“Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce: Summary and Critique

“Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum and Christine Pierce, first appeared in Analysis in 1976, examines how defenses of sexist practices in contemporary philosophy often rely on principles that are implicitly racist.

"Implicit Racism" by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce

“Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum and Christine Pierce, first appeared in Analysis in 1976, examines how defenses of sexist practices in contemporary philosophy often rely on principles that are implicitly racist. The authors argue that justifications for institutionalized sexism—such as those based on tradition (the conservative defense), statistical differences (the pseudo-liberal defense), and individual choice (the libertarian defense)—can also be applied to uphold racial discrimination. They demonstrate how philosophers like J.R. Lucas, W.T. Blackstone, and W.E. Cooper use arguments that, if taken to their logical conclusion, could justify racial prejudice in hiring, institutional policies, and social roles. By drawing parallels between sexism and racism, the article exposes the flawed logic in these philosophical positions and challenges the notion that sexist discrimination can be justified while racial discrimination cannot. This work is significant in literary theory and feminist philosophy as it critiques the intersection of gender, race, and institutional bias, highlighting how implicit biases operate under seemingly neutral principles. It contributes to critical race theory and feminist critique by demonstrating how oppression is often justified through appeals to cultural norms and pseudo-scientific reasoning.

Summary of “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce

1. Implicit Racism in Defenses of Sexism

  • The article argues that many justifications for sexism are implicitly racist because they rely on principles that could also be used to justify racial discrimination (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 91).
  • The authors examine three common defenses of sexist practices:
    • The Conservative Defense
    • The Pseudo-Liberal Defense
    • The Libertarian Defense

2. The Conservative Defense: Tradition as Justification for Discrimination

  • This argument claims that established prejudices should be preserved in law and policy.
  • J.R. Lucas argues that sexist employment policies are justified because people “recognise that a person’s sex can reasonably be regarded as relevant to his or her suitability for particular posts” (Lucas, 1973, pp. 166-168, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92).
  • The authors point out that this reasoning could also justify racial discrimination, as some people historically saw “boss-servant roles in racial terms” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).

3. The Pseudo-Liberal Defense: Using Statistical Differences to Justify Discrimination

  • Some philosophers argue that equal opportunity should depend on further investigation into gender differences.
  • W.T. Blackstone suggests that gender equality “would be correct only if all relevant facts, characteristics, or circumstances… were independent of gender” (Blackstone, 1975, p. 247, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).
  • J.R. Lucas extends this reasoning by saying that “the more integrally and the more invariably a difference is connected with a person’s sex, the more we are entitled to insist that the mere fact of being male or female can constitute a conclusive reason against being allowed to do something” (Lucas, 1973, p. 167, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).
  • Ketchum and Pierce argue that this logic can be applied to race, justifying discriminatory hiring practices if statistical differences exist between racial groups, leading to racial bias in employment (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).

4. The Libertarian Defense: Defending Discrimination as a Matter of Choice

  • W.E. Cooper defends sexist institutions by appealing to individual freedom, arguing that people should be free to choose traditional gender roles (Cooper, 1975, p. 256, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
  • The authors criticize this argument by showing that the same logic could be used to justify racial oppression, arguing that if Black individuals “choose” lower-status positions, this could be seen as legitimizing racial discrimination (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).
  • They note that no one argues for the right of Black people to be treated as slaves, yet Cooper uses similar reasoning to defend sexism (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).

5. Critique of These Defenses

  • The authors argue that these defenses of sexism fail to recognize how discrimination is institutional and systemic, rather than a matter of personal choice.
  • They point out that all three defenses imply that societal change should only happen if sexist or racist attitudes disappear naturally, rather than being challenged through policy and law (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 96).

6. Conclusion: Challenging Implicit Bias in Justifications of Inequality

  • The authors conclude that justifications for sexism often rely on principles that could be applied to racism, exposing the hidden racial biases in these philosophical defenses (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 96).
  • They argue for a more critical approach to discrimination, one that does not rely on cultural traditions, statistical differences, or individual choices as justifications for inequality (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 97).

Key Takeaways

  • Sexist defenses often rest on arguments that could justify racial discrimination.
  • Conservative, pseudo-liberal, and libertarian defenses of sexism reinforce implicit racism.
  • Discrimination should be challenged systematically, not passively accepted as tradition or personal preference.
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce
Theoretical Term/ConceptDefinition/ExplanationReference from the Article
Implicit RacismThe idea that arguments defending sexism often rely on principles that can also be used to justify racial discrimination, even if not explicitly stated.“Several articles which defend sexist practices are implicitly racist… principles that apply to the areas where sexism and racism are similar” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 91).
The Conservative DefenseA justification for discrimination based on tradition and cultural norms, arguing that established social structures should not be altered.“If attitudes and habits of discrimination are sufficiently integral to the culture, discriminatory policies and laws are justified” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92).
The Pseudo-Liberal DefenseA justification that argues equality must wait for further evidence about gender differences, often relying on statistical correlations to justify discrimination.“The more integrally and the more invariably a difference is connected with a person’s sex, the more we are entitled to insist that the mere fact of being male or female can constitute a conclusive reason against being allowed to do something” (Lucas, 1973, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).
The Libertarian DefenseAn argument that claims individual freedom justifies sexist practices, suggesting that discrimination is acceptable if it results from free choices.“The inequalities Jaggar deplores may arise because of the way that free men and women choose to lead their lives” (Cooper, 1975, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
Institutional DiscriminationThe idea that discrimination is not just a matter of individual prejudice but is built into legal, social, and economic structures, reinforcing inequality.“One person cannot be discriminated against as a woman without there being some practice or policy of discrimination which would affect other women who might not so choose” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).
Comparative OppressionThe concept that arguments used to justify one form of oppression (sexism) can also be applied to another (racism), revealing inconsistencies in justifications for discrimination.“A racist who thinks of servility and deference as essential characteristics of negritude will have as much difficulty taking orders from a Black boss as will a sexist who thinks of a woman boss as inappropriate” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).
Social ConstructivismThe idea that gender and race roles are not biologically determined but are created and reinforced by societal norms and institutions.“Neither Blackstone nor Lucas explains why he thinks that hiring people on the basis of sex—and, within the favored sex, on qualifications—would be so much easier and more beneficial than hiring on the basis of individual qualifications” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
Moral Relativism in DiscriminationThe flawed argument that if a group accepts their own discrimination, then it is morally permissible.“One could produce a racially just society by convincing Blacks that they are better off as slaves, servants, and manual laborers” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).
False Equivalence in DiscriminationThe claim that discriminating against an individual based on group statistics is justifiable, comparing it to generalized policies like speed limits.“Lucas argues for institutionalizing sexist discrimination in such cases on the analogy of the speed limit” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
Systemic OppressionThe recognition that oppression is not just about individual choices but is maintained through social, economic, and legal systems.“Such institutions regulate and affect people other than those who choose them” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).
Contribution of “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce to Literary Theory/Theories

1. Critical Race Theory (CRT)

  • Revealing the Overlap Between Sexism and Racism:
    • The article argues that philosophical justifications for sexism often rely on principles that could also justify racism, thus exposing the implicit racism within arguments defending gender inequality.
    • “Several articles which defend sexist practices are implicitly racist… principles that apply to the areas where sexism and racism are similar” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 91).
  • Exposing Institutional Racism Through Gender Analysis:
    • The study shows how institutional discrimination is defended using logic that maintains both racial and gender hierarchies.
    • “A racist who thinks of servility and deference as essential characteristics of negritude will have as much difficulty taking orders from a Black boss as will a sexist who thinks of a woman boss as inappropriate” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).

2. Feminist Theory

  • Intersectionality of Gender and Race:
    • The article precedes and informs later feminist theories of intersectionality, showing how sexist oppression often mirrors racial oppression.
    • “The conservative argument policies directed against racism or sexism can be justified only if the society is not racist or sexist” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).
  • Critique of Gender-Based Essentialism:
    • Challenges the pseudo-liberal argument that women’s roles should be determined by biology or statistical differences, a concept later addressed by feminist theorists like Judith Butler.
    • “The more integrally and the more invariably a difference is connected with a person’s sex, the more we are entitled to insist that the mere fact of being male or female can constitute a conclusive reason against being allowed to do something” (Lucas, 1973, cited in Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).

3. Postcolonial Theory

  • Colonial Logic in Justifications of Oppression:
    • The article highlights how the same arguments used to justify sexism were used historically to uphold colonialism and racial hierarchy.
    • “If a widespread association between the role of priest or the role of soldier and maleness justifies excluding women from professions related to those roles, similar associations would justify excluding Blacks” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92).
  • Cultural Norms as Justifications for Discrimination:
    • The conservative defense of discrimination as “tradition” parallels colonial arguments for maintaining racial hierarchies in occupied territories.
    • “If attitudes and habits of discrimination are sufficiently integral to the culture, discriminatory policies and laws are justified” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92).

4. Social Constructivism

  • Critique of Biological Determinism:
    • The authors challenge the idea that social roles are dictated by biological sex or race, instead arguing that they are social constructs reinforced by power structures.
    • “Neither Blackstone nor Lucas explains why he thinks that hiring people on the basis of sex—and, within the favored sex, on qualifications—would be so much easier and more beneficial than hiring on the basis of individual qualifications” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
  • Discrimination as a Socially Maintained System:
    • The article supports later social constructivist theories by demonstrating that discrimination persists not due to natural differences but due to constructed social norms.
    • “One person cannot be discriminated against as a woman without there being some practice or policy of discrimination which would affect other women who might not so choose” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).

5. Legal and Political Philosophy

  • Critique of Libertarian Defenses of Discrimination:
    • The authors challenge libertarian arguments that discrimination should be a matter of free choice, pointing out that discrimination is systemic and affects all individuals within an oppressed group.
    • “Such institutions regulate and affect people other than those who choose them” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).
  • Opposing the “Consent” Argument for Inequality:
    • They argue that just because individuals “choose” to accept lower status does not mean the discrimination is justifiable—a key critique of laissez-faire approaches to social justice.
    • “One could produce a racially just society by convincing Blacks that they are better off as slaves, servants, and manual laborers” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).

6. Moral and Ethical Philosophy

  • Moral Critique of Discrimination Justifications:
    • The article challenges the idea that discrimination is morally acceptable if it is statistically or culturally justified.
    • “Lucas argues for institutionalizing sexist discrimination in such cases on the analogy of the speed limit” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94).
  • Critique of Relativism in Discrimination:
    • The authors expose the danger of moral relativism in justifications of racism and sexism, showing how similar reasoning has historically been used to justify slavery and segregation.
    • “No articles in the literature champion the rights of Blacks to be treated as inferior (or to be slaves if they want to be) in order to safeguard their freedom, and Cooper offers no reason for granting such rights to sexists while not granting them to racists” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95).

7. Influence on Intersectionality Studies

  • Early Formulation of Intersectionality Concepts:
    • The article precedes and contributes to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s later work on intersectionality, which examines how multiple forms of discrimination overlap.
    • “Policies directed against racism or sexism can be justified only if the society is not racist or sexist” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93).

Conclusion: Broader Impact on Literary and Social Theory

  • Implicit Racism bridges multiple literary, social, and philosophical disciplines, offering an early critique of implicit bias, intersectionality, and institutional discrimination.
  • The study challenges sexist and racist justifications by exposing their shared logic, laying groundwork for later scholarship in critical race theory, feminist theory, and postcolonial studies.
  • It remains an important work in understanding how social injustices are justified through flawed philosophical reasoning, making it a foundational text in intersectional and social justice studies.
Examples of Critiques Through “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce
Literary Work & AuthorCritique Through “Implicit Racism”
“Oroonoko” (1688) – Aphra Behn– The novel portrays Oroonoko as noble yet enslaved, reinforcing hierarchical racial structures where exceptionalism is the only path for Black agency. – This aligns with the pseudo-liberal defense, which justifies discrimination by using statistical differences or exceptions rather than individual merit. – “Lucas argues for institutionalizing sexist discrimination in such cases on the analogy of the speed limit” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94), meaning that if the majority of a group lacks qualifications, discrimination against all members is justified.
“The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn” (1885) – Mark Twain– The character Jim is depicted as submissive and deferential, reflecting the conservative defense of racial roles that justifies discrimination based on ingrained cultural attitudes. – The novel critiques racism but also reinforces racial paternalism, much like how sexist justifications claim that women benefit from oppression. – “A racist who thinks of servility and deference as essential characteristics of negritude will have as much difficulty taking orders from a Black boss as will a sexist who thinks of a woman boss as inappropriate” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93), meaning that racist logic prevents acceptance of leadership by marginalized groups.
“Heart of Darkness” (1899) – Joseph Conrad– Conrad’s portrayal of Africa as a place of darkness and primitivism reflects implicit racist logic, assuming that certain races are inherently suited for subjugation. – This aligns with the conservative defense, which maintains that societal prejudices should be upheld because they are deeply embedded in culture. – “If attitudes and habits of discrimination are sufficiently integral to the culture, discriminatory policies and laws are justified” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92), meaning that systemic racism is legitimized by tradition.
“To Kill a Mockingbird” (1960) – Harper Lee– Atticus Finch’s moral defense of Tom Robinson represents a pseudo-liberal framework, where a single act of justice is framed as progress, while systemic racism remains unchallenged. – This parallels pseudo-liberal arguments against gender equality, which claim change must be slow and incremental, relying on the goodwill of privileged groups rather than legal or systemic reform. – “The conservative argument policies directed against racism or sexism can be justified only if the society is not racist or sexist” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93), meaning that discrimination is only opposed when it is no longer socially accepted.
Criticism Against “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce

1. Overgeneralization of Philosophical Arguments

  • The article groups different sexist defenses under a broad framework, treating them as if they uniformly support racial discrimination.
  • Some philosophers might argue that not all justifications for sexism inherently translate to racism, making the comparison too broad and generalized.
  • “Several articles which defend sexist practices are implicitly racist” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 91). → While this is a valid observation, it does not account for nuanced defenses of sexism that may not rely on racial logic.

2. Lack of Empirical Evidence for Implicit Racism in Sexist Defenses

  • The article critiques theoretical defenses of sexism without providing historical or empirical evidence of these arguments being used to justify racial discrimination in real-world policies.
  • “A racist who thinks of servility and deference as essential characteristics of negritude will have as much difficulty taking orders from a Black boss as will a sexist who thinks of a woman boss as inappropriate” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93). → This analogy is strong in theory but lacks direct case studies or real-life examples demonstrating that the same logic has been applied in legal or policy decisions.

3. Limited Engagement with Intersectionality

  • The article presents sexism and racism as parallel but separate issues, rather than acknowledging how they intersect in the lived experiences of women of color.
  • While it identifies the connection between racial and gender oppression, it does not fully engage with the complexities of intersectionality, a concept later developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw in Mapping the Margins (1991).
  • “Policies directed against racism or sexism can be justified only if the society is not racist or sexist” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93). → This critique is valid, but does not explore how Black women or other marginalized groups experience overlapping forms of discrimination.

4. Philosophical vs. Legal Perspectives on Discrimination

  • The article frames discrimination as a matter of philosophical logic but does not deeply engage with legal and sociopolitical contexts where sexism and racism function differently.
  • Some sexist policies were legally challenged earlier than racist ones (e.g., women’s suffrage in some Western countries before civil rights for racial minorities). This suggests that philosophical justifications for sexism and racism have historically functioned differently in law and governance.

5. Absence of Counterarguments from Opposing Philosophers

  • While the article critiques Lucas, Blackstone, and Cooper, it does not engage with responses from other contemporary philosophers who may reject sexist arguments without endorsing racism.
  • “Neither Blackstone nor Lucas explains why he thinks that hiring people on the basis of sex… would be so much easier and more beneficial than hiring on the basis of individual qualifications” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94). → The lack of opposing perspectives limits the depth of the debate, making the argument appear one-sided.

6. Potential Misinterpretation of Libertarian Thought

  • The article critiques libertarian defenses of sexism but may oversimplify their position on individual freedom.
  • It implies that libertarianism passively allows discrimination, rather than recognizing that libertarians advocate for non-interference by the state, not necessarily endorsing discrimination itself.
  • “Such institutions regulate and affect people other than those who choose them” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95). → While valid, this critique does not fully consider libertarian responses that distinguish between personal discrimination and institutionalized oppression.

7. Lack of Cross-Cultural Analysis

  • The article focuses on Western philosophical debates without considering how sexism and racism are justified differently across cultures.
  • Non-Western perspectives on discrimination may not align with the conservative, pseudo-liberal, and libertarian defenses described in the paper.

Representative Quotations from “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce with Explanation
QuotationExplanation
“Several articles which defend sexist practices are implicitly racist… principles that apply to the areas where sexism and racism are similar.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 91)Establishes the article’s main thesis: that defenses of sexism rely on principles that can also justify racism, revealing hidden biases in philosophical arguments.
“If attitudes and habits of discrimination are sufficiently integral to the culture, discriminatory policies and laws are justified.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 92)Critiques the conservative defense of discrimination, which argues that prejudices should be preserved because they are part of tradition. This logic could justify both racial and gender discrimination.
“A racist who thinks of servility and deference as essential characteristics of negritude will have as much difficulty taking orders from a Black boss as will a sexist who thinks of a woman boss as inappropriate.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93)Draws a parallel between racist and sexist attitudes, showing how both forms of discrimination assume certain groups should be subordinate.
“The conservative argument policies directed against racism or sexism can be justified only if the society is not racist or sexist.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 93)Critiques the circular reasoning used in conservative defenses, which claim that change should only happen once discrimination has already disappeared—making change impossible.
“Lucas argues for institutionalizing sexist discrimination in such cases on the analogy of the speed limit.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94)Criticizes pseudo-liberal justifications for discrimination, which argue that broad rules (e.g., hiring restrictions for women) are justified if a statistical majority lacks certain qualifications.
“Neither Blackstone nor Lucas explains why he thinks that hiring people on the basis of sex—and, within the favored sex, on qualifications—would be so much easier and more beneficial than hiring on the basis of individual qualifications.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 94)Challenges pseudo-liberal defenses of discrimination, arguing that hiring should be based on individual merit, not gender or racial categories.
“One person cannot be discriminated against as a woman without there being some practice or policy of discrimination which would affect other women who might not so choose.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95)Critiques the libertarian defense of discrimination, which claims that discrimination is acceptable if individuals choose it (e.g., a woman choosing to be in a traditional role). The authors argue that individual choices affect systemic discrimination.
“One could produce a racially just society by convincing Blacks that they are better off as slaves, servants, and manual laborers than they would be if they had opportunity equal to those of Whites.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95)Uses a satirical analogy to expose the flaws in libertarian arguments, showing that acceptance of discrimination does not make it just.
“Such institutions regulate and affect people other than those who choose them.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95)Argues that social institutions create and sustain discrimination, rather than it being an issue of personal choice.
“No articles in the literature champion the rights of Blacks to be treated as inferior (or to be slaves if they want to be) in order to safeguard their freedom, and Cooper offers no reason for granting such rights to sexists while not granting them to racists.” (Ketchum & Pierce, 1976, p. 95)Critiques philosophers who defend sexism while rejecting racism, exposing inconsistencies in their logic.
Suggested Readings: “Implicit Racism” by Sara Ann Ketchum And Christine Pierce
  1. Ketchum, Sara Ann, and Christine Pierce. “Implicit Racism.” Analysis, vol. 36, no. 2, 1976, pp. 91–95. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3327100. Accessed 11 Mar. 2025.
  2. Banks, Antoine J., and Heather M. Hicks. “Fear and Implicit Racism: Whites’ Support for Voter ID Laws.” Political Psychology, vol. 37, no. 5, 2016, pp. 641–58. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44132916. Accessed 11 Mar. 2025.
  3. Quillian, Lincoln. “Does Unconscious Racism Exist?” Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 1, 2008, pp. 6–11. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20141814. Accessed 11 Mar. 2025.

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