 56)	Tatman explains apocalyptic literature’s symbolic, non-literal intent, which Haraway overlooks in her focus on cyborgs subverting apocalyptic ends. Cyborgs, as apocalyptic creatures, inherit theological hopes and fears, potentially virtualizing apocalypses to avoid real ones, but risking indifference in their god-like capacity to imagine and enact destruction.
“Cyborgs are made (at least partially) in the image of God, and know this even better, perhaps, than the most fervent Christian fundamentalist.” (☁️) (Tatman, 2003: 59)	Tatman argues that cyborgs, despite Haraway’s rejection of a transcendent God, embody divine traits like omnipresence and omniscience (e.g., seeing from space). This ontological relation to the Christian God reveals cyborgs’ non-innocence and potential for indifference, mirroring the monotheistic God’s detachment, which Tatman critiques as a dangerous inheritance.
“The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate, and as capable of acting on their passion, their desire.” (😈) (Tatman, 2003: 61)	Tatman contrasts the embodied, passionate nature of sinners with the disembodied, indifferent cyborgs, advocating for nurturing human sinfulness—passion and desire—over cyborg apathy, which inherits the “Father’s sin” of indifference, emphasizing the need for fleshy responsiveness to counter theological and technological detachment.
“It may be neither the God nor the machine but the passionate, pleasure-and-knowledge-seeking human animal in us we need to nurture for our survival. Or, it may be the sinner, not the cyborg, that saves us in the end.” (🌍) (Tatman, 2003: 61)	Tatman’s concluding argument rejects cyborg salvation in favor of the sinner’s passionate humanity, warning that cyborgs’ god-like indifference, tied to theological and technological origins, threatens survival. Embracing the human animal’s desire and embodiment offers a feminist alternative to the cyborg’s potentially colonizing, apathetic soteriology, reasserting agency in a diasporic world.

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