“Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell: Summary and Critique

“Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell first appeared in 2001 in the Humboldt Journal of Social Relations (Vol. 26, Nos. 1/2, pp. 154–173), a double issue published by the Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University, and preserved via JSTOR.

"Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion" By Robert A. Campbell: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell

“Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell first appeared in 2001 in the Humboldt Journal of Social Relations (Vol. 26, Nos. 1/2, pp. 154–173), a double issue published by the Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University, and preserved via JSTOR. In this essay, Campbell argues that Haraway’s famous “cyborg manifesto” functions less as a socialist-feminist rupture than as a legitimating myth for the United States’ technoscientific civil religion—relocating “salvation” from grace or liberation to the embrace of a hybrid world where boundaries between human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/non-physical dissolve (Campbell 2001, 154–156, 160–164). He reads Haraway’s “ironic political myth” and stance of “blasphemy” as rhetorically dazzling yet complicit with techno-optimism, ultimately making the cyborg a carrier of a new salvation history rather than an escape from it (Campbell 2001, 155–166). By situating Haraway against broader debates on civil religion, technological mysticism, and redemptive technology (e.g., Wuthnow; Stahl), Campbell’s article is important to literature and literary theory because it reframes posthumanist imagery and feminist technoscience not merely as cultural critique but as theology-laden narrative—showing how figurative constructs (myth, irony, trope) mediate power, belief, and the sacred within late-modern discourse (Campbell 2001, 166–169, 171–173).

Summary of “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell

Haraways Cyborg as Political Myth

  • Campbell argues that Haraway frames the cyborg as an “ironic political myth” faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism, but also as blasphemy within U.S. civil religion traditions (Haraway, 1985:65; Campbell, 2001, p. 156).
  • Myth here functions as a legitimating narrative—a worldview that provides coherence and authority (Campbell, 2001, pp. 156–157).

Blasphemy vs. Apostasy

  • Haraway adopts the stance of the blasphemer (insider critic), not the apostate (outsider), to challenge dominant religious-political traditions while still working within them (Campbell, 2001, pp. 157–158).
  • This position acknowledges the pervasive American civil religion that merges Christianity with national identity (Campbell, 2001, p. 158).

Irony as Strategy and Its Limits

  • Haraway employs irony as “humor and serious play”, but Campbell critiques this as rhetorical ambiguity that risks misinterpretation and undermines her critique (Haraway, 1985:65; Campbell, 2001, pp. 158–159).
  • Instead of subverting technological civil religion, her irony may inadvertently affirm it (Campbell, 2001, p. 159).

Technology as Civil Religion

  • Campbell, drawing on Wuthnow, argues that technology has replaced older legitimating myths in American civil religion, offering tangible “this-worldly” salvation (Wuthnow, 1988:282–291; Campbell, 2001, pp. 160–161).
  • Haraway’s work, despite its critique, affirms this myth by grounding salvation in technoscientific progress (Campbell, 2001, pp. 161–162).

Breakdown of Western Dualisms

  • Haraway’s cyborg challenges three key dualisms:
    1. Human/Animal – rejecting human exceptionalism (Haraway, 1985:68).
    2. Organism/Machine – merging biology and technology (Haraway, 1985:99).
    3. Physical/Non-physical – integrating spirituality with technoscience (Haraway, 1985:70; Campbell, 2001, pp. 162–164).
  • Campbell argues these dissolutions lead to a holistic “cyborg salvation history” (p. 164).

Cyborg as Carrier of Salvation History

  • The cyborg is not outside history but becomes the “carrier” of salvation history, embodying humanity’s hopes through technology (Campbell, 2001, p. 164).
  • Unlike Christian salvation rooted in divine grace, Haraway’s is a technological soteriology—salvation through technoscience (Campbell, 2001, pp. 164–165).

Haraways Religious Language

  • Haraway borrows heavily from religious tropes such as witnessing, blasphemy, and salvation (Haraway, 1997:47, 120; Campbell, 2001, pp. 164–166).
  • Campbell notes parallels to biblical narratives (e.g., Babel, Pentecost) in her use of “speaking in tongues” (Haraway, 1985:101; Campbell, 2001, p. 165).

Cyborg Myth as Techno-Optimism

  • Campbell critiques Haraway for reinforcing a techno-celebratory worldview, where technology itself becomes the site of redemption (Campbell, 2001, pp. 166–168).
  • Scholars such as Hochman and Stahl similarly argue that Haraway’s utopian vision downplays the environmental and capitalist costs of technology (Campbell, 2001, pp. 168–169).

Future of Religion: Techno-Mysticism

  • The cyborg embodies a fusion of science and religion, creating a technological mysticism or implicit religion of technology (Stahl, 1999:13; Campbell, 2001, pp. 167–169).
  • Salvation is redefined as becoming light, energy, and signals—a new civil religion of technoscience (Haraway, 1985:70; Campbell, 2001, p. 169).

Final Claim: No Postmodern Reality

  • Campbell concludes that Haraway’s work, despite its postmodern rhetoric, offers no real rupture—“the stark reality about postmodern reality is that there is no such thing” (Campbell, 2001, p. 169).
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell
Term / ConceptExplanationReference
✦ Cyborg salvation historyCampbell’s central term: the cyborg becomes the “carrier” of salvation, shifting hope from divine grace or liberation politics to technoscientific becoming.“The cyborg is not outside salvation history; the cyborg is the ultimate ‘carrier’ of that history” (Campbell, 2001, p. 164).
✶ Ironic political mythHaraway frames her manifesto as an ironic myth; Campbell critiques irony as rhetorical play that risks reinforcing what it critiques.“Haraway indicates that her work is to be seen as an ‘ironic political myth’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 156).
✹ Blasphemy (vs. apostasy)Haraway adopts the stance of insider-critic (“blasphemer”) rather than outsider (“apostate”), working within U.S. civil religion.“Blasphemy is not apostasy… the blasphemer is an insider acting as critic” (Campbell, 2001, p. 157).
✪ Legitimating mythHaraway’s cyborg functions as a legitimating myth—a worldview giving coherence to technoscience and politics.“Evidence… warrants a more complex interpretation of myth as ‘legitimating myth’ or ‘plausibility structure’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 156).
❂ Civil religion (technological)Technology replaces Christianity/nationalism as America’s sacred myth; Haraway’s rhetoric affirms this new civil religion.“Haraway’s work… offers further legitimation for the technological myth that undergirds the civil religion of the United States” (Campbell, 2001, p. 154).
⚙︎ TechnoscienceThe fused domain of science and technology grounds Haraway’s cyborg and salvation narrative.“Her ‘mutant modest witness’… will live in a world of technoscience” (Campbell, 2001, p. 162).
☍ Crisis of legitimationPost-WWII myths of American supremacy falter; technology steps in as new legitimating myth.“A ‘crisis of legitimation’… the old myths that maintained the perception of American supremacy no longer seem plausible” (Campbell, 2001, p. 160).
⇄ Breakdown of dualismsHaraway dissolves human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/non-physical binaries.“Haraway’s manifesto is based on the breakdown of three traditional (modern Western) boundaries” (Campbell, 2001, p. 162).
✥ Cyborg as image / carrierThe cyborg is a rhetorical and historical figure embodying salvation within technoscience.“The cyborg… becomes part of the ‘natural’ order… the ultimate ‘carrier’ of that history” (Campbell, 2001, p. 164).
☼ New monotheism of light/signalsSalvation is reimagined as energy, signals, and immanence of technoscience.“This is a new monotheism, where matter and energy, body and spirit collapse into light” (Campbell, 2001, p. 169).
♲ Technological mysticismFaith in universal efficacy of technology operates as hidden religion.“Stahl describes… ‘technological mysticism,’ a ‘faith in the universal efficacy of technology’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 167).
✧ Redemptive technology vs. techno-optimismCampbell contrasts humane ideals of justice/limits with Haraway’s techno-celebration.“Haraway… wields this sexy metaphor to sell the dated agenda of techno-optimism” (Campbell, 2001, p. 166).
✢ Modest witnessHaraway’s self-description embeds religious language of witnessing and salvation in technoscience.“Haraway… would like to see her ‘mutant modest witness’… live in a world of technoscience” (Campbell, 2001, p. 162).
✎ Speaking in tongues / heteroglossiaHaraway invokes biblical language of tongues to describe transgressive rhetoric.“Blasphemers can strike fear… by adopting a ‘powerful infidel heteroglossia’ and ‘speaking in tongues’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 165).
☵ Spiral dance / dialecticA metaphor for life evolving through constructive/destructive interplay, linked to DNA.“Haraway also argues… bound up in the ‘spiral dance’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 165).
∞ Grand narrative / theory of everythingHaraway, despite anti-metanarrative stance, produces a universal salvation story through the cyborg.“In pursuing a postmodern aversion… Haraway stumbled into the grandest narrative of all” (Grassie, cited in Campbell, 2001, p. 167).
⊙ Immanentism / holismTranscendence replaced by an immanent, holistic order mediated by technoscience.“Our concept of self should incorporate a new naturalism, a new holism, and a new immanentism” (Campbell, 2001, p. 161).
✕ No ‘postmodern reality’Campbell’s verdict: Haraway’s rhetoric offers no rupture—postmodern reality does not exist.“The stark reality about ‘postmodern reality’ is that there is no such thing” (Campbell, 2001, p. 169).
Contribution of “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell to Literary Theory/Theories

Poststructuralism & Deconstruction

  • Campbell situates Haraway’s manifesto within the feminist post-structuralist critique of science, noting her challenge to universal, totalizing theories (Crewe, 1997; Campbell, 2001, p. 155).
  • By highlighting Haraway’s use of irony and myth, Campbell demonstrates how rhetorical strategies deconstruct binaries and destabilize meaning, yet paradoxically risk reinforcing dominant ideologies (Campbell, 2001, pp. 158–159).
  • This reflects a poststructuralist concern with language, ambiguity, and the limits of representation.

Feminist Literary Theory

  • Haraway’s cyborg is read as a feminist icon challenging gender essentialism and the myth of human exceptionalism (Haraway, 1985:68; Campbell, 2001, pp. 162–163).
  • Campbell critiques how Haraway frames the cyborg as both emancipatory and as complicit with techno-optimism, exposing tensions within feminist theory between critique and complicity (Campbell, 2001, p. 166).
  • Contribution: highlights how feminist theory can be both critical and vulnerable to ideological capture by dominant technoscientific narratives.

Myth Criticism & Religious Studies in Literature

  • Campbell interprets Haraway’s “cyborg” as a legitimating myth akin to religious salvation history (Campbell, 2001, p. 156).
  • He frames her rhetoric of blasphemy, witnessing, and salvation as continuations of biblical/mythic patterns transposed into technoscience (Campbell, 2001, pp. 157–165).
  • Contribution: situates literary/mythic tropes as crucial in understanding how technoscience inherits theological functions.

⚙︎ Cultural Studies & Civil Religion

  • Campbell argues Haraway’s work legitimates the civil religion of technology in U.S. culture, transforming salvation into a technoscientific project (Campbell, 2001, pp. 154–160).
  • By reading Haraway alongside Wuthnow and Stahl, Campbell places the cyborg within cultural narratives of progress and national destiny (Campbell, 2001, pp. 160–169).
  • Contribution: expands cultural studies by showing how literature and theory participate in national mythmaking through religious-technological metaphors.

Science, Technology, and Literature (STS & Technocriticism)

  • Campbell underscores how Haraway collapses the boundaries between human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/non-physical (Campbell, 2001, pp. 162–164).
  • He critiques her cyborg as embodying a technological mysticism, reinforcing rather than dismantling technoscientific authority (Campbell, 2001, pp. 167–169).
  • Contribution: advances technocriticism in literary studies by framing literature and theory as implicated in the cultural legitimation of science and technology.

Utopian/Dystopian Literary Theory

  • Haraway’s cyborg offers a utopian vision of a post-gender, post-dualist world (Campbell, 2001, pp. 162–163).
  • Campbell critiques this as “techno-celebratory” and insufficiently attentive to environmental and capitalist costs (Campbell, 2001, pp. 166–168).
  • Contribution: complicates utopian studies by showing how utopian tropes can legitimize existing technological orders instead of disrupting them.

Examples of Critiques Through “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell
NovelCritique through Campbell’s FrameworkReference from Campbell
Klara and the Sun (Kazuo Ishiguro, 2021)Ishiguro’s AI narrator embodies the cyborg as carrier of salvation history, where faith in technoscience replaces divine grace. Like Haraway’s cyborg, Klara mediates between machine and spiritual hope, but Campbell would caution that this risks becoming a legitimating myth of techno-optimism rather than critique.“The cyborg is not outside salvation history; the cyborg is the ultimate ‘carrier’ of that history” (Campbell, 2001, p. 164).
Machines Like Me (Ian McEwan, 2019)McEwan’s android protagonist reflects the civil religion of technology, where technological beings embody moral dilemmas. Campbell’s lens suggests that rather than dismantling human/machine binaries, such narratives reinforce technology’s mythic status as a new foundation of belief.“Haraway’s work… offers further legitimation for the technological myth that undergirds the civil religion of the United States” (Campbell, 2001, p. 154).
Sea of Tranquility (Emily St. John Mandel, 2022)Mandel’s time-travel and simulation motifs echo Haraway’s collapse of physical/non-physical boundaries. Campbell would read this as part of a techno-mystical worldview where salvation is relocated to data and signals, aligning with a new monotheism of light.“This is a new monotheism, where matter and energy, body and spirit collapse into light” (Campbell, 2001, p. 169).
⚙︎ The Candy House (Jennifer Egan, 2022)Egan’s networked consciousness recalls Haraway’s spiral dance/heteroglossia, where multiple voices and selves intertwine. Campbell’s critique would stress the risk of technological mysticism—a hidden religion of connectivity—rather than liberation from power.“Stahl describes… ‘technological mysticism,’ a ‘faith in the universal efficacy of technology’” (Campbell, 2001, p. 167).
Criticism Against “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell
  • Overemphasis on Religious Framework
    Campbell reads Haraway primarily through the lens of salvation history and civil religion, which may oversimplify her engagement with feminist, socialist, and postmodern theory. This risks reducing her complex rhetorical strategies to theology alone (Campbell, 2001, pp. 154–157).
  • Neglect of Feminist Political Stakes
    His critique sometimes sidelines Haraway’s feminist and socialist commitments, framing her cyborg more as a myth that legitimates technoscience than as a political tool for resistance (Campbell, 2001, pp. 162–166).
  • Irony Misinterpreted as Weakness
    Campbell treats Haraway’s ironic method as undermining clarity and responsibility, but many theorists argue irony is precisely her strength—a deliberate rhetorical strategy to resist totalizing discourse (Campbell, 2001, pp. 158–159).
  • ⚙︎ Techno-Deterministic Reading
    By arguing that Haraway inadvertently reinforces techno-optimism, Campbell risks overstating determinism, ignoring how Haraway uses the cyborg as a political fiction rather than a literal endorsement of technology (Campbell, 2001, pp. 166–168).
  • Limited Engagement with Literary Dimensions
    Although the article appears in a journal of social relations, Campbell focuses on sociology and religion. His reading underplays how Haraway’s cyborg operates as a literary trope and cultural metaphor, thus missing contributions to narrative and myth analysis (Campbell, 2001, pp. 156–164).
  • Conflation of Critique with Complicity
    Campbell argues Haraway is “victim of her own ironic myth,” but this conflates critical complicity (a strategy of working within contradictions) with ideological surrender (Campbell, 2001, p. 159).
  • Dismissal of Postmodern Pluralism
    His conclusion that “the stark reality about postmodern reality is that there is no such thing” dismisses Haraway’s pluralist, situated knowledge project too quickly, potentially misreading her anti-foundational politics (Campbell, 2001, p. 169).
Representative Quotations from “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell with Explanation
Quotation (with symbol)ExplanationPage / Context
🟣 “The cyborg is not outside salvation history; the cyborg is the ultimate ‘carrier’ of that history.Campbell’s central thesis: Haraway’s cyborg doesn’t abolish salvation narratives—it embodies them within technoscience, relocating hope from theology to technology.p. 164
🔶 “Haraway’s work… offers further legitimation for the technological myth that undergirds the civil religion of the United States.He argues Haraway’s rhetoric reinforces a national myth of technological destiny (civil religion), rather than subverting it.p. 154
🟢 “Haraway indicates that her work is to be seen as an ‘ironic political myth’.Signals Campbell’s focus on irony as Haraway’s method; he later critiques how irony can blur accountability and stabilize what it seeks to unsettle.p. 156
🔵 “Blasphemy is not apostasy…” (Campbell glosses) “the blasphemer is an insider acting as critic.Campbell frames Haraway’s stance as insider dissent within U.S. civil-religious discourse—provocative but still within the tradition.p. 157
🟠 “Some readers may be dazzled—even overwhelmed—by Haraway’s use of irony, but… [she] unwittingly becomes the unintended victim of her own word play.His sharpest stylistic critique: Haraway’s irony risks undermining her critique by enabling misreadings and unintended legitimation.p. 159
🟡 “Haraway’s manifesto is based on the breakdown of three traditional (modern Western) boundaries… [human/animal, organism/machine, physical/non-physical].”Campbell outlines Haraway’s anti-dualist program; he later argues its cultural effect is to naturalize technoscience.p. 162
🟤 “This is a new monotheism, where matter and energy, body and spirit collapse into light.Campbell’s striking metaphor for technological mysticism: the sacred becomes signals/energy, sacralizing technoscience.p. 169
🔺 “The cyborg myth is not merely a thought experiment… rather, it is a legitimation myth.He recasts Haraway’s figure as a worldview-maintaining story—supporting existing techno-social orders, not overthrowing them.p. 166
💠 “A ‘crisis of legitimation’… the old myths that maintained the perception of American supremacy no longer seem plausible.Historical backdrop: as older national myths falter, technology steps in as the new source of legitimacy.p. 160
🌈 “The stark reality about ‘postmodern reality’ is that there is no such thing.Campbell’s verdict: despite postmodern gestures, Haraway’s project doesn’t deliver a real break from modernity’s technological faith.p. 169
Suggested Readings: “Cyborg Salvation History: Donna Haraway And The Future Of Religion” By Robert A. Campbell
  1. Campbell, Robert A. “CYBORG SALVATION HISTORY: Donna Haraway and the Future of Religion.” Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, vol. 26, no. 1/2, 2001, pp. 154–73. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263409. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.
  2. TOYE, MARGARET E. “Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Touching (Up/On) Luce Irigaray’s Ethics and the Interval Between: Poethics as Embodied Writing.” Hypatia, vol. 27, no. 1, 2012, pp. 182–200. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41328904. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.
  3. HARAWAY, DONNA J., and CARY WOLFE. “A Cyborg Manifesto: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIALIST-FEMINISM IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY.” Manifestly Haraway, University of Minnesota Press, 2016, pp. 3–90. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt1b7x5f6.4. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.
  4. Prins, Baukje. “The Ethics of Hybrid Subjects: Feminist Constructivism According to Donna Haraway.” Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, pp. 352–67. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/690020. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.

“Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek: Summary and Critique

“Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–Technology Relations” by Peter-Paul Verbeek first appeared in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences in 2008, published by Springer Science + Business Media.

Introduction: “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek

Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–Technology Relations” by Peter-Paul Verbeek first appeared in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences in 2008, published by Springer Science + Business Media. The article extends Don Ihde’s phenomenology of technology by exploring the concept of “cyborg intentionality,” distinguishing three main forms: mediated, hybrid, and composite intentionality (Verbeek, 2008). Mediated intentionality refers to the ways technologies shape and channel human perception, such as eyeglasses or thermometers; hybrid intentionality describes situations where humans and technologies merge into a new experiential entity, as with implants or pacemakers; and composite intentionality highlights the interplay between human intentionality and the directedness of technological artifacts themselves. This work is significant in literature and literary theory because it reframes the cyborg not merely as a metaphor but as a phenomenological reality, challenging humanist boundaries between subject and object and expanding the scope of posthumanist and technocultural studies (Haraway, 1991; Stiegler, 1998). By reconceptualizing intentionality as co-constituted by human and nonhuman agents, Verbeek advances debates central to critical theory, posthumanism, and cultural studies, underscoring how technology is not external to human existence but intrinsic to its very constitution.

Summary of “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek

🌐 Overview & Aim

  • Verbeek expands Don Ihde’s phenomenology to analyze how intentionality operates in human–technology relations, coining “cyborg intentionality.” He aims “to augment Don Ihde’s analysis” and examine cases “at the limits of Ihde’s analysis.” (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Core claim: intentionality—long treated as exclusively human—must be reconceptualized to include mediated, hybrid, and composite forms that blend human and technological agency. (Verbeek, 2008)

🧭 Intentionality in Phenomenology

  • In the phenomenological tradition, intentionality reveals our inextricable directedness toward the world: we never simply think or see, but always think/see something. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Verbeek emphasizes that “the ‘world in itself’ is inaccessible,” becoming a “world for us” through our modes of encounter—now deeply technological. (Verbeek, 2008)

🔧 Mediated Intentionality (Ihde’s Four Relations)

  • Technologies shape and channel experience: glasses (embodiment), ATMs (alterity), thermometers (hermeneutic), air conditioners (background). (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Key insight: in all but alterity, “human intentionality is mediated by a technological device,” so experiences like “reading off a thermometer” involve “cyborg intentionality.” (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Quote: technologies “help to shape a specific relation between humans and world.” (Verbeek, 2008)

🧬 Hybrid Intentionality (Beyond Embodiment)

  • Adds a fifth relation: cyborg relation — (human/technology) → world, where human and artifact merge (e.g., implants, pacemakers, psychoactive drugs) to form a new experiencing entity. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Distinction: unlike embodiment (where shares can be teased apart), in hybrids “there actually is no association…anymore. Rather, a new entity comes about.” (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Theoretical stakes: clarifies posthumanist (co-constitution) vs transhumanist (physical fusion) trajectories and their ethical implications (e.g., Sloterdijk’s “anthropotechnologies”). (Verbeek, 2008)

🧩 Composite Intentionality (Double Directedness)

  • Technologies possess specific directedness (their own “intentionality”), which, added to human intentionality, yields a composite form: human → (technology → world). (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Example (via Ihde): a recorder “has a different intentionality for sound,” amplifying background noise that humans ignore—showing nonhuman selectivity. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Quote: composite intentionality “results from adding technological intentionality and human intentionality.” (Verbeek, 2008)

🧱 Augmenting Ihde: Opening the “Dashes” into Arrows

  • Verbeek argues Ihde’s diagrams black-box two links:
    • the human–technology bond in embodiment, and
    • the technology–world bond in hermeneutics.
  • By replacing the dash with an arrow (technology → world), Verbeek reveals nonhuman intentionality and the double intentionality of hermeneutic relations. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Quote: “Drawing attention to these intentionalities makes it possible to substantially augment his analysis.” (Verbeek, 2008)

🎨 Artistic Probes of Composite Intentionality

  • Augmented intentionality: Wouter Hooijmans’s long-exposure night photography uses starlight and “sustained exposures” to render what “only things that last” reveal—an artificially expanded human vision. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Constructive intentionality: De Realisten’s stereophotography constructs three-dimensional amalgams with no everyday counterpart; technological vision here generates reality rather than representing it. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Quote: these works “aim to reveal a reality that can only be experienced by technologies.” (Verbeek, 2008)

🧠 Posthuman Condition & Stakes

  • Verbeek aligns with thinkers (Haraway, Stiegler, Latour) in claiming we have “become such entities” where technology is constitutive of humanity (e.g., writing transforming cultural interpretation). (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Ethical and metaphysical implication: re-articulating intentionality helps us understand “the ‘posthuman’ or perhaps even ‘transhuman’ beings we are becoming”—and the limits of humanity. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Quote: “Intentionality… needs to be extended to the realm of technology – and to the realm of human–technology amalgams.” (Verbeek, 2008)

📚 Significance for Literary/Critical Theory

  • For literary/posthumanist theory, Verbeek reframes the cyborg not merely as metaphor but as phenomenological structure that co-constitutes perception, agency, and meaning-making—opening new readings of mediation, embodiment, and authorship. (Verbeek, 2008)
  • Bridges Haraway’s cyborg politics and Hayles’s posthuman embodiment by specifying how technologies mediate, merge, and co-direct intentionality—grounding cultural analysis in phenomenological micro-structures of technicity. (Verbeek, 2008)
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek
Term/ConceptReference (Verbeek, 2008)Explanation
🌐 Cyborg Intentionality“The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of ‘cyborg intentionality’…” (p. 387)Umbrella concept describing how human intentionality is blended with technological agency in mediated, hybrid, and composite forms.
🔧 Mediated Intentionality“Human intentionality is mediated by a technological device.” (p. 389)Technologies (e.g., glasses, thermometer, ATM) shape and channel perception, meaning intentionality occurs through them.
🧬 Hybrid Intentionality“Rather, a new entity comes about… this fifth human–technology relation is the basis for what can be called hybrid intentionality.” (p. 390)Human and technology merge into a single experiencing entity (e.g., implants, pacemakers, drugs). Goes “beyond the human.”
🧩 Composite Intentionality“Composite intentionality comes about: a form of intentionality which results from adding technological intentionality and human intentionality.” (p. 392)The double directedness of humans and technologies together; humans are directed at the way technology is directed at the world.
🎯 Technological Intentionality“The specific ways in which specific technologies can be directed at specific aspects of reality.” (p. 392)Devices have their own directedness (e.g., recorders capture background noise differently than human hearing).
🧭 Originary Technicity (Stiegler)“Humanity is an invention of technology, rather than the other way round.” (p. 388)Claim that technology is constitutive of humanity; humans realize themselves technologically.
📡 Hermeneutic Relation“Technologies provide representations of reality, which need interpretation…” (p. 389)Technologies mediate by representing reality (e.g., thermometer values), requiring interpretation to make sense.
👓 Embodiment Relation“When looking through a pair of glasses, the glasses are not noticed explicitly but are ‘incorporated’.” (p. 389)A technology becomes an extension of the body, shaping perception without being explicitly noticed.
🔊 Alterity Relation“In this ‘alterity relation,’ human beings interact with a device, as is the case when taking money from an ATM.” (p. 389)Technology is encountered as a quasi-other to interact with.
🌬️ Background Relation“Where technologies are not experienced directly, but rather create a context for our perceptions, like the humming of the air conditioning.” (p. 389)Technology frames experience passively in the background.
🖼️ Augmented Intentionality“Hooijmans’s photographs embody… an artificially expanded form of human intentionality.” (p. 393)Art (long-exposure photos) shows how tech expands human perception beyond natural limits.
🏗️ Constructive Intentionality“The intentionality involved here can be called constructive intentionality.” (p. 394)Technologies don’t just represent but construct new realities (e.g., stereophotography creating non-existent objects).
📐 From Dashes to Arrows“The dash… should be replaced with an arrow.” (p. 392)Verbeek’s methodological move: making technology’s own intentionality explicit in diagrams of relations.
📚 Posthumanism vs. Transhumanism“A ‘posthumanist’ approach… a ‘transhumanist’ approach…” (pp. 390–391)Posthumanism: humans/tech co-constitute each other. Transhumanism: physical fusion creates new beings beyond Homo sapiens.
🧵 Co-constitution“Technologies used… help to constitute us as different human beings.” (p. 391)Humans and technologies are mutually shaping, altering what counts as human experience.
Contribution of “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek to Literary Theory/Theories

🌐 Posthumanism & Cyborg Theory

  • Verbeek builds on Donna Haraway’s cyborg manifesto, extending it phenomenologically by showing that the cyborg is not only a cultural metaphor but a lived ontological condition of human–technology relations (Haraway, 1991; Verbeek, 2008, p. 388).
  • Contribution to literary theory: Offers a phenomenological grounding for posthumanist literary readings where subjectivity is hybrid, distributed, and co-constituted with technologies.
  • Example: In literary criticism, this allows for reading narratives of embodiment, prosthesis, and digital culture as reflecting cyborg intentionality rather than merely symbolic cyborg identity.

🧭 Phenomenology & Postphenomenology

  • Verbeek reworks phenomenology of intentionality (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) by arguing that intentionality is always mediated, hybridized, or composite in technological cultures (Verbeek, 2008, pp. 389–392).
  • Contribution to literary theory: Expands phenomenological approaches to literature (reader-response, phenomenology of perception in narrative) by showing that reading itself can be seen as technologically mediated intentionality (e.g., through writing systems, digital texts).
  • Theorists like Don Ihde are repositioned in literary studies as tools for analyzing media and textuality beyond humanist subjectivity.

📚 Posthumanist Literary Theory (Hayles)

  • Verbeek echoes N. Katherine Hayles’s thesis in How We Became Posthuman that human subjectivity is inseparable from informational and technological frameworks (Hayles, 1999; Verbeek, 2008, p. 388).
  • Contribution: Strengthens media theory and literary posthumanism by giving a phenomenological account of how technologies co-constitute human perception and meaning-making.
  • In literary analysis, this can enrich readings of science fiction, digital literature, and techno-cultural texts by grounding them in embodied technological phenomenology rather than abstraction.

🧩 Actor–Network Theory & Material Agency

  • Verbeek aligns with Latour’s claim that nonhumans have agency by articulating technological intentionality (Latour, 1993; Verbeek, 2008, p. 392).
  • Contribution: Bridges ANT with literary theory by enabling readings where objects and technologies in texts are not passive symbols but active mediators of meaning.
  • This shift supports materialist literary criticism: novels, poems, and plays can be read as networks of human and nonhuman actants, redistributing agency in narrative analysis.

🧬 Transhumanism & Speculative Literature

  • Verbeek distinguishes between posthumanist co-constitution and transhumanist physical fusion (Bostrom, 2004; Verbeek, 2008, pp. 390–391).
  • Contribution: Gives literary theory a nuanced vocabulary to analyze speculative fiction and utopian/dystopian narratives about human enhancement, AI, and bionics.
  • For transhumanist literature, hybrid intentionality provides a way to see fictional cyborgs not only as symbols but as experiencing entities with distinct intentionalities.

🎨 Aesthetics, Representation, and Mediation

  • Verbeek’s examples of augmented and constructive intentionality in art (Hooijmans’s photography, De Realisten’s stereography) show that technologies construct realities and expand perception (Verbeek, 2008, pp. 393–394).
  • Contribution: Extends aesthetic theory in literature by providing a framework for analyzing representation and mediation not as transparent but as technologically co-produced.
  • In literary studies, this helps analyze how texts mediate alternative realities, much like technologies mediate perception.

🧵 Co-Constitution & Literary Subjectivity

  • Verbeek emphasizes that “technologies used… help to constitute us as different human beings” (Verbeek, 2008, p. 391).
  • Contribution: Influences literary subjectivity theory by showing how characters, narrators, and readers can be analyzed as co-constituted with technologies, shifting away from humanist autonomy.
  • Example: In narrative theory, characters who use prosthetics, digital devices, or writing systems can be seen as cyborg subjects whose intentionality is distributed.
Examples of Critiques Through “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek
WorkCritique through Cyborg IntentionalityLink to Verbeek’s Framework
🤖 Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818)Victor’s creation is a hybrid intentionality: the monster is not merely a human or a machine but a new experiential entity (like Verbeek’s implanted chip or pacemaker). The novel illustrates the anxiety of a “new entity” whose intentionality cannot be divided between creator and creation.Verbeek: “Rather, a new entity comes about… this fifth human–technology relation is the basis for what can be called hybrid intentionality.” (p. 390)
🛰️ Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968)The androids embody composite intentionality: their perception blends human intentionality with technological intentionality (artificial beings experiencing the world). Readers must confront the double intentionality where machines appear to “see” reality differently.Verbeek: “Composite intentionality… results from adding technological intentionality and human intentionality.” (p. 392)
📱 Dave Eggers’s The Circle (2013)Technologies like SeeChange cameras and social media platforms enact mediated intentionality, altering how characters perceive and interact with the world. The novel critiques how mediated intentionality collapses privacy, shaping human–world relations through surveillance devices.Verbeek: “Humans do not experience the world directly here, but always via a mediating artifact which helps to shape a specific relation between humans and world.” (p. 389)
🧬 Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003)Genetic engineering and biotech humans (the “Crakers”) illustrate transhumanist hybrid intentionality: beings that are not simply humans enhanced by technology but posthuman hybrids created as “successors” to Homo sapiens. The novel probes ethical issues similar to Verbeek’s reference to Sloterdijk’s “anthropotechnologies.”Verbeek: “Humans and technologies merge into a new entity, which is sometimes even considered to be the successor of Homo sapiens.” (pp. 390–391)
Criticism Against “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek

⚖️ Overextension of Intentionality

  • Critics may argue Verbeek stretches the concept of intentionality too far by attributing it to technologies. Traditional phenomenology sees intentionality as exclusively human consciousness, and extending it to artifacts risks conceptual dilution (Verbeek, 2008, p. 392).

🔧 Technology as Neutral Tool vs. Agent

  • Some would contend that Verbeek overstates technological agency. While he emphasizes technological intentionality, critics may argue that technologies only reflect human design choices, not autonomous intentionality.

🌀 Blurring Posthumanism and Transhumanism

  • By integrating both posthumanist co-constitution and transhumanist fusion, Verbeek risks conceptual ambiguity. His dual framing may be seen as collapsing critical distinctions that literary/cultural theorists like Haraway or Bostrom keep separate (Verbeek, 2008, pp. 390–391).

📚 Limited Engagement with Literary/Cultural Discourse

  • Although Verbeek references Haraway, Hayles, Latour, Stiegler, his article is largely philosophical-phenomenological, not literary or cultural. Critics might see this as a missed opportunity to more deeply engage with cyborg narratives and cultural texts.

🔍 Reduction of Power and Politics

  • Verbeek’s focus is phenomenological rather than political. Critics may argue his framework underplays issues of power, ideology, and inequality embedded in technological systems—central concerns for posthumanist and critical theory (e.g., feminist, postcolonial critiques).

🧩 Ambiguity in “Composite Intentionality”

  • The idea of composite intentionality (human → [technology → world]) could be criticized as philosophically vague. Is it metaphorical, or does it imply literal technological “experience”? Skeptics may argue that Verbeek conflates functional directedness with genuine intentionality (Verbeek, 2008, p. 392).

🧭 Dependence on Ihde’s Framework

  • Verbeek’s contribution builds on Don Ihde’s four human–technology relations, but some may argue his work is too dependent on Ihde, offering refinements rather than a truly radical rethinking.

🧬 Ethical Blind Spots

  • While Verbeek references Sloterdijk’s “anthropotechnologies,” critics could argue his approach does not fully address ethical risks of hybrid/transhuman intentionalities, leaving unanswered questions about responsibility, governance, and moral limits.
Representative Quotations from “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek with Explanation
QuotationExplanation
🌐 “A cyborg is a border-blurring entity, uniting both human and nonhuman elements.” (p. 388)Verbeek draws on Haraway and Latour to show that cyborgs collapse the traditional divide between humans (intentional agents) and objects (passive tools).
🔧 “Human intentionality is mediated by a technological device.” (p. 389)Technologies are not neutral—they actively shape how humans perceive and engage with the world, exemplifying mediated intentionality.
👓 “When looking through a pair of glasses, the glasses are not noticed explicitly but are ‘incorporated.’” (p. 389)Technologies can become extensions of the body, showing how embodiment relations produce new forms of perception.
🧬 “Rather, a new entity comes about… this fifth human–technology relation is the basis for what can be called hybrid intentionality.” (p. 390)Hybrid intentionality arises when human and technology merge (e.g., implants, pacemakers), forming a new experiential being.
📚 “Humans and technologies merge into a new entity, which is sometimes even considered to be the successor of Homo sapiens.” (pp. 390–391)Verbeek connects hybrid intentionality with transhumanist thought, raising questions about posthuman futures.
🧩 “Composite intentionality comes about: a form of intentionality which results from adding technological intentionality and human intentionality.” (p. 392)Composite intentionality emphasizes the double directedness of humans and technologies interacting together.
🎯 “Technological intentionality… needs to be understood as the specific ways in which specific technologies can be directed at specific aspects of reality.” (p. 392)Verbeek argues that technologies themselves have directedness, shaping perception independently of humans.
🖼️ “Hooijmans’s photographs embody… an artificially expanded form of human intentionality.” (p. 393)Art demonstrates augmented intentionality, where technology expands human perceptual capacity beyond natural limits.
🏗️ “The intentionality involved here can be called constructive intentionality.” (p. 394)Technologies don’t just represent reality—they construct new realities that humans can only access through machines.
🧭 “Intentionality used to be one of these concepts which belonged to the realm of the exclusively human, but by now it has become clear that it needs to be extended to the realm of technology.” (p. 394)Verbeek’s central claim: intentionality must be rethought as co-constituted by humans and technologies, reshaping phenomenology itself.
Suggested Readings: “Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking The Phenomenology Of Human–Technology Relations” By Peter-Paul Verbeek
  1. Fetzer, Frank. “A Cyborg, If You Like.: Technological Intentionality in Avatar-Based Single Player Video Games.” Violence | Perception | Video Games: New Directions in Game Research, edited by Federico Alvarez Igarzábal et al., 1st ed., transcript Verlag, 2019, pp. 115–26. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv371c139.13. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.
  2. Oudshoorn, Nelly. “The Vulnerability of Cyborgs: The Case of ICD Shocks.” Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol. 41, no. 5, 2016, pp. 767–92. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24778234. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.
  3. de Fren, Allison. “Technofetishism and the Uncanny Desires of A.S.F.R. (Alt.Sex.Fetish.Robots).” Science Fiction Studies, vol. 36, no. 3, 2009, pp. 404–40. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40649546. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025.

“Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams: Summary and Critique

“Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams first appeared in 1992 as an occasional essay presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San Francisco.

"Cyborg Anthropology"
Introduction: “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams

“Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams first appeared in 1992 as an occasional essay presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San Francisco. Later published as a position piece, it represents the authors’ initial attempt to frame “cyborg anthropology” not as an elite academic practice but as a cultural project that situates theorizing within the lived realities of late capitalism (Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 1). The essay emphasizes that cyborg anthropology brings cultural anthropology into dialogue with science and technology studies (STS) and feminist theory, focusing on the intersections of knowledge production, technological mediation, and subject formation. By examining the blurred boundaries between humans and machines, it challenges anthropology’s traditional human-centered focus and aligns itself with broader cultural studies’ critiques of power, domination, and identity. Importantly, the work foregrounds the reflexive role of anthropologists in critiquing and participating in the cultural production of humanness through technology, offering new metaphors for understanding contemporary life. Its significance in literature and literary theory lies in its contribution to posthumanist and poststructuralist debates, where it provides tools to question the stability of subjectivity, the role of machines in shaping agency, and the political dimensions of cultural production, thereby enriching the critical vocabularies available to scholars of culture and text.

Summary of “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams

Introduction and Context

  • The essay was first presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San Francisco and later published as an occasional essay (Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 1).
  • It positions cyborg anthropology as a “descriptive label that marks a cultural project rather than an elite academic practice” (p. 1).
  • The authors stress that it is “not just for anthropologists or other professional intellectuals” but a tool to provoke wider cultural discussion (p. 1).

⚙️ Cyborg Anthropology as Theorizing and Participation

  • Defined both as a mode of theorizing and a participatory practice in society.
  • It examines “the relations among knowledge production, technological production, and subject production” (p. 1).
  • The cyborg image, while originating in science fiction, is used to “call attention more generally to the cultural production of human distinctiveness” (p. 1).
  • Encourages anthropologists to be “culturally reflexive” about their role in science and technology (p. 1).

📚 Connections with Cultural Studies

  • Cyborg anthropology “articulates in productive and insightful ways with cultural studies” (p. 1).
  • Inspired by British cultural studies (Birmingham School) in critiquing institutional production of subjectivity, race, and class (p. 1).
  • Draws from American cultural studies, which linked knowledge and power to resist conservative politics in the 1980s (p. 1).
  • Like cultural studies, it stresses that “academic theorizing always has political dimensions” (p. 1).

🔬 Three Areas of Study and Critique

1. Science and Technology as Culture

  • Anthropology has historically excluded science and technology from ethnographic critique.
  • Cyborg anthropology instead treats them as “cultural phenomena whose histories, functions, and representations cross boundaries” (p. 2).
  • It asserts that “we are all scientists”, reconstructing and interpreting science in everyday contexts (p. 2).

2. Rethinking “Anthropos”

  • Challenges the human-centered foundations of anthropology.
  • The term itself is an oxymoron, drawing attention to assumptions of “man” as anthropology’s central subject.
  • Argues that subjectivity is co-produced: “human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines…as they are machine producers and operators” (p. 2).
  • Notes the “notable silence in ethnographic writing” regarding how technologies define anthropological practice (p. 2).

3. New Ethnographic Field Sites

  • Expands fieldwork to include the ways machines participate in shaping subjectivities.
  • Technologies—from computers to spoons—help organize identities, desires, and social differences (p. 2).
  • Calls attention to how machines adjudicate boundaries of knowledge, power, and social life.

♀️ Feminist and Posthumanist Influences

  • Feminist studies are central to cyborg anthropology.
  • By problematizing the body and gender, they show “who and what is reproduced (and by what sorts of technologies)” (p. 2).
  • Analyses of reproductive technologies reveal “unexpected relationships between women and technology” (p. 2).
  • Poststructuralist and posthumanist critiques also inform the rejection of autonomous, humanist subjectivity.

Dangers and Challenges

  • Cyborg anthropology is a “dangerous activity” because it blurs human/machine boundaries and embeds anthropology within structures of power (p. 2).
  • Danger arises from co-optation—the risk of losing critical edge by accepting scientific presuppositions.
  • To remain critical, it must remain “accountable to both academic theorizing and popular theorizing” (p. 2).
  • Emphasizes both the “dangers of studying up” (critiquing power) and the “pleasures of studying down” (engaging popular practices) (p. 2).

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams
Term/ConceptReference from ArticleExplanation
Cyborgp. 264: “Although the cyborg image originated in space research and in science fiction…”Refers to beings that are part human and part machine; used as a metaphor for hybridized subjectivities and the breakdown of human/machine boundaries.
Cyborg Anthropologyp. 264–265: “We view cyborg anthropology both as an activity of theorizing and as a vehicle…”A mode of analysis that situates human subjectivity within science, technology, and culture, rejecting strict humanist boundaries.
Anthroposp. 266: “A broad critique of the adequacy of ‘anthropos’ as the subject…”Challenges the idea of a stable, autonomous, skin-bound human subject as the focus of anthropology.
Actantp. 267: “Viewing both humans and objects as ‘actants’…”From Actor-Network Theory; assigns agency not only to humans but also to nonhumans (machines, tools).
Subjectivityp. 266–267: “Human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines…”Identity and agency are co-produced through technologies (books, trains, typewriters, computers, etc.), not isolated within individuals.
Hybridizationp. 264: “Forms of life that are part human and part machine…”Merging of biological and technological forms, dissolving boundaries.
Alternative World-Makingp. 265: “Cyborg anthropology invests in alternative world-making…”Imagining new cultural possibilities through metaphors of science and technology.
Technosciencep. 266: “Anthropological inquiry in these areas is especially important since science and technology…”The inseparability of science and technology as cultural practices, shaping social relations and power.
STS (Science & Technology Studies)p. 268: “Cyborg anthropology can contribute…by expanding dramatically the purview of STS…”Field that investigates how science and technology are socially constructed; cyborg anthropology extends its reach.
Feminist Technosciencep. 268: “The cyborg anthropology we outline would not be imaginable without the work of feminist studies…”Brings in feminist critiques, especially on the body, reproduction, and gendered dimensions of technology.
Nontraditional Relationshipsp. 268: “The new reproductive technologies demonstrate ‘nontraditional’ and unexpected relationships…”Feminist critique of how technologies disrupt conventional gender/sexual relations.
Blurring Boundariesp. 267: “A crucial first step in blurring the human-centered boundaries of anthropological discourse…”Central metaphor; challenges dualisms (human/machine, culture/nature, male/female).
Studying Up / Studying Downp. 269: “The dangers of ‘studying up’ and the pleasures of studying ‘down’…”Revisiting classic anthropological methods: “studying up” means examining power/elite institutions; “down” refers to marginalized communities.
Objectivity / Communityp. 269: “Cyborg anthropology might participate in continued critical translations of ‘objectivity’ and ‘community’…”Suggests redefinition of these concepts beyond human-centered frames.
Dangerp. 269: “Cyborg anthropology is a dangerous activity…”Danger implies risk in challenging hegemonic frames of science/anthropology, but also opportunity for resistance.
Complicityp. 269: “Remaining accountable to both academic theorizing and popular theorizing…”Accepts that anthropologists are complicit in systems they critique; accountability is essential.
Cultural Production of Humannessp. 265: “Exploring the production of humanness through machines…”Human identity itself is culturally produced via interaction with technologies.
Alternative Formulationsp. 266: “Posing the challenge of alternative formulations…”Rejecting fixed notions of subject, gender, race, class by proposing flexible reconfigurations.
World-Making Metaphorsp. 265: “Cyborg anthropology invests in alternative world-making by critically examining the powers of imagination…”Use of metaphors (cyborg, actant, hybridity) to construct new ways of imagining society.
Contribution of “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams to Literary Theory/Theories

·  🌐 Blurring Boundaries of Text and Subject

  • Reference: p. 267 — “A crucial first step in blurring the human-centered boundaries of anthropological discourse…”
  • Contribution: Challenges the traditional humanist subject in literary theory, encouraging readings where humans, machines, and texts co-produce meaning.

·  🧩 Critique of Humanist Subjectivity

  • Reference: p. 266 — “The term ‘cyborg anthropology’…draws attention to the human-centered presuppositions of anthropological discourse…”
  • Contribution: Anticipates posthuman literary theories by decentering the “individual author” or autonomous subject as the sole meaning-maker.

·  🔄 Metaphors as Theoretical Tools

  • Reference: p. 265 — “Cyborg anthropology invests in alternative world-making by critically examining the powers of the imagination…”
  • Contribution: Validates the literary use of metaphors (cyborg, hybridity, actant) as critical tools for theorizing cultural and textual production.

·  ♀️⚙️ Feminist Literary Critique and Technoscience

  • Reference: p. 268 — “The cyborg anthropology we outline would not be imaginable without the work of feminist studies…”
  • Contribution: Extends feminist literary theory by analyzing how gender, technology, and textual reproduction intersect.

·  🤖 Technologies as Texts

  • Reference: p. 266–267 — “Human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines…”
  • Contribution: Positions machines and technologies themselves as “texts” to be read, interpreted, and critiqued within literary frameworks.

·  🪞 Reflexivity and Critique of Objectivity

  • Reference: p. 269 — “Cyborg anthropology might participate in continued critical translations of ‘objectivity’ and ‘community’…”
  • Contribution: Resonates with deconstruction and poststructuralist literary theory by destabilizing notions of objective meaning.

·  🎭 Multiplicity of Subject Positions

  • Reference: p. 267 — “It is increasingly clear that…we are in the midst of constructing new, multiple, and partial subjectivities.”
  • Contribution: Influences narrative and identity theories by showing subjectivity as fragmented, hybrid, and co-produced — key in postmodern literary analysis.

·  ⚡ Critique of Power in Knowledge Production

  • Reference: p. 265 — “It looks for ways to critique, resist, and participate within structures of knowledge and power.”
  • Contribution: Aligns with cultural studies and Marxist literary criticism by foregrounding how power circulates in texts and knowledge systems.

·  🔬 Ethnography of Science as Textual Practice

  • Reference: p. 266 — “Studying science becomes both more amenable to ethnographic investigation and more important as a topic of research.”
  • Contribution: Suggests that scientific discourse can be treated as literature, subject to narrative analysis, tropes, and symbolic structures.

·  ⚠️ Danger and Resistance as Literary Tropes

  • Reference: p. 269 — “Cyborg anthropology is a dangerous activity…”
  • Contribution: Reframes “danger” as both a metaphorical trope and a methodological stance, echoing literary themes of subversion and resistance.
Examples of Critiques Through “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams
Literary WorkCyborg Anthropology CritiqueReferences (from article)
🤖 Frankenstein by Mary ShelleyExplores co-produced subjectivity: Victor and the Creature reveal how humans and machines shape one another. Cyborg anthropology stresses that “human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines…as they are machine producers and operators” (p. 2).Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 2
🧬 Brave New World by Aldous HuxleyCritiques how technologies of reproduction and control constitute social life. Feminist insights note that reproductive technologies involve “nontraditional and unexpected relationships between women and technology” (p. 2).Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 2
📱 Neuromancer by William GibsonReflects cyborg anthropology’s idea that “we are all scientists” reconstructing science and technology across contexts (p. 2). Case embodies how identities are co-produced through bodies, machines, and information networks.Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 2
🌍 1984 by George OrwellDemonstrates how technologies of surveillance embed power. Cyborg anthropology explains that “science and technology routinely constitute power relations without overt discussion” (p. 2).Downey, Dumit, & Williams, 1992, p. 2
Criticism Against “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams

  • ⚖️ Overextension of the Cyborg Metaphor
    • Critics argue that the concept risks becoming too broad, applied to everything from spoons to satellites.
    • By stretching the cyborg metaphor universally, it may lose analytical sharpness and become more poetic than rigorous (p. 2).
  • 🧩 Undermining of Human Agency
    • The claim that “human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines…as they are machine producers” (p. 2) may underplay the role of human intention and decision-making.
    • This risks collapsing human creativity into technological determinism.
  • 📚 Lack of Methodological Specificity
    • While it calls for ethnographic critique of science and technology, the essay provides few concrete methods for carrying this out.
    • Its “first attempt at positioning” cyborg anthropology (p. 1) leaves it open to charges of vagueness.
  • 🧭 Disciplinary Boundaries and Relevance
    • Some anthropologists may see it as drifting too far into cultural studies, feminist theory, and posthumanism.
    • Its oxymoronic title challenges the anthropological focus on anthropos, risking disciplinary alienation.
  • Danger of Co-optation
    • The authors themselves note the danger that participation in science and technology may lead to “acceptance of presuppositions that constrain the imagination of alternate worlds” (p. 2).
    • Critics may see this as an inherent contradiction in the project.
  • 🔒 Excessive Reflexivity and Self-Positioning
    • By insisting that “we are all scientists” (p. 2) and that anthropologists are always implicated, the framework risks paralyzing critique.
    • Too much focus on reflexivity can make it difficult to sustain constructive ethnographic engagement.
Representative Quotations from “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams with Explanation
QuotationExplanation
“We view cyborg anthropology both as an activity of theorizing and as a vehicle for enhancing the participation of cultural anthropologists in contemporary societies.” (p. 264)Defines cyborg anthropology not just as theory but as a participatory practice, merging scholarship with cultural critique.
“Cyborg anthropology takes up this challenge by exploring the production of humanness through machines.” (p. 265)Central thesis: humanness is not natural but culturally constructed via interaction with technologies.
“Cyborg anthropology invests in alternative world-making by critically examining the powers of the imagination invested in the sciences and technologies of contemporary societies.” (p. 265)Frames imagination as a critical force; shows how science/tech shape possible cultural worlds.
“The term ‘cyborg anthropology’ is an oxymoron that draws attention to the human-centered presuppositions of anthropological discourse.” (p. 266)Exposes how traditional anthropology assumes a human-centered subject; introduces posthuman critique.
“Human subjects and subjectivity are crucially as much a function of machines, machine relations, and information transfers as they are machine producers and operators.” (p. 266–267)Radical claim: subjectivity itself is co-produced with machines, not autonomous — aligns with posthumanism.
“A crucial first step in blurring the human-centered boundaries of anthropological discourse is to grant membership to the cyborg image in theorizing.” (p. 267)Calls for integrating the cyborg metaphor into theoretical practice to de-center human-only perspectives.
“How do machines come to adjudicate boundaries on realms of knowledge and experience, institutions, pathologies, and anomalies?” (p. 267)Raises key research questions: machines actively shape cultural categories (knowledge, health, identity).
“The cyborg anthropology we outline would not be imaginable without the work of feminist studies.” (p. 268)Credits feminist theory for making body, gender, and reproduction central to rethinking human/tech relations.
“Cyborg anthropology is a dangerous activity…because it accepts the positions it theorizes for itself as a participant in the constructed realms of science and technology.” (p. 269)Danger means complicity — scholars are embedded in the same technocultural systems they critique.
“The dangers of ‘studying up’ and the pleasures of studying ‘down’ are well known.” (p. 269)Revisits anthropological methodology; reminds us that power dynamics exist in choosing research subjects (elites vs marginalized).
Suggested Readings: “Cyborg Anthropology” by Gary Lee Downey, Joseph Dumit, and Sarah Williams
  1. Downey, Gary Lee, et al. “Cyborg Anthropology.” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 10, no. 2, 1995, pp. 264–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/656336. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.
  2. Escobar, Arturo, et al. “Welcome to Cyberia: Notes on the Anthropology of Cyberculture [and Comments and Reply].” Current Anthropology, vol. 35, no. 3, 1994, pp. 211–31. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2744194. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.
  3. NELSON, ROBERT M., and PAUL E. BRODWIN. “The Ventilator/Baby as Cyborg: A Case Study in Technology and Medical Ethics.” Biotechnology and Culture: Bodies, Anxieties, Ethics, Indiana University Press, 2000, pp. 209–23. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005txd.13. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.

“Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo: Summary and Critique

“Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo first appeared in 1994 in Feminist Studies (Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 133–152), where she stages a critical encounter between ecofeminist recuperations of “woman–nature” affinity and Donna Haraway’s cyborg/posthuman interventions, arguing for an environmental feminism that resists both romanticized Mother-Earth essentialism and uncritical technophilia (Alaimo, 1994, pp. 133–136, 145–149).

"Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism" by Stacy Alaimo: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo

“Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo first appeared in 1994 in Feminist Studies (Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 133–152), where she stages a critical encounter between ecofeminist recuperations of “woman–nature” affinity and Donna Haraway’s cyborg/posthuman interventions, arguing for an environmental feminism that resists both romanticized Mother-Earth essentialism and uncritical technophilia (Alaimo, 1994, pp. 133–136, 145–149). Drawing on cultural studies and post-Marxist “articulation” theory (Laclau & Mouffe), Alaimo shows how the same ideologemes (e.g., feminized nature, human/animal blurring) can be articulated toward antithetical political ends—co-opted by patriarchal capitalism or mobilized for liberation—thus requiring situated, strategic interventions (pp. 133–135). Her analysis of popular culture’s Mother-Nature tropes (e.g., Earth Day media) demonstrates how “care” discourse privatizes ecological responsibility and displaces structural culpability onto domestic labor, while her engagement with Haraway advances an alternative figuration of nature as agentic, “artifactual,” and coyote-trickster—neither passive resource nor mystical elsewhere (pp. 136–138, 143–146). At the same time, she warns that cyborgian boundary-blurring can slide into militarized technophilia in a nuclear age, unless tethered to an oppositional politics (pp. 146–149). Alaimo’s contribution is pivotal to literary theory and ecocriticism: it reframes the nature/culture binary that underwrites canons and genres, reorients feminist ecological reading from essence to articulation and agency, and models how textual analysis (of ads, TV, manifestos) can map the political stakes of representation—culminating in her call to “articulate” women and nature as co-agents in a shared, activist struggle rather than as timeless victims or romantic icons (pp. 149–152).

Summary of “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo

Main Ideas and Arguments

Ecofeminism vs. Haraway’s Cyborg

  • Ecofeminism emphasizes bonds between women and nature, drawing on “parallel oppressions” and promoting an “ethic of caring and solidarity” (Alaimo, 1994, p. 133).
  • Haraway’s cyborg/postmodern feminism destabilizes binaries like nature/culture and human/technology, radically unsettling the category of “nature” (p. 133).
  • Alaimo positions her work “between the cyborg and ecofeminist poles,” seeking a critical environmental feminism that avoids romantic essentialism and technophilia (p. 133–134).

Critiques of Ecofeminism

  • Ecofeminism gained popularity (e.g., Ms. and Hypatia features), but critics argued it became too “ethics and lifestyle” oriented, neglecting political praxis.
    • Ariel Salleh: anthologies are “largely preoccupied with ethics, life-style, self-realization, cultural ritual and art… while 465 million people starve today” (p. 134).
    • Stephanie Lahar: warned of declining references to political action, asking “Can we afford not to have an action-oriented philosophy… when we are literally threatened… by nuclear war or ecological destruction?” (p. 134).

Problems with the Mother Earth Image

  • Popularized in ecofeminism, male-dominated environmentalism, and capitalist culture.
  • Carolyn Merchant warned against reinstating “nature as the mother of humankind” since both women and nature “need to be liberated from the anthropomorphic and stereotypic labels” (p. 136).
  • Earth Day 1990 TV special portrayed Mother Earth as a “sick, selfless victim” saved by consumerism and housekeeping, shifting responsibility onto women while excusing systemic polluters (pp. 136–137).
  • Alaimo: “Domestic imagery makes earth saving just another domestic chore” (p. 137).

WomanAnimal Boundaries and Cyborg Transgressions

  • Susan Griffin’s Woman and Nature blurred the woman/animal boundary to create ecofeminist solidarity.
    • Example: horse waiting for her master parallels housewife waiting for husband (p. 139).
    • Criticism: risks reinforcing women/animals as passive victims.
  • Haraway’s cyborg challenges multiple dualisms (mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, agent/resource) to undermine domination (p. 140).
  • Whale Adoption Project: personalized whales to foster empathy, yet still infantilized them (“they need to be ‘adopted’ by humans”) (p. 140).

Glorification and Mystification of Nature

  • Ecofeminists valorize nature and women, but mystification risks reinforcing dualisms.
    • Griffin: “Behind naming, beneath words, is something else… an existence unnamed and unnameable” (p. 143).
  • Such mystical essentialism can be re-articulated into patriarchal/racist narratives, e.g., truck commercials eroticizing domination of Native women, animals, and landscapes (pp. 143–144).
  • Haraway and Merchant counter this by envisioning nature as agentic, not passive resource.
    • Haraway’s “Coyote discourse” emphasizes nature as witty, unpredictable agent (p. 145).
    • Merchant: “Nonhuman nature is dynamic and alive. As a historical actor, nature interacts with human beings through mutual ecological relations” (p. 145).

Cyborg Politics in a Nuclear Age

  • Haraway’s cyborg embraces blurred human/machine boundaries, rejecting technophobia.
    • “The machine is not an it to be animated, worshiped and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment” (p. 147).
  • Problem: U.S. technoculture already eroticizes weapons and militarism.
    • Ads liken pilots’ “control stick” to phallic power; Reagan joked about football players as MX missiles (pp. 146–147).
    • Carol Cohn showed nuclear discourse filled with orgasmic, phallic metaphors (p. 147).
  • Thus, cyborgian boundary-blurring risks reinforcing, not subverting, phallotechnology.

Toward an Activist Alliance

  • Ecofeminism risks essentialism; cyborg politics risks technophilia.
  • Alaimo calls for “articulating both women and nature as agents in a mutual struggle” (p. 149).
  • Rather than grounding politics in essential affinities (woman = nature), environmental feminism should build coalitions based on political alliances (p. 149).
  • Such an approach emphasizes women’s activism and nature’s agency, resisting co-optation by capitalism or patriarchy.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo
Theoretical Term / ConceptExplanation (with Reference)
🔴 Articulation (Post-Marxist)From Laclau & Mouffe, articulation explains how ideologies are contingent and gain meaning only through context. Alaimo notes that “ideologies have no essential meaning… what they mean depends upon how they are ‘articulated’” (Feminist Studies, 20.1, p. 134). This shows why “woman = nature” can be either liberatory or co-opted.
🟠 Cultural Studies / InterventionAlaimo uses cultural studies’ pragmatic focus: “how can one assess the politics of particular ideologies and intervene in ways that will benefit both feminism and environmentalism?” (p. 133). This grounds her analysis of TV, ads, and ecofeminist texts.
🟡 Nature/Culture DualismHaraway “seek[s] to destabilize the nature/culture dualism that grounds the oppression of both women and nature” (p. 133). For Alaimo, this dualism underpins domination systems, and ecofeminism sometimes reinscribes it.
🟢 Ecofeminist Affinity & Care EthicEcofeminism “seeks to strengthen the bonds between women and nature by critiquing their parallel oppressions and encouraging an ethic of caring” (p. 133). Critics like Ariel Salleh counter that anthologies are “largely preoccupied with ethics, life-style, self-realization, [and] ritual” while urgent material crises persist (p. 134).
🔵 Mother Earth TropeCarolyn Merchant warns that “both [women and nature] need to be liberated from the anthropomorphic and stereotypic labels that degrade the serious underlying issues” (p. 136). Alaimo shows the Earth Day 1990 special cast Mother Earth as a victim saved by housewives, making “earth saving just another domestic chore” (p. 137).
🟣 Situated Knowledges (Haraway)Haraway redefines objectivity: “Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not as a screen or a ground or a resource” (p. 145). Alaimo stresses this reframing resists passive views of nature.
🟤 Artifactualism (Haraway)Haraway proposes nature is “made, but not entirely by humans; it is a co-construction among humans and non-humans” (p. 145). This destabilizes mastery without reducing nature to mystical essence.
⚫️ Coyote/Trickster NatureHaraway urges: “We need not lapse into appeals to a primal mother resisting her translation into resource. The Coyote or Trickster… suggests the situation we are in when we give up mastery but keep searching for fidelity” (p. 145). This resists mystification and asserts agency.
Cyborg (Haraway)Cyborgs blur human/animal/machine boundaries. Haraway writes, “late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial” (p. 146). “The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines” (p. 147).
🟥 Phallotechnology / TechnophiliaAlaimo notes militarized culture eroticizes weapons. Caputi observes “idealized virility is thus gleefully fused to weaponry and to… earth-destroying lethality” (p. 147). This makes feminist cyborg politics precarious in a nuclear age.
🟦 Human/Animal Boundary BlurringSusan Griffin writes that “nature did not create us: we were bred for domestic labor” (p. 139), linking women and animals. The Whale Adoption Project individualizes whales with names and “distinctive personalities” but infantilizes them as adoptees (p. 140).
🟪 Mystification vs. Material AgencyGriffin’s mystical vision: “Behind naming, beneath words, is something else… an existence unnamed and unnameable” (p. 143). In contrast, Merchant insists: “Nonhuman nature is dynamic and alive. As a historical actor, nature interacts with human beings” (p. 145).
🟩 Politics-Based Coalition (Fuss)Alaimo cites Diana Fuss: “politics [is] the basis of a possible coalition of women” (p. 149). This avoids essentialist woman–nature bonds and grounds ecofeminism in activist alliances.
🟫 Activist Alliance: Women ↔ Nature as Co-AgentsAlaimo concludes: “Articulating women and nature as agents in a mutual struggle… could strengthen environmental feminism’s political impetus while opposing the appropriation of nature as passive resource” (pp. 133, 149). This centers agency and action.
Contribution of “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo to Literary Theory/Theories

🟠Post-Marxist Theory (Articulation – Laclau & Mouffe)

  • Alaimo applies articulation theory to ecofeminist and cyborg discourses.
  • She argues that meaning is never fixed but depends on political articulation.
  • Contribution: Shows how cultural texts (ads, TV shows, ecofeminist anthologies) can be articulated toward feminist ecological critique or toward patriarchal capitalism.
  • Quote: “Ideologies have no essential meaning… what they mean depends upon how they are ‘articulated’” (Alaimo, 1994, p. 134).

🟠 Cultural Studies (Interventionist Critique)

  • Alaimo situates ecofeminism and cyborg theory within cultural studies’ praxis of intervention.
  • Contribution: Demonstrates how theory and critique must engage with popular culture (Earth Day TV, truck commercials, ads) to reveal hidden ideologies.
  • Quote: She asks how critics can “assess the politics of particular ideologies and intervene in ways that will benefit both feminism and environmentalism” (p. 133).

🟡 Feminist Theory (Nature/Culture Dualism)

  • Haraway destabilizes the binary of nature vs. culture, which underlies women’s and nature’s oppression.
  • Ecofeminism often reinscribes the dualism by glorifying “Mother Earth.”
  • Contribution: Alaimo shows that both reinforcement and destabilization of this dualism carry risks, urging careful theoretical navigation.
  • Quote: Ecofeminism promotes “an ethic of caring” (p. 133), while Haraway “seek[s] to destabilize the nature/culture dualism” (p. 133).

🟢 Ecofeminism (Ethics of Care and Affinity)

  • Ecofeminism links women and nature through solidarity, but risks essentialism.
  • Contribution: Alaimo critiques ecofeminism’s reliance on metaphors like “Mother Earth,” which can be co-opted by patriarchy and consumerism.
  • Quote: Critics like Ariel Salleh note ecofeminist anthologies are “preoccupied with ethics, life-style, [and] ritual” while global crises rage (p. 134).

🔵 Feminist Epistemology (Situated Knowledges)

  • Haraway’s theory redefines objectivity as partial, situated knowledge rather than universal mastery.
  • Contribution: Alaimo imports this into eco-criticism, suggesting a shift from mystical “nature” to nature as agent.
  • Quote: “Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent” (p. 145).

🟣 Posthumanism / Cyborg Theory

  • Cyborgs destabilize human/animal/machine divides, creating hybrid subjectivity.
  • Contribution: Alaimo highlights the ambivalence—cyborg politics can resist domination or bolster technophilia in militarized culture.
  • Quote: “Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial” (p. 146).
  • Quote: “The machine is us, our processes… We can be responsible for machines” (p. 147).

🟥 Technoculture & Phallotechnology Critique

  • Feminist cultural theory reveals militarized eroticization of technology.
  • Contribution: Alaimo shows how cyborg theory must grapple with “phallotechnology” if it is to remain oppositional in a nuclear age.
  • Quote: Caputi: “Idealized virility is thus gleefully fused to weaponry and to… earth-destroying lethality” (p. 147).

🟤 Materialist Feminism (Artifactualism & Coyote Discourse)

  • Haraway refigures nature as “artifactual,” co-constructed by humans and nonhumans.
  • Contribution: Alaimo incorporates this into ecofeminism, urging a move away from mystical Mother Nature toward agentic, unpredictable figures like the Coyote Trickster.
  • Quote: Nature is “made, but not entirely by humans; it is a co-construction among humans and non-humans” (p. 145).
  • Quote: “The Coyote or Trickster… suggests the situation we are in when we give up mastery” (p. 145).

🟩 Coalitional Feminism (Diana Fuss)

  • Coalitions should be grounded in politics, not essential affinities.
  • Contribution: Alaimo advances a feminist ecological politics based on alliances of women and nature as agents, not as victims.
  • Quote: Politics must be “the basis of a possible coalition of women” (p. 149).

🟫 Environmental Feminism (Activist Alliance)

  • Core Contribution: Alaimo synthesizes ecofeminism and cyborg theory into an activist alliance model, articulating women and nature as political co-agents.
  • Quote: “Articulating women and nature as agents in a mutual struggle… could strengthen environmental feminism’s political impetus while opposing the appropriation of nature as passive resource” (pp. 133, 149).
Examples of Critiques Through “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo
WorkCritique through Alaimo’s LensQuotation & Reference
🔵 Earth Day 1990 Television SpecialDemonstrates how ecofeminist imagery of Mother Earth is co-opted into patriarchal capitalism and domestic ideology. Responsibility for saving the earth is shifted onto women’s household labor instead of systemic reform.“Mother Earth is a near-dead victim, to be saved by commercial capitalism (buying the right products)… Domestic imagery makes earth saving just another domestic chore” (Alaimo, 1994, pp. 136–137).
🟢 Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her (1978)Griffin blurs boundaries between women and animals to foster solidarity. Alaimo acknowledges the empathy it generates but critiques how it risks reinforcing women and animals as passive victims and the mystical essentialism of nature.Griffin: “Nature did not create us: we were bred for domestic labor” (p. 139). Alaimo: this blurring “supports the historically ingrained position of women and animals as the Other” (p. 139).
🟣 Octavia Butler, Adulthood Rites & Imago (1988–89)Butler’s fiction imagines non-visual, embodied epistemologies that align with ecofeminism. Alaimo warns these mystical portrayals may unintentionally preserve the very culture/nature dualism ecofeminism seeks to disrupt.“Griffin’s work evokes a mysticism that retains the dualism between nature and culture. Octavia Butler, in Adulthood Rites and Imago, shares Griffin’s ecofeminist epistemology…” (p. 143).
🟤 Donna Haraway, Manifesto for Cyborgs (1985)Haraway’s cyborg destabilizes entrenched dualisms (nature/culture, human/machine) and offers liberatory possibilities. Alaimo highlights the ambivalence: cyborg politics may empower feminism or slip into militarized technophilia.“Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial… The machine is us… We can be responsible for machines” (pp. 146–147).
Criticism Against “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo

🔴 Overreliance on Haraway and Ecofeminist Dichotomy

  • Alaimo positions herself between ecofeminism and Haraway’s cyborg but may reduce both to simplified poles.
  • Critics might argue she overlooks internal diversity within ecofeminism (spiritual, materialist, activist strands) and within cyborg/posthuman feminism.

🟠 Abstract Theorizing vs. Practical Activism

  • While Alaimo stresses “intervention,” her essay is still highly theoretical.
  • Critics may claim her proposals for articulating women and nature as “co-agents” remain abstract, without concrete strategies for activism.

🟡 Potential Undermining of Ecofeminist Spirituality

  • Alaimo critiques mystical ecofeminist writings (e.g., Griffin) for reinforcing dualisms.
  • Critics sympathetic to spiritual ecofeminism may see this as dismissing alternative, embodied, or indigenous epistemologies that resist Western rationalism.

🟢 Ambiguity in Cyborg Critique

  • While acknowledging Haraway’s cyborg as destabilizing dualisms, Alaimo highlights its risk of technophilia.
  • Critics may find her stance ambivalent—neither fully embracing nor fully rejecting cyborg theory—leaving unresolved tensions.

🔵 Limited Engagement with Non-Western Perspectives

  • Alaimo critiques Western ecofeminist imagery (Mother Earth, Earth Day media) but engages little with non-Western or indigenous ecofeminisms.
  • This could be seen as a gap, given that global ecofeminist practices provide alternatives to both romantic essentialism and technophilia.

🟣 Dependence on Popular Culture Critiques

  • Some may argue her analysis of cultural texts (Earth Day TV, truck commercials, whale adoption letters) risks being too anecdotal.
  • This reliance may weaken claims to broader theoretical universality.

🟤 Ambivalence of “Activist Alliance” Model

  • Alaimo proposes women and nature as “co-agents” in struggle, but the model is not fully developed.
  • Critics might see this as utopian or insufficiently detailed for guiding ecofeminist praxis.

Marginalization of Race and Class Dimensions

  • While gender and nature are central, critics might note limited attention to how race, class, and colonialism intersect with ecofeminist or cyborg discourses.
  • This makes the intervention less intersectional compared to later eco-critical and feminist scholarship.
Representative Quotations from “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo with Explanation
QuotationExplanation
Articulating women and nature as agents in a mutual struggle … could strengthen environmental feminism’s political impetus.”Alaimo’s core proposal: move beyond victimhood/motherhood tropes and figure both women and nature as co-actors, not passive resources—shifting eco-politics toward collective agency. (Alaimo 1994)
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools.”She adopts Haraway’s cyborg to destabilize nature/culture, self/other, mind/body, but keeps a critical eye on technophilia. (Alaimo 1994)
The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment.A selective embrace of technics: if machines are part of us, feminist politics must claim responsibility for them rather than mystify or demonize them. (Alaimo 1994)
Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, not as a resource.Drawing on Haraway, Alaimo argues for an epistemology where nature acts, undercutting objectifying science and extractivist logics. (Alaimo 1994)
Mother Earth … can be pocketed by patriarchal capitalism.”Alaimo shows how sentimental “Mother Nature” imagery is easily co-opted to privatize responsibility and sell green consumerism. (Alaimo 1994)
“‘What you can do at home to save the earth’ … places the blame and responsibility on women.”Media domesticates environmentalism, casting it as women’s housework and obscuring corporate/state responsibility. (Alaimo 1994)
Glorifying nature by mystifying it may fortify a discursive chain inimical to ecofeminism.”Eco-spiritual exaltations risk reinscribing nature as a pure, feminine Other—fuel for domination, not liberation. (Alaimo 1994)
Holism, empathy, and ‘fluid ego boundaries’ … are coded as feminine and devalued.”Even seemingly positive ecofeminist values can be rearticulated within masculinist orders; articulation politics must be strategic. (Alaimo 1994)
The cyborg is the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism.”Haraway’s warning, stressed by Alaimo: techno-utopia is contaminated by military/market origins; feminist cyborg politics must say no to these lineages. (Alaimo 1994)
Toward an activist alliance … celebrating women and nature as agents rather than passive victims.”The essay’s destination: a coalitional, interventionist environmental feminism grounded in agency, not essence or sentiment. (Alaimo 1994)

Suggested Readings: “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism” by Stacy Alaimo

  1. Alaimo, Stacy. “Cyborg and Ecofeminist Interventions: Challenges for an Environmental Feminism.” Feminist Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1994, pp. 133–52. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3178438. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.
  2. Sandilands, Catriona. “Mother Earth, the Cyborg, and the Queer: Ecofeminism and (More) Questions of Identity.” NWSA Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, 1997, pp. 18–40. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4316528. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.
  3. Covino, William A. “Grammars of Transgression: Golems, Cyborgs, and Mutants.” Rhetoric Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 1996, pp. 355–73. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/465861. Accessed 6 Sept. 2025.

“The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz: Summary and Critique

“The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz first appeared in 2016 as chapter 19 of the book The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data, published by Amsterdam University Press.

Introduction: “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz

“The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz first appeared in 2016 as chapter 19 of the book The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data, published by Amsterdam University Press. The chapter’s main idea is that the algorithmic transformation of society is a “silent revolution” occurring without the necessary public and political debate. Bunz argues that we tend to view technology through a purely economic lens of “disruption,” engaging in a simplistic “for or against” debate rather than shaping its development. Drawing on the philosopher Gilbert Simondon, she posits that an effective critique must go beyond mere opposition and involve a “dialogue with technology,” where humans and machines are understood to be in an “ensemble.” This concept is significant in literary and technology theory because it challenges the traditional view of humans as masters over technology and instead calls for active engagement and digital literacy. Bunz stresses that citizens, and particularly humanities scholars, must move beyond critique from a distance to consciously interact with and understand algorithmic systems, as they fundamentally reshape skilled work, knowledge, and the public sphere.

Summary of “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz

🌐 The Silent Revolution of Algorithms

  • Bunz argues that the digital revolution is “silent” because it unfolds without hype but deeply transforms society: “Algorithms and data merge in automatized processes of intellectual labour… this slippery slope into an algorithmic society unfolds relatively unnoticed” (Bunz, 2016, p. 249).
  • Unlike past technologies (e.g., the printing press, Haraway’s cyborg), today’s technology is rarely debated politically; instead, it is framed as economic disruption—what Christopher Kelty calls a “Fog of Freedom” (p. 249).
  • She stresses that society misses the chance to consciously shape technology: “We don’t debate what we want from technology… we are either for or against it” (p. 250).

🔄 Beyond Critique: Turning Towards Technology

  • Mere criticism of algorithms is insufficient; action and engagement are needed. Bunz notes: “A negative critique of technology is in danger to fail when it does not actively change anything” (p. 250).
  • Drawing on Gilbert Simondon, she proposes a “dialogue with technology”—humans should be in an “ensemble with the machine” rather than distant critics (p. 251).
  • Leaving technical expertise solely to corporations or hackers is politically dangerous: “As digital technology has become part of our daily environment… we are all asked to make more of an effort of consciously interacting with technology” (p. 251).

👩💻 Algorithms and Skilled Work

  • Algorithms disrupt skilled professions much as machines disrupted manual labor.
  • Expertise once exclusive to professionals (doctors, lawyers, journalists) is now “accessible to everyone” and in some cases partially automated (e.g., U.S. legal “e-discovery” software replacing document reviewers) (p. 251).
  • Yet, Bunz stresses algorithms will not fully replace experts: “Information needs contextual knowledge to be judged… automation of knowledge needs to be guarded by experts” (p. 252).
  • Conclusion: Experts are not erased, but their areas of work are transformed.

👥 The Role of Citizens

  • Citizens must cultivate digital literacy: not necessarily coding, but understanding algorithmic limits.
  • Bunz asks: “Why a company knows more about me, thanks to analysing data, than I can?” (p. 252).
  • She cites Luciana Parisi’s call to study “algorithmic thought” as central to understanding contemporary knowledge and society (p. 252).
  • Political urgency: technology is “too important for our societies” to be left unexamined (p. 252).

📰 The Public Sphere in the Digital Age

  • The internet democratizes media, giving “an alternative channel for each single member of the public” (p. 252).
  • Examples include The Guardian’s early adoption of participatory journalism and social media’s role in movements like Black Lives Matter (p. 253).
  • However, risks include mass surveillance, trolling, and unequal visibility: “Some ends are far better connected than others and have more reach: the thick ‘head’ has an advantage over its thin long tail” (p. 253).
  • Thus, digital publics are simultaneously more open and more vulnerable.

🎓 Universities and Humanities in Dialogue with Technology

  • Bunz argues that universities, especially the humanities, must engage with technology.
  • Since algorithms are now a “cultural technique”, humanities scholars should study them as part of knowledge systems: “What can we know? is a classic question posed in the humanities” (p. 253).
  • She envisions universities as active spaces for developing a hands-on, cultural dialogue with algorithms.

📡 Making the Silent Revolution Heard

  • The upcoming Internet of Things will make technology’s effects increasingly visible: “As things are just about to start babbling… it will soon be hard to ignore it” (p. 254).
  • Yet, scholars caution against living with opaque systems: “If we don’t want to live with a technology that is a black box, we all need to interact with it more attentively” (p. 254).

Core Thesis: Mercedes Bunz calls for a dialogue with technology—a conscious, collective, and interdisciplinary engagement that moves beyond critique to active participation. Without such engagement, society risks ceding control of knowledge, work, and the public sphere to opaque, corporate-driven algorithms.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz
Term/ConceptExplanationReference from the Article
Silent Revolution 🔵The idea that algorithms and data are profoundly reshaping society, especially intellectual work, in a quiet, continuous way, without the public discussion that usually marks major technological changes.“In her book, The Silent Revolution, Mercedes Bunz describes a relentless transformation that unfolds silently. Algorithms and data merge in automatized processes of intellectual labour…”
Dialogue with Technology 🤝A method of engaging with technology that moves beyond simple praise or criticism. It involves actively interacting with, understanding, and shaping technology, rather than observing it from a distance.“Following the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon (1958), I understand this change as a dialogue with technology.”
Ensemble (Human-Machine) ⚙️A concept from Gilbert Simondon that rejects the idea of humans as masters of machines. Instead, it views humans and technology as existing together in a single, interconnected system or partnership.“Simondon understood the human as being in an ‘ensemble’ with the machine, instead of being the master above it.”
Turning Towards Technology ➡️The practical action of creating a “dialogue.” It means applying one’s critique through direct engagement and interaction, rather than holding a detached, and often ineffective, negative viewpoint.“In short, ‘turning towards technology’ does not mean to become non-critical, but to apply one’s critique in a dialogue with technology.”
Zoon Politikon 🏛️The classical Greek concept of the human as a “political animal” whose identity is formed through public discourse and opinion-forming. Bunz argues this is threatened by algorithmic decision-making.“…it questions our identity as zoon politikon. What once was opinion forming has now been taken over by decision-making machines that have become an inherent part of our social organization.”
Fog of Freedom 🌫️A term from Christopher Kelty used to describe the vague and undefined political promise of digital technology. It highlights how technology’s economic impact often overshadows any clear social or political goals.“If there is a political promise at all, it is one that can be described with Christopher Kelty (2015) as a ‘Fog of Freedom’.”
Algorithmic Thought 🧠A concept from Luciana Parisi arguing that to understand what knowledge and thinking are today, one must directly study the logic, capabilities, and limitations of the algorithms that process information.“As my colleague Luciana Parisi (2013) puts it: when we are interested in what knowledge and thinking is today, we need to study ‘algorithmic thought’.”
The Long Tail 📊A term describing the structure of the digital public sphere. While technically democratic, attention is concentrated on a few popular entities (the “thick head”), leaving the vast majority of voices with very little reach (the “thin long tail”).“…the shape of that digital public – the long tail – is one of those problems… The social functions of those ends are far less democratic than the technical functions. Some ends are far better connected than others and have more reach…”
Contribution of “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz to Literary Theory/Theories

🤖 Posthumanism and Philosophy of Technology

This chapter pushes posthumanist theory from the abstract to the practical by providing a clear methodology for engaging with non-human actors (algorithms).

  • Decentering the Human: Bunz directly challenges the humanist concept of human mastery over tools. She advocates for Gilbert Simondon’s model of an “ensemble,” where humans and machines coexist in a partnership, forcing a re-evaluation of human exceptionalism.

Reference: “Simondon understood the human as being in an ‘ensemble’ with the machine, instead of being the master above it.”

  • Aligning with Cyberfeminism: By citing Donna Haraway’s “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” Bunz places her argument in a lineage of theories that see technology not as a neutral tool but as a politically charged agent capable of transforming social structures and identity.

Reference: She lists “Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto (1987)” as a “prominent example for research addressing the political side of technology.”


🏛️ Political Theory and Media Studies

Bunz updates classical political theory for the digital age, arguing that algorithms are fundamentally reshaping the public sphere and the nature of political identity.

  • Redefining the Zoon Politikon: The chapter argues that our identity as “political animals” who engage in public discourse is threatened. Algorithmic processes replace human “opinion forming” with automated “decision-making,” thus altering a core component of political life.

Reference: “…it questions our identity as zoon politikon. What once was opinion forming has now been taken over by decision-making machines…”

  • Critiquing the Digital Public Sphere: Bunz provides a nuanced critique of the internet’s democratizing effect. Using the concept of “the long tail,” she shows how the technical architecture of the internet does not guarantee a democratic distribution of attention, a vital contribution to theories of digital discourse.

Reference: “The social functions of those ends are far less democratic than the technical functions. Some ends are far better connected than others and have more reach: the thick ‘head’ has an advantage over its thin long tail.”


💻 Digital Humanities and Software Studies

The text serves as a direct call to action for the humanities, defining its crucial role in an era dominated by computational culture.

  • Validating Humanistic Methods: Bunz argues that the humanities are uniquely positioned to analyze algorithmic culture because their expertise has always been the study of “human knowledge storing” (e.g., writing, books). She reframes computer code as a cultural text that requires the same rigorous analysis.

Reference: “Today, algorithms are a cultural technique, so from my perspective, it is the humanities that are concerned with human culture.”

  • Promoting Algorithmic Literacy: The chapter insists that understanding “algorithmic thought” is not just for computer scientists. It is a necessary literacy for anyone studying contemporary culture, pushing the humanities to engage with technology on a technical and conceptual level.

Reference: “As my colleague Luciana Parisi (2013) puts it: when we are interested in what knowledge and thinking is today, we need to study ‘algorithmic thought’.”


🌐 New Materialism

Bunz’s work contributes a strong argument for material engagement, suggesting that abstract, text-based critique is insufficient for understanding and changing our technological world.

  • Critique Through Action: The chapter argues that detached criticism of technology is ineffective. It advocates for a materialist approach where critique is followed by “action,” meaning direct interaction and a hands-on dialogue with technological systems.

Reference: “This shows clearly that a negative critique of technology is in danger to fail when it does not actively change anything.”

  • Moving Beyond Representation: By insisting on a “dialogue,” Bunz moves the focus from what technology represents to what it does. This aligns with new materialist theories that prioritize the agency and material effects of non-human objects over their interpretation alone.

Reference: “As digital technology has become part of our daily environment… we are all asked to make more of an effort of consciously interacting with technology, and in understanding it…”

Examples of Critiques Through “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz

📚 Literary Work🔍 Critique through Bunz’s Lens
👩💻 The Every by Dave Eggers (2021)Silent Revolution → The novel dramatizes an algorithm-driven society where technology shapes opinion invisibly, echoing Bunz’s claim that “what once was opinion forming has now been taken over by decision-making machines” (p. 249). 🔄 Turning Towards Technology → Eggers shows characters trapped in critique without action; Bunz warns that mere negativity fails: “Critique… is in danger to fail when it does not actively change anything” (p. 250). 👥 Citizenship → The book’s dystopia highlights the need for digital literacy, aligning with Bunz’s call for understanding “algorithmic thought” (p. 252).
🤖 Klara and the Sun by Kazuo Ishiguro (2021)Silent Revolution → Klara’s AI perspective reveals how algorithms integrate unnoticed into human life, embodying Bunz’s “silent” disruption. 🔄 Dialogue with Technology → The novel dramatizes Simondon’s idea of “ensemble with the machine” (p. 251), showing coexistence rather than domination. 📰 Public Sphere → Ishiguro critiques emotional outsourcing to machines, resonating with Bunz’s warning that technology is “too important for our societies” to be left unexamined (p. 252).
🌐 No One Is Talking About This by Patricia Lockwood (2021)Silent Revolution → The protagonist’s fragmented online existence mirrors Bunz’s argument that media matter most when they “seem not to matter at all” (p. 250). 🔄 Skilled Work → The book depicts how expertise and meaning-making collapse under algorithmic feeds, reflecting Bunz’s insight that algorithms change the terrain of knowledge work (p. 251). 📰 Public Sphere → Lockwood’s portrayal of the “portal” echoes Bunz’s analysis of surveillance and trolling as the flipside of digital democratization (p. 253).
📱 The Candy House by Jennifer Egan (2022)Silent Revolution → Egan’s imagined technology of collective memory dramatizes how data silently reshapes human identity and discourse. 🔄 Dialogue vs. Critique → The novel highlights both fascination and fear, showing the limits of binary “for or against” thinking (p. 250). 🎓 Universities & Humanities → Egan’s metafictional style enacts Bunz’s claim that cultural fields must engage with algorithms as “cultural technique” (p. 253). 📡 Making It Heard → Like Bunz’s Internet of Things, Egan suggests the collective voice of technology cannot be ignored once internalized by society (p. 254).
Criticism Against “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz

Conceptual Vagueness and Idealism

  • The central concept of a “dialogue with technology” is arguably metaphorical and idealistic, lacking a concrete, practical definition. It remains unclear how an individual or society can have a meaningful “dialogue” with a non-sentient, privately-owned, and often opaque algorithmic system. The term risks romanticizing technology and anthropomorphizing code, distracting from the human-driven corporate and political interests that actually control it.

🧐 Dismissal of Traditional Critique

  • Bunz’s assertion that “a negative critique of technology is in danger to fail when it does not actively change anything” can be seen as a significant underestimation of the power of critical theory. The primary function of critique is not always to produce immediate, measurable change (like market share shifts), but to expose underlying ideologies, power structures, and social consequences. By framing critique as a failure if it’s not followed by “action,” the argument devalues the crucial intellectual work of raising awareness, shaping discourse, and informing policy.

👤 Individualization of Systemic Problems

  • The call for citizens to become more “digitally literate” and to “make more of an effort” risks placing the burden of solving systemic issues onto the individual user. This approach can deflect responsibility from the powerful corporations that design and profit from these systems and the governments that fail to regulate them. It suggests that the solution to mass surveillance, data exploitation, and algorithmic bias is individual education rather than collective political action and robust structural reform.

⚖️ Masking of Power Asymmetries

  • Using terms like “ensemble” to describe the human-machine relationship creates a false equivalence that masks the profound power imbalance at play. A user and a platform like Google or Facebook are not equal partners in an “ensemble.” The corporation dictates the terms of engagement, owns the infrastructure, and controls the data. This framing can obscure the fundamentally exploitative dynamics of the relationship, where the user is often the product, not a collaborator.
Representative Quotations from “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz with Explanation
🌟 #📖 Quotation + Explanation
🌐 1“Algorithms and data merge in automatized processes of intellectual labour… this slippery slope into an algorithmic society unfolds relatively unnoticed” (p. 249). ➡️ This highlights the silent revolution, where algorithms shape culture and society without public awareness.
⚡ 2“What once was opinion forming has now been taken over by decision-making machines” (p. 249). ➡️ Bunz warns that algorithms now guide decisions once made through public discourse, altering our identity as political beings.
🔍 3“We don’t debate what we want from technology… we are either for or against it” (p. 250). ➡️ She critiques society’s binary attitude toward technology, missing nuanced engagement.
🔄 4“A negative critique of technology is in danger to fail when it does not actively change anything” (p. 250). ➡️ Bunz stresses critique must lead to action, not just commentary.
🤝 5“Following… Simondon, I understand this change as a dialogue with technology. [The] human [is] in an ‘ensemble’ with the machine” (p. 251). ➡️ She advocates coexistence and dialogue, not dominance or detachment.
👩‍💻 6“Expertise was exclusive… Now the knowledge of teachers, doctors, journalists… has become accessible to everyone” (p. 251). ➡️ Algorithms democratize knowledge, but unsettle skilled professions.
🛠️ 7“It is not that the expert is replaced by algorithms. It is more that their areas of work are changing” (p. 252). ➡️ Bunz reframes automation as transformation, not erasure, of expertise.
👥 8“We all need to become more digitally literate… to understand what programs can do and what they cannot do” (p. 252). ➡️ She calls for citizen responsibility in cultivating digital literacy.
📰 9“The digital public… assists where [journalism] is helpless… but there is a flipside… mass surveillance and trolling are the ugly outcomes” (p. 253). ➡️ The internet strengthens democracy but also creates new vulnerabilities.
🎓 10“Humanities scholars should establish their very own dialogue with technology. After all, ‘What can we know?’ is a classic question posed in the humanities” (p. 253). ➡️ She urges the humanities to lead cultural engagement with algorithms, not leave it to computer science alone.
Suggested Readings: “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology” by Mercedes Bunz
  1. Bunz, Mercedes. “The Need for a Dialogue with Technology.” The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data, edited by Mirko Tobias Schäfer and Karin van Es, Amsterdam University Press, 2017, pp. 249–54. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1v2xsqn.24. Accessed 28 Aug. 2025.
  2. RAJAN, KAUSHIK SUNDER. “Dialogue.” Multisituated: Ethnography as Diasporic Praxis, Duke University Press, 2021, pp. 136–68. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1zn1sz3.8. Accessed 28 Aug. 2025.
  3. Drake, Bruce, et al. “It’s Only Words: Impacts of Information Technology on Moral Dialogue.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1, 2000, pp. 41–59. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25074221. Accessed 28 Aug. 2025.

“I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman: Summary and Critique

“I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman first appeared in The European Journal of Women’s Studies in 2003.

"I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg" by Lucy Tatman: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

“I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman first appeared in The European Journal of Women’s Studies in 2003. In this article, Tatman interrogates the theological underpinnings of Donna Haraway’s concept of the cyborg, arguing that Haraway’s reliance on Christian metaphors—such as incarnation, salvation history, apocalypse, and the Garden of Eden—renders the cyborg less a radical break from tradition and more a rearticulation of Christian soteriological myths. Tatman suggests that despite Haraway’s insistence that the cyborg is “outside salvation history” (Haraway, 1991a, p. 150), the figure paradoxically echoes the role of a savior, blending theological imagery with technological modernity. By situating the cyborg within the Christian symbolic universe, Tatman reveals the extent to which notions of apocalypse, divine transcendence, and redemption continue to structure even ostensibly posthuman imaginaries (Tatman, 2003, pp. 52–54). Her critique matters for literature and literary theory because it underscores how theological narratives persist within feminist and posthuman discourse, raising questions about the boundaries between myth, metaphor, and materiality. In literary studies, Tatman’s essay expands the interpretive horizon of cyborg theory by showing how religious tropes shape narratives of technology, embodiment, and liberation, thus complicating Haraway’s vision of the cyborg as a wholly secular and emancipatory figure.

Summary of “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

1. Haraway’s Cyborg and Christian Theology

  • Tatman argues that Donna Haraway’s cyborg imagery is deeply indebted to Christian theological metaphors, despite Haraway’s claims of radical rupture.
  • Haraway repeatedly uses terms such as “incarnation,” “salvation history,” “apocalypse,” and “Garden of Eden” (Tatman, 2003, p. 51).
  • These references signal that the cyborg may not exist “outside salvation history,” as Haraway claims, but is instead tightly coupled with Western Christian symbolic traditions (p. 52).

2. Cyborg as a Savior-Figure

  • Tatman contends that Haraway’s cyborg assumes a soteriological role, functioning like a modern savior.
  • She asks whether Haraway is “offering cyborgs as the saviours of the 21st century” and argues that indeed, cyborgs are imagined as liberators for the marginalized and despised (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).
  • This parallels Christian salvation narratives, where divine figures intervene on behalf of the oppressed.

3. Problematic Theological Dependence

  • Haraway asserts that the cyborg is “outside salvation history” and “without innocence” (Haraway, 1991a, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 52).
  • Yet Tatman demonstrates that Haraway paradoxically places the cyborg in the Garden, albeit without God’s omniscient gaze (Tatman, 2003, p. 53).
  • This shows an inescapable reliance on theological frameworks, even in supposedly post-theological discourse.

4. The Origin Story of Cyborgs

  • Contrary to Haraway’s insistence that cyborgs lack an origin story, Tatman traces their genesis to the 19th century, linking them to:
    • Heilsgeschichte (salvation history),
    • The Industrial Revolution, and
    • Marxist thought (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).
  • This “trinitarian union” situates cyborgs within both technological and theological histories, undermining their supposed mythic autonomy.

5. Apocalypse and Eschatology

  • Tatman highlights Haraway’s neglect of the epistemological aspects of apocalypse, focusing only on its teleological “end” dimension.
  • Apocalyptic texts, she notes, were written by and for the oppressed, revealing divine mysteries rather than literal predictions of doom (Tatman, 2003, p. 56).
  • Haraway’s cyborgs inherit this apocalyptic heritage, becoming “apocalyptic creatures – not by choice, but by birthright” (p. 57).

6. Cyborgs as Diasporic and God-like

  • Cyborgs, Tatman writes, are diasporic beings with no homeland and no covenant with God, but nonetheless resemble God in their omnipresence and technological power (Tatman, 2003, pp. 58–59).
  • Haraway herself admits that “modern machinery is an irreverent upstart god, mocking the Father’s ubiquity” (Haraway, 1991a, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 59).
  • Thus, cyborgs function as a new incarnation of divinity, even while rejecting the transcendent Father God.

7. Salvation by Cyborg vs. Salvation by God

  • Tatman argues that the “cyborg incarnation” mirrors Christian salvation history rather than escaping it.
  • Both assume:
    • (a) a human need for salvation, and
    • (b) salvation occurring in historical time (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).
  • Haraway’s insistence that cyborgs are outside salvation history, Tatman suggests, is undermined by her continual use of theological language (p. 60).

8. The Danger of Indifference

  • Tatman concludes that the gravest danger of cyborgs is not their non-innocence, but their inherited capacity for indifference (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).
  • She contrasts this with the metaphor of “sin,” which preserves passion and embodied humanity: “The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate” (p. 63).
  • For survival, Tatman insists, it may be the sinner—embodied, passionate humanity—rather than the indifferent cyborg, that saves us in the end.
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman
Term/Concept Reference Detailed Explanation
Cyborg (🤖)“What do you get when you combine three biotech companies, a handful of patents, and a Noah’s Ark full of cloned animals? . . . Farmers are already cloning prized cows and pigs, a practice that will balloon if, as expected, the Food & Drug Administration approves the marketing of milk and meat from clones later this year.” (Weintraub and Keenan, 2002: 94), but central to Tatman’s analysis: “I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)The cyborg is a central hybrid figure in Donna Haraway’s work, representing beings that are part animal, part machine, blurring boundaries between natural and artificial. Tatman argues that Haraway’s cyborg is ontologically dependent on Christian theological metaphors, portraying it as a savior-like entity outside traditional salvation history but ironically tied to it. It lacks an origin story in the Western sense, is without innocence, and is situated in a non-innocent Garden of Eden. Cyborgs are diasporic, non-innocent creatures born from the Industrial Revolution, salvation history, and Marxist thought, capable of subverting or enacting apocalypse, embodying irreverent gods, and potentially indifferent like the monotheistic God. Tatman prefers the “sinner” over the cyborg for its passionate, embodied humanity that might ensure survival.
Ontology (🧠)“Two years ago there were still some people who were fascinated, shocked and excited and concerned by Haraway’s bold claim that ‘we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology’; that we humans are ‘creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted’.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)Ontology refers to the nature of being or existence. In the article, Tatman explores how Haraway’s cyborg ontology—defining human existence as hybrid animal-machine entities—is dependent on Christian theological frameworks like salvation history and transcendent God. This dependency reveals a “tight coupling” between cyborgs and Western Christian symbols, making cyborgs not truly outside theological narratives but ontologically linked to concepts of incarnation, apocalypse, and divine indifference. Tatman critiques this as problematic from a feminist theological perspective, suggesting cyborg ontology inherits godly traits like omnipotence and indifference, potentially leading to disembodied, passionless existence.
Salvation History (Heilsgeschichte) (📜)“To begin with, ‘salvation history’ is the English translation of the German term Heilsgeschichte, a uniquely Christian theological term which, unlike cyborgs-according-to-Haraway, does have an origin story.” (Tatman, 2003: 55)Salvation history, or Heilsgeschichte, is a 19th-century Christian theological concept originating from J.C. von Hofmann, viewing history as a progressive divine intervention toward salvation of the elect. Tatman links it to the Industrial Revolution and eschatology, arguing Haraway’s cyborg, despite claims of being outside it, is inseparably tied to this narrative. Cyborgs emerge from this history combined with machines and Marxist revolution, embodying progress (smooth or violent) and apocalyptic ends. This dependency matters as it positions cyborgs within a Christian framework of divine action in history, yearning for salvation, and potential indifference, contrasting Haraway’s blasphemous myth.
Apocalypse (💥)“Haraway appreciates the fact that they are about The End, but not the fact that they are also about knowledge, knowledge that does not end when the story does, if it does.” (Tatman, 2003: 56)Apocalypse means revelation or unveiling, a subcategory of eschatology involving symbolic, cataclysmic imagery of end times, not meant literally but as divine truth for the oppressed. Tatman traces its Jewish roots and Christian inheritance, noting its 19th-century resurgence amid industrial fears. Haraway uses it to describe cyborgs subverting “the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust,” but Tatman argues cyborgs are apocalyptic creatures by birthright, capable of enacting or virtualizing ends. This matters as it ties cyborgs to theological hopes/fears of final judgment, progress, and destruction, potentially satisfying curiosity through virtual apocalypses to avoid real ones, but risking godly indifference.
Salvation (✝️)“The notion of ‘salvation by cyborg’ is of course rather different from that of ‘salvation by God’, but it seems to me that both sorts of salvation assume (a) a human need for it, and (b) that salvation must (or has, or will, or just possibly might) happen in history.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)Salvation refers to deliverance from sin or harm, often through divine intervention in Christian theology. Tatman critiques Haraway’s “cyborg soteriology” as a problematic savior-myth akin to salvation by Christ, offering liberation for the marginalized but dependent on theological models like incarnation and history. Cyborgs are positioned as 21st-century saviors, subverting apocalypse, but inheriting needs for historical salvation and godly traits. This feminist theological issue highlights assumptions of human need for salvation in history, potentially leading to colonization-like missionary zeal, with Tatman favoring sinful passion over cyborg indifference for true regeneration.
Second Coming (🔄)“Cyborgs seem to be quite stubbornly attached to it, perhaps even more stubbornly attached to this particular rubbish-strewn garden than those who dream of ‘the Second Coming and their being raptured out of the final destruction of the world’.” (Tatman, 2003: 54)The Second Coming is the eschatological return of Christ for final judgment and salvation. Tatman metaphorically equates cyborgs to this, as incarnate gods present on earth, omnipotent yet impotent in alleviating suffering, racing toward immortality via technology. Cyborgs embody this through destructive capabilities and hopes for technological miracles restoring Eden. This dependency on Christian models matters as it reveals cyborgs’ non-innocence, enacting god-tricks and temptations of omnipotence, potentially forcing conversions like missionaries, but also offering potential for subverting real apocalypses through virtual ones.
Sin (😈)“The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate, and as capable of acting on their passion, their desire.” (Tatman, 2003: 61)Sin represents human non-innocence, fleshliness, passion, and capacity for harm in Christian theology. Tatman contrasts cyborg non-innocence (indifferent, disembodied) with sinfulness (passionate, embodied), arguing Haraway’s cyborgs inherit godly indifference as “Our Father’s sin.” Preferring to be a “sinner than a cyborg,” Tatman suggests nurturing the sinful human animal—desire-seeking and responsive—for survival, as it counters cyborg apathy in facing suffering. This critiques cyborg ontology’s theological ties, emphasizing passion over technological detachment.
Incarnation (👥)“Although Haraway writes that ‘the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,’ lacking an ‘origin story in the Western sense,’ and ‘completely without innocence’, she nonetheless situates cyborgs in ‘the Garden’, albeit a Garden lacking the omniscient gaze of a transcendent God.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)Incarnation is the theological concept of divine becoming flesh, as in Christ. Tatman argues Haraway’s “cyborg incarnation”—merging organism and machine—is not outside salvation history but dependent on it, making cyborgs irreverent gods incarnate. This tight coupling reveals ontological links to transcendent God, with cyborgs enacting Second Coming-like presence, but risking indifference and omnipotence. It matters as it positions cyborgs within Christian narratives of divine embodiment, blending flesh/technology in a blasphemous yet faithful myth.
Garden of Eden (🌳)“Nevertheless, I would suggest that unless a cyborg can imagine, and can imagine in horrifying detail, ‘returning to [silicon] dust’, then there is no sense in Haraway’s desire ‘to see if cyborgs can subvert the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust’, no sense to her affirmation that cyborgs might weave something other than ‘a shroud for the day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends salvation history’.” (Tatman, 2003: 53)The Garden of Eden symbolizes original innocence and paradise before the Fall in Christian myth. Haraway places cyborgs in a non-innocent Garden without transcendent God or expulsion, rejecting return to dust. Tatman sees paradox: cyborgs’ attachment to this “rubbish-strewn garden” ties them to theological origins, yearning for restoration via technology. This dependency highlights cyborgs’ non-innocence and potential to perceive any place as garden, but risks apocalyptic destruction or indifferent salvation.
Transcendent God (☁️)“It is clear that she is not advocating faith in a transcendent, omnipotent and very masculine Father God.” (Tatman, 2003: 53)Transcendent God is the omnipotent, omniscient, indifferent monotheistic deity above history. Tatman argues Haraway’s rejection of this “god-trick” (all-seeing illusion) still ontologically ties cyborgs to it, as they embody godly traits like space-viewing and ubiquity. Cyborgs are made in this God’s image, irreverent upstarts mocking yet inheriting indifference. This matters in revealing cyborgs’ positive relation to theology, potentially leading to disembodied apathy rather than passionate response.
God-trick (🎭)“She is particularly disdainful of the all-seeing god-trick in ‘Situated Knowledges’.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)The god-trick is Haraway’s term for the illusion of objective, all-seeing knowledge like a transcendent God. Tatman notes Haraway forbids it but cyborgs commit it daily via technology (e.g., satellites). This dependency on theological models exposes cyborgs’ temptations toward immortality and omnipotence, within salvation history, risking indifference and colonization.
Blasphemy (⚡)“With these words Donna Haraway begins ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’: This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. . . . Blasphemy protects one from the Moral Majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. . . . At the center of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.” (Tatman, 2003: 52-53)Blasphemy is irreverent speech against sacred things, which Haraway uses faithfully in her cyborg myth to protect from internal moralism while insisting on community. Tatman sees it as Haraway’s strategy, making cyborgs blasphemous saviors welcoming to outcasts, echoing Christian narratives but subverting them. This ironic faith reveals deep theological dependency, enabling liberation myths but tied to salvation history.
Eschatology (⏳)“There is thus a strongly eschatological dimension to Heilsgeschichte, or a concern with last or end times.” (Tatman, 2003: 55)Eschatology is the study of end times, emerging in the 19th century amid industrial changes. Tatman links it to Heilsgeschichte and apocalypse, arguing cyborgs’ origins in this era make them eschatological beings obsessed with progress and ends. This matters as it positions cyborgs within Christian fixations on “The End,” potentially subverting real apocalypses through virtual ones.
Diaspora (🌍)“It is awfully curious to me that she writes that, for cyborgs, ‘the task is to survive in the diaspora’.” (Tatman, 2003: 58)Diaspora refers to dispersed peoples without homeland, like Jews post-Temple destruction. Tatman applies it to cyborgs as placeless, email-addressed beings without divine covenant or promised land. This ties cyborgs to Jewish apocalyptic traditions, making survival in dispersion their key task, delighting in temporary homes, potentially cultivating gardens anywhere but risking indifference.
Soteriology (🛡️)“I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (Tatman, 2003: 52)Soteriology is the study of salvation. Tatman critiques Haraway’s cyborg as a soteriological figure, offering salvation by technology akin to Christ, problematic for feminists due to patriarchal ties. Cyborgs address human woundedness with regeneration dreams, but within salvation history, tempting god-like goals and enacting missionary colonization.
Contribution of “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman to Literary Theory/Theories

1. Feminist Theory and Posthumanism

  • Tatman critiques Haraway’s cyborg as a feminist icon by situating it within Christian soteriological frameworks.
  • Contribution: She challenges the posthuman feminist claim that the cyborg transcends traditional narratives, arguing instead that Haraway’s “cyborg soteriology” mirrors problematic structures of salvation theology (Tatman, 2003, p. 52).
  • This reorients feminist theory to acknowledge that supposedly radical metaphors may still be constrained by patriarchal-religious traditions.

2. Literary Theology (Religion in Literary Criticism)

  • Tatman demonstrates that Haraway’s texts are unintelligible without their theological references: “take away these theological/religious concepts, and I suggest one is left with practically no meaningful content whatsoever” (Tatman, 2003, p. 53).
  • Contribution: She integrates theological hermeneutics into literary/posthuman criticism, showing that literary theory must account for the persistence of Christian metaphors in cultural texts—even when deployed ironically.
  • This strengthens the theoretical bridge between theology and literature, situating cyborg discourse in the tradition of Heilsgeschichte (salvation history).

3. Critical Theory (Frankfurt School / Marxist Dimensions)

  • Tatman links cyborg origins to the Industrial Revolution, Marxist critique, and salvation history as a “trinitarian union” (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).
  • Contribution: This Marxist-inflected reading positions the cyborg as both a product of industrial capitalism and a myth of historical progress, thereby embedding Haraway’s myth in ideology critique.
  • In literary theory, this expands cyborg studies beyond feminist identity politics into a critique of capitalism, technology, and historical materialism.

4. Apocalyptic and Eschatological Narratives

  • Tatman shows that Haraway’s cyborg inherits the apocalyptic imagination, becoming an “apocalyptic creature – not by choice, but by birthright” (Tatman, 2003, p. 57).
  • Contribution: She reads the cyborg as part of apocalyptic narrative traditions in literature, aligning it with genres of revelation, catastrophe, and redemption.
  • For literary theory, this situates the cyborg alongside symbolic structures of eschatology and apocalypse, reinforcing Catherine Keller’s argument that apocalypse “metabolizes within us and outside of ourselves” (Keller, 1996, as cited in Tatman, 2003, p. 57).

5. Poststructuralism and Deconstruction

  • Tatman identifies paradoxes in Haraway’s insistence that the cyborg is outside salvation history, arguing: “The lady protests too much, methinks” (Tatman, 2003, p. 60).
  • Contribution: This deconstructive gesture reveals how Haraway’s discourse remains entangled in what it denies—illustrating Derrida’s principle that exclusions still carry traces of what they reject.
  • Thus, Tatman contributes to poststructuralist literary theory by exposing the cyborg as a text haunted by Christian metaphysical binaries.

6. Diaspora and Cultural Identity Theory

  • Tatman reframes the cyborg as a diasporic creature, with “no homeland” and only an “email address” as its permanent identity marker (Tatman, 2003, p. 58).
  • Contribution: This adds a diaspora studies dimension to literary theory, connecting the cyborg to displacement, hybridity, and fractured belonging.
  • It opens cyborg discourse to postcolonial literary analysis by aligning cyborg ontology with migrant and diasporic subjectivities.

7. Ethics, Embodiment, and Affect Theory

  • Tatman contrasts the metaphor of the sinner (embodied, passionate, desiring) with the cyborg’s indifference: “What scares me the most about cyborgs is… our Godly and technological capacity for indifference” (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).
  • Contribution: She extends affect theory and embodiment studies by foregrounding passion, desire, and flesh as ethical correctives to technological abstraction.
  • This positions literary theory to consider how metaphors of sin and salvation preserve embodied humanity in contrast to disembodied, indifferent cyborg logics.
Examples of Critiques Through “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman
PoemCritique Through Tatman’s Lens
“The Second Coming” – W. B. YeatsYeats’s apocalyptic imagery of the beast “slouching toward Bethlehem” resonates with Tatman’s claim that cyborgs inherit apocalyptic birthright (Tatman, 2003, p. 57). The poem’s eschatological dread mirrors the cyborg-God as a destructive, indifferent force. ⚡🔥👁️
“God’s Grandeur” – Gerard Manley HopkinsHopkins celebrates divine immanence in nature, but Tatman would critique this reliance on salvation history and covenantal imagery. She’d argue that cyborg discourse similarly recycles theological metaphors, even when claiming rupture. 🌿✝️✨
“The Waste Land” – T. S. EliotEliot’s fragmented modernist text echoes Tatman’s concern with diaspora and loss of sacred origins. Just as Tatman calls cyborgs diasporic creatures without homeland (p. 58), Eliot portrays cultural exile and yearning for restoration through myth and ritual. 🌍💔🌀
“Dover Beach” – Matthew ArnoldArnold laments the decline of faith, which parallels Tatman’s critique of the indifference of cyborgs. The poem’s “eternal note of sadness” reflects her warning that technological-cyborg identities risk losing passion, embodiment, and human sinfulness (p. 63). 🌊😔🕯️
Criticism Against “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman

Over-Theologizing Haraway

  • Tatman arguably overstates the role of Christian theology in Haraway’s cyborg theory.
  • Critics may argue that Haraway’s use of terms like salvation, apocalypse, or Garden is largely metaphorical and ironic, not evidence of ontological dependence.
  • Tatman risks collapsing playful metaphor into theological determinism.

🔄 Paradox of Deconstruction

  • Tatman critiques Haraway for being unable to escape salvation history but simultaneously uses Haraway’s own metaphors against her.
  • This could be seen as a circular critique—accusing Haraway of entanglement while reinforcing the same entanglement through Tatman’s own reading.

📜 Historical Essentialism

  • Tatman links cyborg origins to a “trinitarian union” of salvation history, Industrial Revolution, and Marxist thought (Tatman, 2003, p. 55).
  • Critics might see this as overly essentialist and historically reductive, ignoring non-Western and non-Christian traditions that shape technological imaginaries.

🌀 Neglect of Posthuman Potential

  • By emphasizing theological entrapment, Tatman downplays Haraway’s radical feminist potential of the cyborg as a tool of resistance and hybridity.
  • Her reading risks flattening cyborg discourse into theology, leaving little space for posthuman or queer futurities.

🌍 Eurocentric Framing

  • Tatman situates cyborg identity primarily in Western Christian symbolic systems.
  • Critics may argue this neglects global, pluralistic, and indigenous perspectives on technology, embodiment, and myth.

❤️ Preference for “Sinner” Over Cyborg

  • Tatman concludes that “the sinner, not the cyborg, may save us” (Tatman, 2003, p. 63).
  • This metaphor risks romanticizing human sinfulness while underestimating technological embodiment as a site of passion and agency.
  • Critics may view this as a nostalgic retreat into theological humanism.

Representative Quotations from “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman with Explanation
QuotationExplanation
“What do you get when you combine three biotech companies, a handful of patents, and a Noah’s Ark full of cloned animals? . . . Farmers are already cloning prized cows and pigs, a practice that will balloon if, as expected, the Food & Drug Administration approves the marketing of milk and meat from clones later this year.” (🧬) (Weintraub and Keenan, 2002: 94, cited in Tatman, 2003: 51)This opening quotation sets a provocative tone by linking biotechnology and cloning to biblical imagery (Noah’s Ark, milk and honey). Tatman uses it to question whether technological advancements fulfill or distort sacred promises, framing the cyborg as a modern, unsettling reality that challenges traditional notions of creation and divine providence, introducing her critique of Haraway’s cyborg as a quasi-theological entity.
“Two years ago there were still some people who were fascinated, shocked and excited and concerned by Haraway’s bold claim that ‘we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology’.” (🤖) (Tatman, 2003: 52, citing Haraway, 1991a: 150)Tatman highlights Haraway’s assertion that cyborgs define human existence as hybrid animal-machine entities. She notes the fading shock value, suggesting society’s growing indifference to cyborgization, setting up her argument that Haraway’s cyborg is deeply tied to Christian theological frameworks, despite claims of being outside them, revealing an ontological dependency on salvation history.
“I would like to argue that Donna Haraway is even more of a prophet than she usually is acknowledged to be, and that her offering of a cyborg soteriology (or her vision of salvation by cyborg) is, from a feminist theological perspective, abundantly problematic.” (🛡️) (Tatman, 2003: 52)Tatman positions Haraway as a prophetic figure whose cyborg vision offers a salvation narrative akin to Christian soteriology, problematic for feminists due to patriarchal theological ties. She critiques the cyborg as a savior-figure that assumes a human need for historical salvation, potentially replicating oppressive dynamics like missionary colonization.
“Although Haraway writes that ‘the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,’ lacking an ‘origin story in the Western sense,’ and ‘completely without innocence’, she nonetheless situates cyborgs in ‘the Garden’.” (👥) (Tatman, 2003: 52, citing Haraway, 1991a: 150, 151, 157)This quote critiques Haraway’s paradoxical claim that cyborgs exist outside salvation history while placing them in a theological Garden of Eden. Tatman argues this reveals a “tight coupling” with Christian narratives, as cyborgs embody an incarnation-like merging of flesh and machine, undermining Haraway’s attempt to divorce them from theological origins and highlighting their non-innocent, god-like traits.
“This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification.” (⚡) (Tatman, 2003: 52-53, citing Haraway, 1991a: 149)Quoting Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Tatman underscores the blasphemous nature of Haraway’s cyborg myth, which takes theological concepts seriously to subvert them. This irony enables a feminist liberation narrative but ties cyborgs to Christian frameworks, as blasphemy requires engagement with the sacred, making cyborgs both subversive and dependent on theology.
“To begin with, ‘salvation history’ is the English translation of the German term Heilsgeschichte, a uniquely Christian theological term which, unlike cyborgs-according-to-Haraway, does have an origin story.” (📜) (Tatman, 2003: 55)Tatman introduces Heilsgeschichte, contrasting Haraway’s claim that cyborgs lack an origin story. She argues cyborgs are born from 19th-century salvation history, Industrial Revolution, and Marxist thought, linking them to Christian narratives of divine progress, positioning cyborgs within a theological framework of historical salvation, challenging their supposed independence.
“First, apocalyptic literature is, as a genre, strange. Characterized by richly symbolic language, including a great deal of cataclysmic ‘natural’ upheaval and bloody confrontations between good and evil, such texts are not meant to be taken literally.” (💥) (Tatman, 2003: 56)Tatman explains apocalyptic literature’s symbolic, non-literal intent, which Haraway overlooks in her focus on cyborgs subverting apocalyptic ends. Cyborgs, as apocalyptic creatures, inherit theological hopes and fears, potentially virtualizing apocalypses to avoid real ones, but risking indifference in their god-like capacity to imagine and enact destruction.
“Cyborgs are made (at least partially) in the image of God, and know this even better, perhaps, than the most fervent Christian fundamentalist.” (☁️) (Tatman, 2003: 59)Tatman argues that cyborgs, despite Haraway’s rejection of a transcendent God, embody divine traits like omnipresence and omniscience (e.g., seeing from space). This ontological relation to the Christian God reveals cyborgs’ non-innocence and potential for indifference, mirroring the monotheistic God’s detachment, which Tatman critiques as a dangerous inheritance.
“The nice thing about the metaphors ‘sin’ and ‘sinner’ is that they include, implicitly, an understanding of humans as fleshy, passionate, and as capable of acting on their passion, their desire.” (😈) (Tatman, 2003: 61)Tatman contrasts the embodied, passionate nature of sinners with the disembodied, indifferent cyborgs, advocating for nurturing human sinfulness—passion and desire—over cyborg apathy, which inherits the “Father’s sin” of indifference, emphasizing the need for fleshy responsiveness to counter theological and technological detachment.
“It may be neither the God nor the machine but the passionate, pleasure-and-knowledge-seeking human animal in us we need to nurture for our survival. Or, it may be the sinner, not the cyborg, that saves us in the end.” (🌍) (Tatman, 2003: 61)Tatman’s concluding argument rejects cyborg salvation in favor of the sinner’s passionate humanity, warning that cyborgs’ god-like indifference, tied to theological and technological origins, threatens survival. Embracing the human animal’s desire and embodiment offers a feminist alternative to the cyborg’s potentially colonizing, apathetic soteriology, reasserting agency in a diasporic world.
Suggested Readings: “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg” by Lucy Tatman
  1. Tatman, Lucy. “I’d Rather be a Sinner than a Cyborg.” European Journal of Women’s Studies 10.1 (2003): 51-64.
  2. Downey, Gary Lee, et al. “Cyborg Anthropology.” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 10, no. 2, 1995, pp. 264–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/656336. Accessed 27 Aug. 2025
  3. Orr, Jackie. “Materializing a Cyborg’s Manifesto.” Women’s Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1/2, 2012, pp. 273–80. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23333457. Accessed 27 Aug. 2025.
  4. Allison, Anne. “Cyborg Violence: Bursting Borders and Bodies with Queer Machines.” Cultural Anthropology, vol. 16, no. 2, 2001, pp. 237–65. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/656538. Accessed 27 Aug. 2025.

“Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly: Summary and Critique

“Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly first appeared in Film International, Issue 53 (2009).

"Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies" by Fran Pheasant-Kelly: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly first appeared in Film International, Issue 53 (2009). The article critically examines post-human hybridity in Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991) and RoboCop (1987), focusing on the intersection of cyborg identity, abjection, and post-human theory. Pheasant-Kelly situates her analysis within theoretical frameworks drawn from Jean Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum and Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection, highlighting how cyborgs disrupt stable categories of subjectivity, body, and identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 54–55). The article emphasizes that cyborgs occupy an ambiguous position between human and machine, a hybridity that raises questions of selfhood, mortality, and embodiment. Through close readings of scenes where bodily boundaries are transgressed—such as the T101’s self-exposure of its metallic skeleton or Murphy’s traumatic rebirth as RoboCop—the analysis links cinematic representations of cyborgs to broader cultural anxieties surrounding death, technology, and medical science (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–62). Importantly, the study contributes to literary and cultural theory by extending Kristeva’s concepts of abjection beyond horror into science fiction, thereby reinforcing the cyborg as a key post-human figure that unsettles distinctions between subject and object, human and machine. This makes the article significant for scholarship on posthumanism, film theory, and literary criticism more broadly, particularly in how cultural texts negotiate identity at the boundaries of the human.

Summary of “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

🔹 Introduction: Cyborgs and the Post-Human

  • Pheasant-Kelly situates the cyborg as a central post-human figure in science fiction cinema.
  • Unlike aliens in Star Wars (1977), cyborgs emphasize the human-machine interface, blurring distinctions between human subjectivity and technological embodiment (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).
  • She draws on Baudrillard’s simulacrum and Kristeva’s abjection to explain how cyborgs destabilize boundaries (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).

Quote:
“Boundary maintenance is integral to the coherent subject, both in relation to repression of corporeal abjection and to the preservation of ego” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).


🔹 Post-Humanism and Theoretical Framework

  • References key thinkers: Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999), Badmington (2000), Bell (2007).
  • Post-humanism challenges distinctions between human and non-human, organism and machine.
  • Hayles argues that the post-human privileges information over embodiment, treating the body as “an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3).
  • Post-human hybridity raises cultural anxieties about technology, evolution, and identity.

🔹 Abjection and Kristeva’s Theory

  • Abjection = disturbance of identity, order, and boundary (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4).
  • Cyborgs embody abjection because they are “in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4).
  • Films like Terminator 2 and RoboCop foreground the abject body through violent, traumatic transformations (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–61).

Quote:
“The abject has this dialectical appeal, being both repulsive yet alluring” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).


🔹 Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991)

  • T101 learns human morality and culture from John Connor—highlighting post-human subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
  • Scenes of bodily violation (cutting his arm, CPU removal, torn flesh) emphasize the abject hybridity of flesh and machine.
  • T101 adopts human signifiers—language (“no problemo”), gestures (“thumbs-up”), and empathy (“I know now why you cry”).
  • T1000 represents fluid abjection: unstable, boundaryless, feminized, and lacking subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 59–60).

Quote:
“The T1000 has no clear boundary and becomes integrated with objects and surfaces with which it comes into contact” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60).


🔹 RoboCop (1987)

  • Murphy’s violent death and rebirth as RoboCop reflects traumatic abjection and the erasure of subjectivity.
  • Controlled by OCP’s directives, RoboCop parallels the infantile state within the maternal semiotic chora (Kristeva, 1984).
  • Identity resurfaces through flashbacks, gestures (gun-twirling), and the mirror stage, signaling self-recognition (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
  • The final reclaiming of the name “Murphy” represents the impossibility of repressing identity.

Quote:
“Like Terminator 2, RoboCop demonstrates the impossibility of repressing identity within the post-hybrid body” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).


🔹 Medical and Cultural Anxieties

  • Cyborg imagery reflects real-world anxieties about organ transplants, brain death, and medical technologies (Blank, 2001; Lock, 2002).
  • Cyborgs embody cultural fears of death’s ambiguity—patients on life support, comatose states, and identity loss (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 62–63).
  • The hybrid body becomes a metaphor for biomedical uncertainty and ethical dilemmas.

🔹 Conclusion: Identity and Post-Human Hybridity

  • Cyborg films like T2 and RoboCop explore the tensions between humanity and technology, showing that while cyborgs may be post-human, they are “not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).
  • Abjection provides a critical framework to analyze subjectivity, hybridity, and cultural anxieties in post-human cinema.

Quote:
“The cybernetic organism may be post-human but is not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).


Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly
🔑 Term / ConceptDefinition & ExplanationExample from the Article
🤖 CyborgA hybrid entity combining human and machine, central to post-humanism debates. Cyborgs embody the tension between natural identity and artificial construction.In RoboCop (1987), Murphy undergoes “total body prosthesis,” becoming a cyborg whose human memories resurface despite corporate programming (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
🌐 Post-HumanismThe theoretical stance that human identity is no longer fixed but interwoven with technology, cybernetics, and non-human agents (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999).T101 in Terminator 2 acquires human morals and behavior from John Connor, reflecting the fusion of human and machine subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
🌀 AbjectionFrom Kristeva (1982): that which disturbs boundaries between subject/object, self/other. Abjection provokes both horror and fascination.The scene where T101 cuts open his arm to reveal the metal skeleton beneath bloody flesh is an abject moment of hybridity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
📡 SimulacrumBaudrillard’s (1994) idea of the dominance of the copy over the original—where representation replaces reality.In Blade Runner (1982), cited as context, questions about Deckard’s humanity reflect the indistinguishability of human and artificial identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).
⚖️ Boundary MaintenanceThe effort to preserve identity and subjectivity through stable borders between body/mind, human/machine.In T2, the CPU removal scene blurs the line between human vulnerability and machine mechanics, dramatizing identity at risk (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 58–59).
🧩 SubjectivityThe formation of selfhood and personal identity. Cyborg films dramatize the instability of subjectivity under technological hybridity.RoboCop’s mirror recognition scene where he sees his face and recalls his name “Murphy” signals the reassertion of subjectivity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
⚔️ Masculinity & Gendered IdentityThe role of gender in cyborg representation. Often tied to the muscular T101 vs. the fluid, feminized T1000.Tasker (1993) argues that the T1000’s “terrifying fluidity” represents feminization, contrasting with T101’s solid masculinity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).
👶 Semiotic ChoraKristeva’s (1984) concept of the pre-linguistic, maternal realm of sounds/gestures, opposed to the paternal Symbolic (structured language and order).RoboCop’s infantile diet of baby food and his initial inability to speak reflect a regression to the semiotic stage (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
🪞 Mirror StageLacan’s (1993) idea that identity forms when a subject recognizes itself in the mirror, establishing ego.RoboCop’s recognition of himself in the mirror scene signifies the reclaiming of his human identity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
⚰️ Death & Medical AnxietyPost-human films reflect anxieties over brain death, organ transplants, and the ambiguity of the boundary between life and death.In RoboCop, Murphy’s death and mechanical resurrection embody debates over “real death” in the medical world (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 62–63).
Contribution of “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly to Literary Theory/Theories

🤖 Post-Humanism

  • Pheasant-Kelly situates T2 and RoboCop within debates on cyborgs and technological identity, drawing from Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999), and Bell (2007).
  • The article shows how human and machine boundaries blur: the T101 becomes “more human” through John Connor’s teaching of morals and empathy (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
  • Contributes to literary/posthuman theory by demonstrating that cinematic texts negotiate philosophical questions of humanity and evolution, not just technological spectacle.

Quote:
“The posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 56).


🌀 Abjection (Kristevan Psychoanalysis)

  • Applies Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror (1982) to science fiction cinema, extending abjection beyond horror into post-human identity studies.
  • Shows cyborgs as abject hybrids, disturbing order and identity:
    • T101’s bloody arm-cutting scene reveals flesh + machine (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).
    • T1000’s fluid form exemplifies abjection through instability and ambiguity (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60).
  • Contribution: Expands abjection to analyze how cultural texts use bodily boundaries to dramatize subjectivity and hybridity.

Quote:
“Abjection arises in ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).


🪞 Psychoanalytic Theory (Lacan & Subjectivity)

  • Draws on Lacan’s Mirror Stage to explain how cyborgs reclaim identity.
  • In RoboCop, Murphy’s recognition of his face in the mirror signifies a return of subjectivity after abjection (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).
  • Contribution: Shows how cinema enacts psychosexual development through cyborg narratives.

Quote:
“Murphy’s self-recognition is an important stage in assuming his previous identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).


⚖️ Cultural Theory & Simulacrum (Baudrillard)

  • Engages Baudrillard’s (1994) concept of simulacrum, where copies dominate originals.
  • Example: Blade Runner (1982) raises questions of identity by making it unclear whether Deckard is human or replicant (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).
  • Contribution: Positions cyborg cinema as part of postmodern cultural critique, destabilizing authenticity and originality.

Quote:
“One of the central questions raised by the film is the nature of Deckard’s identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).


⚔️ Gender Theory / Feminist Film Theory

  • Engages with Yvonne Tasker (1993) and Christine Cornea (2007) on cyborg masculinities.
  • Shows how T2 contrasts the solid masculinity of T101 with the “terrifying fluidity” of the feminized T1000 (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).
  • Contribution: Moves away from a purely gendered reading, reorienting cyborg analysis toward abjection and subjectivity, enriching feminist/posthuman debate.

Quote:
“The updated Terminator is typified by a lack of the bodily definition that is so important to the masculinity of the bodybuilder” (Tasker, 1993, p. 83, as cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).


⚰️ Biopolitics & Medical Humanities

  • Connects cyborg abjection to medical and ethical debates: organ transplants, life-support, brain death, and identity loss.
  • Example: RoboCop dramatizes anxieties of “real death,” echoing Blank’s (2001) concerns about defining death in medical science (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).
  • Contribution: Brings science fiction into dialogue with biopolitical and medical humanities discourse, extending literary theory toward applied ethics.

Quote:
“Real cyborgs, such as those patients on life-support machines, represent life perpetually on the brink of death” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).


Overall Contribution

  • Pheasant-Kelly’s article advances literary theory by:
    • Extending Kristevan abjection into post-human studies.
    • Applying psychoanalytic frameworks (Lacan, Kristeva) to cinematic cyborg identity.
    • Reframing feminist/gender debates toward abjection and subjectivity.
    • Linking post-humanism with biopolitical anxieties of medical culture.
  • The article establishes cyborg cinema as a site where cultural theory, psychoanalysis, gender studies, and post-humanism intersect.
Examples of Critiques Through “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly
📚 Work & Author🔎 Critique/Engagement through Pheasant-Kelly (2009)
🤖 Donna Haraway – A Cyborg Manifesto (1991)– Haraway views the cyborg as a figure of liberation beyond human/animal/machine boundaries. – Pheasant-Kelly acknowledges this but critiques its utopianism, showing instead how films like T2 and RoboCop reveal the trauma, abjection, and instability of post-human hybridity. – Example: T101 is not just a liberated hybrid but a figure of corporeal abjection (cutting open his arm, exposing metal and blood) (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59). – Contribution: Brings Haraway’s theory into psychoanalytic dialogue with Kristeva.
🌐 N. Katherine Hayles – How We Became Posthuman (1999)– Hayles emphasizes the primacy of informational patterns over embodiment in post-humanism. – Pheasant-Kelly critiques this by stressing that embodiment and corporeal abjection remain central in cyborg cinema. – Example: RoboCop’s diet of baby food and mutilated body highlight material flesh as unavoidable, not accidental (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, pp. 61–62). – Contribution: Counters Hayles’ abstraction with a focus on the visceral and bodily reality of cyborgs.
🌀 Julia Kristeva – Powers of Horror (1982)– Kristeva defines abjection as “what disturbs identity, system, order” (p. 4). – Pheasant-Kelly extends this beyond horror into sci-fi/post-human narratives. – Example: T1000’s fluid form and gender ambiguity embody the abject’s instability (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 60). – Critique: While Kristeva ties abjection to the maternal/feminine body, Pheasant-Kelly shows it also arises in technological and cybernetic bodies.
⚖️ Jean Baudrillard – Simulacra and Simulation (1994) + Yvonne Tasker – Spectacular Bodies (1993)– Baudrillard: Simulacrum erases the distinction between copy and original. Pheasant-Kelly accepts this in Blade Runner but critiques it by emphasizing corporeal difference in T2 and RoboCop, where human/machine boundaries are dramatized, not erased (2009, p. 55). – Tasker: Reads cyborgs through gender/masculinity (T101’s muscular solidity vs. T1000’s feminized fluidity). Pheasant-Kelly critiques this narrow lens, shifting focus from gender to abjection and subjectivity (2009, pp. 57–58). – Contribution: Moves beyond gendered spectacle or postmodern loss of reality, insisting on psychoanalytic depth of cyborg identity.
Criticism Against “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly

🔹 Over-Reliance on Psychoanalysis

  • Heavy dependence on Kristeva’s abjection and Lacanian theory may limit interpretive diversity.
  • Critics may argue that post-humanism could be equally (or better) explained through technological, cultural, or materialist approaches rather than psychoanalytic ones.
  • The article risks imposing psychoanalytic categories onto films rather than letting cinematic texts generate new theoretical insights.

🔹 Neglect of Political/Economic Contexts

  • While it references medical and cultural anxieties, the analysis underplays industrial, political, and capitalist forces shaping cyborg imagery.
  • RoboCop especially is a satire of corporate capitalism and militarization, but Pheasant-Kelly emphasizes abjection and subjectivity over socio-political critique.

🔹 Gender Analysis Overshadowed

  • Although Pheasant-Kelly cites Tasker and Cornea, the article explicitly states it “moves away” from gendered analyses (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).
  • Critics might argue this sidelines important feminist and queer readings, especially since cyborg bodies are deeply tied to gender fluidity, masculinity, and femininity.

🔹 Narrow Film Corpus

  • Focuses almost exclusively on Terminator 2 (1991) and RoboCop (1987).
  • While these are canonical, critics could argue that a broader range of films (e.g., Ghost in the Shell, The Matrix, Ex Machina) would provide more comprehensive insights into post-human identity.

🔹 Theoretical Overlap / Lack of Originality

  • The article leans heavily on existing theorists (Kristeva, Haraway, Hayles, Baudrillard) without offering a fully distinct framework of its own.
  • Its contribution may be seen as application of theory to film, rather than producing new theoretical innovations.

🔹 Limited Engagement with Audience Reception

  • The reading assumes meaning is located in the text/film, but does not explore how audiences interpret cyborgs or how cultural contexts shape reception.
  • Critics might argue that a reception studies approach could enrich the analysis of cyborg subjectivity.
Representative Quotations from “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly with Explanation
🔑 Quotation️ Explanation
🤖 “Boundary maintenance is integral to the coherent subject, both in relation to repression of corporeal abjection and to the preservation of ego” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).Explains that subjectivity depends on stable boundaries between body/mind, human/machine — cyborgs threaten this stability.
🌀 “Abjection arises in ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 4, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 55).Central theoretical anchor: cyborgs embody abjection because they occupy liminal, hybrid states.
🌐 “The posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation… embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 56).Highlights contrast between abstract posthuman theory and Pheasant-Kelly’s stress on corporeal embodiment in film.
⚔️ “The updated Terminator is typified by a lack of the bodily definition that is so important to the masculinity of the bodybuilder” (Tasker, 1993, p. 83, cited in Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 57).Shows how feminist/gender theory frames T101’s masculinity in contrast to T1000’s fluidity.
🩸 “As the T101 peels back the flesh, the now skeletal hand… provides a source of fascination and horror, both for Dyson’s family, and also for the spectator” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 59).Example of abjection — grotesque mixing of flesh and metal, provoking simultaneous disgust and attraction.
👶 “Robocop’s prescribed diet of liquefied food, ‘a rudimentary paste’ that ‘tastes like baby food’, consolidates his semiotic, infantile status” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).Connects cyborg identity to Kristeva’s semiotic chora, infantilization, and loss of subjectivity.
🪞 “Murphy’s self-recognition is an important stage in assuming his previous identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 61).Refers to Lacan’s Mirror Stage — RoboCop recognizing himself restores subjectivity after abjection.
⚰️ “Real cyborgs, such as those patients on life-support machines, represent life perpetually on the brink of death” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).Expands cinematic cyborg discourse into biopolitical/medical humanities, linking to debates about brain death.
🔄 “Like Terminator 2, Robocop demonstrates the impossibility of repressing identity within the post-hybrid body” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 62).Suggests that despite technological programming, human identity resurfaces — subjectivity cannot be erased.
🧩 “The cybernetic organism may be post-human but is not beyond identity” (Pheasant-Kelly, 2009, p. 63).Key conclusion: Cyborgs destabilize boundaries but still negotiate identity and subjectivity, not pure loss of self.
Suggested Readings: “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies” by Fran Pheasant-Kelly
  1. Pheasant-Kelly, Fran. “Cinematic Cyborgs, Abject Bodies: post-human hybridity in T2 and Robocop.” Film International (16516826) 9.5 (2011).
  2. Chen, Yishui. “Binary Logic and Identity Dilemma of Chinese Sci-Fi Films through the Structuring of Narrative Space.” Beijing Film Academy Yearbook 2016, edited by Journal of the Beijing Film Academy, 1st ed., Intellect, 2017, pp. 61–80. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv36xw7nk.9. Accessed 29 Aug. 2025.

“A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan: Summary and Critique

“A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan first appeared in A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway (2025), published by Punctum Books.

"A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway" by Dave Brennan: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan

“A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan first appeared in A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway (2025), published by Punctum Books. In this chapter, Brennan reinterprets Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto by blending personal narrative, medical technology, and speculative fabulation to explore how cyborgism extends beyond science fiction and into the lived realities of illness, care, and storytelling. Drawing on his experience as a father caring for a chronically ill child, Brennan reframes the cyborg not as a grotesque mash-up of machine and flesh in the vein of Darth Vader or Robocop, but as a figure of boundary dissolution where human, nonhuman, technological, and narrative dimensions merge (Brennan, 2025). By emphasizing Haraway’s notion of “speculative fabulation,” he demonstrates how storytelling is essential in navigating uncertainty, particularly within the medical sphere where technology and imagination work together to sustain life. The chapter also critiques patriarchal traditions of storytelling by highlighting Haraway’s provocation that “fathers, after all, are inessential,” showing how cyborg narratives displace hierarchical authority and foreground interdependence (Haraway, 2016, as cited in Brennan, 2025). The importance of Brennan’s work in literature and literary theory lies in its extension of posthumanist and feminist critiques into embodied, affective spaces, illustrating how cyborgism reshapes identity, authorship, and the politics of narrative. Through its interweaving of theory and autobiography, the chapter demonstrates how literary fabulation destabilizes rigid binaries and opens up possibilities for more inclusive and imaginative forms of cultural and critical discourse.

Summary of “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan

🌸 Main Ideas from A Cyborg’s Father


🌱 Storytelling and Child Imagination

  • Brennan begins with his daughter Syl’s storytelling, where physical and imaginary boundaries blur.
  • Syl creates hybrid worlds where “a plush bear milks a paper cow” and “a young witch magics a swimming pool” (Brennan, 2025, p. 171).
  • This blending mirrors Haraway’s idea of fluidity and boundarylessness in cyborg identity.
  • Key Point: Childhood imagination models Haraway’s vision of merging species, technology, and identities.

🤖 Reframing the Cyborg

  • Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto imagines a world where boundaries—human/machine, species, gender—collapse (Haraway, 2016, p. 10).
  • Brennan contrasts popular sci-fi depictions of cyborgs (Darth Vader, Robocop, Seven of Nine) with Haraway’s practical cyborgism.
  • “Here the cyborg is not a centuries-distant mash-up of parts but a reckoning with what bodies and tools and stories are at hand” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).
  • 🌍 Key Point: Cyborg identity is not futuristic fantasy but a lived, embodied condition.

Fatherhood, Care, and Medical Cyborgism

  • Brennan’s role as a father becomes entwined with technological care for Syl’s chronic illness.
  • He calls himself a “timekeeper” who monitors insulin, meals, and blood sugar: “I have never loved numbers; now I find myself always counting” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).
  • Medical technology (CGM, pumps, boluses) situates him as part of Syl’s cyborg system.
  • ❤️ Key Point: Care work itself becomes cyborgian, fusing body, machine, and narrative.

🌌 Speculative Fabulation and New Narratives

  • Haraway’s concept of speculative fabulation emphasizes re-seeing what is already present.
  • Brennan asks: “What stories have always been present that simply haven’t been told?” (Brennan, 2025, p. 173).
  • He draws on Eva Hayward’s “fingery-eyes” and Craig Foster’s My Octopus Teacher to show how interspecies and cross-boundary relations open new forms of storytelling.
  • 🌀 Key Point: Cyborgism invites us to narrate unseen relationships and denormalize human-centered history.

🧪 Medicine as Storytelling

  • Brennan redefines medicine not as pure science but as narrative-making amid uncertainty.
  • He notes: “Now I see it is a storyteller’s craft, ever circling the unknown, a melodrama of resolution and crisis” (Brennan, 2025, p. 174).
  • Medical cyborgism means constructing stories to explain inexplicable bodily-machine failures.
  • 📖 Key Point: Medicine and fabulation are both narrative responses to uncertainty.

🚹 Haraway on Fathers and Storytelling

  • Haraway provocatively states: “For cyborgs, fathers, after all, are inessential” (Haraway, 2016, p. 10; cited in Brennan, 2025, p. 175).
  • Brennan reflects on how patriarchal traditions of fathers as storytellers must give way to decentered, interdependent narratives.
  • Cyborgs, excluded from “reductive, racist, misogynistic, narcissistic, power-hungry fabulations,” become the new storytellers shaping an “extra-human future” (Brennan, 2025, p. 175).
  • 🌈 Key Point: Cyborg storytelling challenges patriarchal authorship and embraces interdependence.

🌟 Conclusion

  • Dave Brennan’s chapter blends memoir, theory, and narrative to reinterpret Haraway’s cyborg.
  • It emphasizes:
    • Storytelling as survival.
    • Medical technology as part of embodied cyborg identity.
    • Fabulation as a tool for reimagining futures.
    • A feminist, posthumanist critique of patriarchal storytelling.
  • Ultimately, Brennan shows how cyborgism reshapes not only theory but also family, care, and literature itself.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan
🌟 Theoretical Term/Concept📖 Reference from Chapter🔎 Explanation & Importance
🤖 Cyborgism“Here the cyborg is not a centuries-distant mash-up of parts but a reckoning with what bodies and tools and stories are at hand” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).Brennan reinterprets Haraway’s cyborg beyond science-fiction tropes (e.g., Darth Vader, Robocop) and frames it as a lived, embodied reality. Cyborgism is about the collapse of human/machine, body/technology, and physical/imaginary boundaries. It represents posthuman identity and interdependence in daily life.
🌌 Speculative Fabulation“What Haraway’s vision/metaphor of the cyborg pushes us toward… Haraway terms this speculative fabulation” (Brennan, 2025, p. 173).Speculative fabulation is Haraway’s narrative strategy for re-seeing what is already present. It asks: “What stories have always been present that simply haven’t been told?” Brennan shows how fabulation enables storytelling that enlarges perception, challenges human-centered history, and explores interspecies connections.
🩺 Medical Cyborgism“Now I see it is a storyteller’s craft, ever circling the unknown, a melodrama of resolution and crisis” (Brennan, 2025, p. 174).Medical cyborgism refers to the fusion of chronic illness, medical devices, and narrative-making. Brennan, as a father caring for Syl, becomes part of the cyborg network of health management (insulin pumps, CGMs, timed injections). Medicine shifts from science to storytelling under uncertainty.
🕰️ Timekeeping & Care as Cyborg Practices“I have begun to understand myself as… one microchip in the machinery that maintains her health and existence. I am the timekeeper” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).Care is framed as cyborg work, where counting, monitoring, and managing devices turn the father into part of the technological system. This redefines fatherhood as embedded in interdependent cyborg relations rather than patriarchal authority.
🧩 Boundarylessness“Physical and imaginary for her read as one continuous text; everything is fluid, merged, boundaryless” (Brennan, 2025, p. 171).Syl’s imaginative play mirrors Haraway’s cyborg ontology: a world without rigid separations between categories such as human/nonhuman, body/machine, or physical/imaginary. This embodies Haraway’s call to embrace fluid, hybrid identities.
🚹 Cyborg Fathers as Inessential“Haraway writes that for cyborgs, ‘fathers, after all, are inessential’” (Haraway, 2016, as cited in Brennan, 2025, p. 175).Haraway’s provocation undermines patriarchal traditions of fathers as the central storytellers. For cyborgs, storytelling shifts to collective, interdependent, and non-patriarchal voices, shaping an “extra-human future” beyond traditional authority.
🪸 Interspecies Relationality“I am reminded of the documentary My Octopus Teacher… an interspecies relationship that wrenches him out of the dark narcissism of human existence” (Brennan, 2025, p. 173).Brennan extends Haraway’s fabulation through examples of interspecies connection (cup corals, octopus). These narratives de-center the human and highlight nonhuman agency, aligning with posthumanist and ecological thought.
Contribution of “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan to Literary Theory/Theories

🤖 Posthumanism

  • Reference: “Here the cyborg is not a centuries-distant mash-up of parts but a reckoning with what bodies and tools and stories are at hand” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).
  • Contribution: Brennan reframes Haraway’s cyborg as a present, embodied figure rather than a sci-fi fantasy. By embedding his fatherhood and medical caregiving into cyborgism, he contributes to posthumanist thought by showing how technology, bodies, and stories are already entangled in daily life.
  • Impact on Theory: This expands posthumanism from abstract philosophy to lived narrative practices of care, illness, and interdependence.

👩🎤 Feminist Literary Theory

  • Reference: “Haraway writes that for cyborgs, ‘fathers, after all, are inessential’” (Haraway, 2016, as cited in Brennan, 2025, p. 175).
  • Contribution: By engaging Haraway’s rejection of patriarchal storytelling, Brennan critiques the authority of fathers as narrators in cultural history. His account decentralizes the male figure and highlights relational, interdependent storytelling.
  • Impact on Theory: This supports feminist theory by destabilizing patriarchal narrative authority and emphasizing alternative, non-hierarchical voices—particularly those of children, caregivers, and cyborg subjects.

📖 Narratology / Storytelling Theory

  • Reference: “Now I see it [medicine] is a storyteller’s craft, ever circling the unknown, a melodrama of resolution and crisis” (Brennan, 2025, p. 174).
  • Contribution: Brennan aligns medical practice with narrative-making, showing that stories emerge to manage uncertainty, failure, and crisis. His use of Haraway’s speculative fabulation broadens narratology by integrating imaginative, interspecies, and technological narratives.
  • Impact on Theory: He contributes to literary narratology by blurring boundaries between fiction, autobiography, science, and medicine—making narrative central to survival and meaning-making.

🌍 Ecocriticism / Interspecies Studies

  • Reference: “I am reminded of the documentary My Octopus Teacher… an interspecies relationship that wrenches him out of the dark narcissism of human existence” (Brennan, 2025, p. 173).
  • Contribution: Brennan’s reflections on octopuses, corals, and children’s imaginations extend Haraway’s interspecies relationality into ecocritical discourse.
  • Impact on Theory: This supports ecocriticism by re-centering nonhuman agency and showing how interspecies encounters disrupt anthropocentrism and enrich literary imagination.

🩺 Medical Humanities

  • Reference: “Medical cyborgism is an effort of fabulation… narratives constructed from unanswerable questions” (Brennan, 2025, p. 174).
  • Contribution: Brennan shows how chronic illness transforms medicine into a narrative practice, where technological failures and bodily mysteries generate new storytelling forms.
  • Impact on Theory: Adds to medical humanities by situating illness and treatment within posthuman fabulation—making health care a site of literary and theoretical innovation.

Overall Contribution

Dave Brennan’s A Cyborg’s Father bridges posthumanism, feminist theory, narratology, ecocriticism, and medical humanities. By mis/reading Haraway through the lens of fatherhood, caregiving, and chronic illness, Brennan transforms cyborg theory from abstract philosophy into lived, narrative, and interdependent practice. His work expands literary theory by emphasizing how stories, machines, bodies, and relationships co-constitute meaning in contemporary culture.

Examples of Critiques Through “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan
📘 Literary Work🤖 Critique through Brennan’s Cyborg Lens📖 Connection to A Cyborg’s Father
🌌 Kazuo Ishiguro, Klara and the Sun (2021)Brennan’s redefinition of cyborgs challenges the novel’s depiction of Klara as a mechanical Other who longs for human connection. Instead of reinforcing human/nonhuman divides, Brennan’s view suggests Klara’s caregiving role exemplifies practical cyborgism, where technology, affection, and survival are inseparable.“Here the cyborg is… a reckoning with what bodies and tools and stories are at hand” (Brennan, 2025, p. 172).
🧪 Sarah Manguso, Very Cold People (2022)This autofiction explores trauma and invisibility in patriarchal America. Brennan’s engagement with Haraway’s claim that “fathers… are inessential” allows a critique of how patriarchal storytelling erases marginal voices, emphasizing instead the narrative agency of silenced figures like Manguso’s young narrator.“For cyborgs, ‘fathers, after all, are inessential’” (Haraway, 2016, as cited in Brennan, 2025, p. 175).
🌊 Ayanna Lloyd Banwo, When We Were Birds (2022)This Caribbean magical-realist novel merges human, spiritual, and ecological worlds. Through Brennan’s notion of speculative fabulation, it can be read as a cyborg text, weaving myth, ecology, and survival into new relational narratives that destabilize human-centered history.“Haraway terms this speculative fabulation… enlarging the spectrum of perception” (Brennan, 2025, p. 173).
🩺 Sandeep Jauhar, My Father’s Brain: Life in the Shadow of Alzheimer’s (2023)Brennan’s idea of medical cyborgism resonates with Jauhar’s memoir about caring for his father with dementia. Just as Brennan narrates Syl’s illness through machines and fabulation, Jauhar’s narrative shows medicine as storytelling against uncertainty, turning illness into a shared cyborg story of family and technology.“Medical cyborgism is an effort of fabulation… narratives constructed from unanswerable questions” (Brennan, 2025, p. 174).
Criticism Against “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan

📖 Over-Personalization of Theory

  • Brennan heavily relies on his daughter’s illness and fatherhood to interpret Haraway.
  • Critics may argue this reduces Haraway’s broader political and theoretical project to an individualized memoir.
  • Risk: The personal lens may obscure the collective, feminist, and anti-capitalist critiques central to Haraway’s manifesto.

🤖 Narrow Scope of Cyborgism

  • While Haraway positions the cyborg as a global, political, and feminist figure, Brennan emphasizes medical caregiving and family life.
  • This focus could be seen as domesticating Haraway’s radical vision into a private, affective domain.
  • Risk: It sidelines larger issues of labor, race, gender, and capitalism that Haraway links to cyborg politics.

🧩 Potential Misreading of Haraway

  • The subtitle itself—Misreading Donna Haraway—invites critique.
  • Some may see Brennan’s interpretation as too selective, emphasizing storytelling and illness while downplaying Haraway’s materialist critique of militarism, technoscience, and patriarchy.
  • Risk: Turning Haraway’s manifesto into a poetic-metaphorical text rather than a political intervention.

🩺 Romanticization of Medical Cyborgism

  • Brennan reframes medical technologies (insulin pumps, CGMs) as sites of narrative creativity and fabulation.
  • Critics might argue this romanticizes the trauma of chronic illness and technological dependency.
  • Risk: Downplays structural issues such as healthcare inequality, accessibility, and systemic failures in medical technology.

🚹 Ambiguity in Critiquing Fatherhood

  • Brennan reflects on Haraway’s claim that “fathers, after all, are inessential.”
  • Yet, his narrative re-centers himself as father-storyteller through Syl’s illness.
  • Risk: Instead of decentering patriarchal voices, his work may recentralize fatherhood through affective authority.

🌍 Limited Engagement with Broader Contexts

  • Haraway’s cyborg is tied to global capitalism, Cold War militarism, and information technology.
  • Brennan’s narrative is localized and micro-focused, missing opportunities to connect Syl’s cyborgism to wider socio-political contexts.
  • Risk: The work might feel too insular compared to Haraway’s expansive vision.
Representative Quotations from “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan with Explanation
🌟 Quotation🔎 Explanation & Critical Significance
🌱 “Physical and imaginary for her read as one continuous text; everything is fluid, merged, boundaryless.” (Brennan, 2025, p. 171)Brennan uses his daughter’s imagination to illustrate Haraway’s idea of collapsing boundaries. This models cyborg fluidity between real/imagined, human/nonhuman.
🤖 “Here the cyborg is not a centuries-distant mash-up of parts but a reckoning with what bodies and tools and stories are at hand.” (p. 172)Brennan rejects sci-fi cyborgs (Darth Vader, Robocop) for practical cyborgism, where survival, care, and narrative merge in the present.
“I have begun to understand myself as… one microchip in the machinery that maintains her health and existence. I am the timekeeper.” (p. 172)Fatherhood becomes cyborg work. Brennan reframes care (insulin, meals, timing) as a form of human-machine interdependence.
📖 “Questions lead to stories. Let us make a story together. Let us sit on the floor and weave a tale of bears, insects, numbers, machines, people.” (p. 172)Brennan stresses storytelling as survival. Narratives become cyborg tools for managing uncertainty and meaning-making.
🌌 “Haraway terms this speculative fabulation, a type of narration that enables new takes on what is already possible.” (p. 173)Brennan adopts Haraway’s speculative fabulation as a literary strategy to expand perception, opening space for new relational stories.
🪸 “I am reminded of the documentary My Octopus Teacher… an interspecies relationship that wrenches him out of the dark narcissism of human existence.” (p. 173)Brennan connects cyborg fabulation with interspecies relationality, showing how encounters with nonhumans shift narratives beyond anthropocentrism.
🩺 “Medical cyborgism is an effort of fabulation… we build stories to make sense of what makes no sense.” (p. 174)Illness and medicine are framed as storytelling processes, where technology and uncertainty produce cyborg narratives.
💔 “When I watch Syl tell the story of her illness… every time I am newly heartbroken, a lump of sandstone washed through again and again.” (p. 174)Brennan captures the affective dimension of cyborg care: grief and hope shaped through a child’s narrative play with medical devices.
🚹 “Haraway writes that for cyborgs, ‘fathers, after all, are inessential.’” (Haraway, 2016, cited in Brennan, 2025, p. 175)A provocative feminist claim Brennan wrestles with. It destabilizes patriarchal authority while recentering interdependent storytelling.
🌈 “Cyborgs… must as a means of survival shrug these stories off. They are the storytellers who will shape the human future, which can only be an extra-human future.” (p. 175)Brennan aligns Haraway’s cyborg with new future narratives, rejecting patriarchal, racist, and anthropocentric storytelling traditions.
Suggested Readings: “A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway” by Dave Brennan
  1. Brennan, Dave. A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway. punctum books, 2025.
  2. Brennan, Dave. “A Cyborg’s Father.” A Cyborg’s Father: Misreading Donna Haraway, Punctum Books, 2025, pp. 171–76. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.28526479.24. Accessed 25 Aug. 2025.
  3. Kivi, Nazila. “A Cyborg Is a Witch Is a Cyborg Is a Witch. . .” CSPA Quarterly, no. 24, 2019, pp. 36–41. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26629590. Accessed 25 Aug. 2025.

“Now Are We Cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring: Summary and Critique

“Now Are We Cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring first appeared in Lockdown Cultures: The Arts and Humanities in the Year of the Pandemic, 2020–21, edited by Stella Bruzzi, Maurice Biriotti, Sam Caleb, and Harvey Wiltshire, and published by UCL Press in 2022.

"Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns" by Emily Baker and Annie Ring: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring

Now Are We Cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring first appeared in Lockdown Cultures: The Arts and Humanities in the Year of the Pandemic, 2020–21, edited by Stella Bruzzi, Maurice Biriotti, Sam Caleb, and Harvey Wiltshire, and published by UCL Press in 2022. This chapter re-engages Donna Haraway’s influential A Cyborg Manifesto (1991) to explore how the Covid-19 lockdowns brought the hybrid condition of human-machine life into sharper focus. Baker and Ring argue that the cyborg—Haraway’s figure of feminist, technological agency—remains vital for understanding the intersectional inequalities revealed and reinforced by the pandemic, particularly through labor, care, and digital precarity (Baker & Ring, 2022, pp. 58–59). They highlight the new “cybourgeoisie” of remote workers, contrasted with keyworkers whose bodily labor and vulnerability in PPE during the crisis expose deep structural inequities (p. 60). Drawing from thinkers like Saidiya Hartman, Paul B. Preciado, and Jean-Luc Nancy, the authors frame the lockdown household as both a site of conservative retrenchment and potential technological resistance (pp. 61–63). The chapter emphasizes “affinities”—Haraway’s term for chosen solidarities—as a strategy to resist the “informatics of domination” and to reimagine community, care, and intellectual collaboration in digitally mediated spaces (pp. 64–65). In literary and cultural theory, Baker and Ring’s work significantly extends posthumanist feminist discourse, offering a critical lens on embodiment, labor, and creative production under pandemic conditions. The cyborg is no longer merely a metaphor but a lived mode of being, through which new, pluralistic ways of thinking and relating might emerge.

Summary of “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring

🤖 Cyborgs and the Lockdown Condition

  • The chapter reactivates Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto in the context of the 2020 Covid-19 lockdowns, showing how the pandemic accelerated human-machine hybridity.
  • Haraway’s cyborg—“a hybrid of machine and organism” (Haraway, p. 149)—is reframed as central to understanding how technology mediates labor, identity, and connection in crises.
  • The authors argue, “The Cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (p. 150), particularly as lockdowns made us more dependent on screens, devices, and digital networks.

🧑🏽🔬 From ‘Sister Outsiders’ to ‘Cybourgeoisie’

  • The chapter contrasts privileged white-collar remote workers (the “cybourgeoisie”) with frontline keyworkers (often women and people of color), redefining who embodies the cyborg.
  • Historical labor contexts are invoked: “The first cyborgs were those workers whose work was systemically devalued or constructed as unskilled” (p. 60).
  • PPE is reimagined as a “prosthesis that enables, rather than blocks, human connection” (p. 60), challenging technophobic narratives.

🧬 Gender, Race, and Anti-Essentialist Feminism

  • Baker and Ring adopt Haraway’s anti-essentialist stance, stressing that cyborg identity rejects naturalized definitions of gender: “There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female” (p. 172).
  • Saidiya Hartman’s account of “wayward lives” (p. 60) informs their view of the cyborg as resisting historical and racialized domination.
  • Maria from Metropolis is cited as a prototype of the anti-essentialist cyborg—a figure that oscillates between virginity and sexual freedom (p. 60).

🏠 The Conservative Return of the ‘Household’

  • Lockdown re-imposed the patriarchal, surveilled “household”: “The household has landed back on us with such an almighty conservative thump” (p. 61).
  • The chapter warns that digital homes may become “electronic cottages” of isolation and surveillance, deepening inequality and atomization (p. 63).
  • Preciado’s analysis of virus-era biopolitics is used to show how domestic spaces became “new frontiers” of disciplinary power (p. 62).

💡 Technological Resistance and ‘Informatics of Domination’

  • Haraway’s concept of “informatics of domination” is key to analyzing how digital systems exacerbate control under capitalism (p. 61).
  • The authors echo Haraway: “Science and technology… are possible means of great human satisfaction as well as a matrix of complex dominations” (p. 181).
  • They promote critical, skillful use of technology—writing, creating, and connecting—as methods of reclaiming power from these systems.

🔗 Affinities vs. Identities

  • Haraway’s idea of “affinity”—“not by blood but by choice” (p. 155)—is central to their vision of cyborg politics.
  • They invoke Goethe’s Elective Affinities to frame household and workplace communities as fluid, experimental constellations (p. 64).
  • “Identities at work… can give way to affinities built across the classes created by the neoliberal university” (p. 64).

🎭 Art, Writing, and Cyborg Creativity

  • The cyborg is seen as an artist and writer whose tools are “the least-worst, least-surveillant platform; the webcam and mousepad” (p. 65).
  • Lockdown cultures—poetry, philosophy, and virtual gatherings—become arenas for “exposure”, “sharing”, and “presentation of the self” (p. 65).
  • The authors cite Nancy’s Inoperative Community as a model for fragile yet meaningful sociality (p. 65).

📉 Play, Work, and the Critique of Capitalism

  • Haraway’s phrase “All work and all play is a dangerous game” (p. 161) captures the risks of gamified, capitalist modes of connection.
  • The authors propose a “prosperity without growth” (Jackson, 2017) that values collaborative creativity over profit.
  • They caution against influencers and one-way communication, embracing instead “two-way channels that facilitate meaningful dialogue” (p. 65).

🌍 Outlook: A Cyborg Future Beyond Lockdown

  • The chapter ends on a hopeful note: “It is up to the cyborgs… to orientate the momentum… towards greener, happier, healthier and more connected futures” (p. 66).
  • Writing, as cyborg practice, becomes a model for empathy, political action, and collective identity.
  • Haraway’s vision—“This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (p. 181)—serves as the ideological anchor for this new community.

Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring
🔧 Theoretical TermExplanation & Reference
🤖 CyborgA hybrid of organism and machine representing technologically-mediated identity and political agency. Haraway writes: “The Cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (p. 150). Reframed during Covid-19 as a lived condition shaped by tech (p. 58).
🧬 Anti-EssentialismRejects the idea of inherent traits defining identity (e.g., gender). Haraway states: “There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female…” (p. 172). Used to critique gendered labor imbalances and traditional roles during lockdown (p. 60).
🔗 AffinityHaraway’s idea of solidarity based on choice rather than identity—“not by blood but by choice” (p. 155). Baker and Ring use this to suggest alliances that cross student-staff-outsourced worker boundaries in the neoliberal university (pp. 63–64).
📡 Informatics of DominationHaraway’s term for how technology enforces global systems of control (p. 161). Baker and Ring apply it to the digitized, surveilled household during Covid-19 and the shift to isolated, tech-mediated labor (pp. 61–62).
🏠 Household ConservatismRefers to how lockdowns reinforced patriarchal household norms. Citing Claire Hemmings: “the household has landed back on us with such an almighty conservative thump” (p. 61). Resurgence of unpaid care work and gender imbalance.
🧪 Elective AffinitiesTaken from Goethe and adapted by Haraway to describe deliberate, transformative social bonds. Baker and Ring use this to envision reshaping domestic and institutional life during lockdown (p. 64).
🎭 Inoperative CommunityFrom Jean-Luc Nancy—community formed not through production, but through shared exposure and vulnerability. Used to describe artistic and affective connections formed in digital lockdown spaces (p. 65).
🎮 Play-WorkThe blurred boundary between leisure and labor under capitalism. Haraway writes: “All work and all play is a dangerous game” (p. 161). Baker and Ring explore how creative acts during lockdown resist—but are also at risk of being co-opted (pp. 65–66).
Contribution of “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring to Literary Theory/Theories

🤖 Posthumanism

  • The chapter updates Haraway’s cyborg for 21st-century conditions, presenting the cyborg as a lived condition during the Covid-19 lockdowns rather than a speculative metaphor.
  • Reframes identity through technologically mediated embodiment, challenging humanist boundaries between human/machine, public/private, and work/home.
  • “We argue that cyborg ‘affinities’ open up new ways of challenging the deadly atomisation… of neoliberal capitalism” (p. 59).
  • Links to Giuliana Ferri’s notion of the cyborg as part of “critical interculturalism embedded in outsider narratives” (p. 61).

🧬 Feminist Literary Theory / Cyberfeminism

  • Engages deeply with Haraway’s socialist-feminist cyborg as a figure of political resistance against gender essentialism.
  • Critiques pandemic-era gender regression: “There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female’” (Haraway, p. 172; cited on p. 60).
  • Challenges normative roles of caregiving, motherhood, and domestic labor during lockdown.
  • Positions the cyborg as an anti-essentialist feminist agent resisting both traditional femininity and techno-phobia.

📡 Biopolitics / Surveillance Studies

  • Extends Foucault’s concept of biopower into the digital home, drawing on Paul B. Preciado: lockdowns intensified “disciplinary infiltration of homes, lives and minds” (p. 62).
  • Intersects with Haraway’s warning about “informatics of domination” (p. 61), where home-working technologies blur control and care.
  • Surveillance becomes embedded not only in government responses but also in domestic life through platform capitalism.

🔗 Marxist & Political Literary Theory

  • Offers a critique of neoliberal capitalism’s restructuring of labor and identity through the pandemic.
  • Coins new class identities like the “cybourgeoisie” (white-collar remote workers) versus “keyworker cyborgs” (low-paid essential workers) (pp. 59–60).
  • Reflects on intersectionality: race, class, and gender determine who suffers most in the technologized lockdown society.

🧪 Affect Theory & Community Studies

  • Builds on Jean-Luc Nancy’s Inoperative Community to describe affective, artistic, and fragmentary communities formed in lockdown: “exposure, sharing, and presentation of the self” (p. 65).
  • Suggests that writing, art, and play during isolation were not escapist but modes of resistance and community-building.
  • Embraces Haraway’s vision of partial, collective knowledge: “This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (p. 181; cited p. 66).

🧱 Queer Theory

  • Incorporates Saidiya Hartman’s “wayward lives” to highlight historical queer, Black, and feminist resistances to domestic confinement (p. 60).
  • Celebrates “the anti-essentialist lives already being lived by cyborg-beings”, particularly queer, racialized, and precarious subjects (p. 60).
  • Positions gender, sexuality, and technology as fluid, not fixed, countering binary identities in both theoretical and social terms.

✍️ Literary Praxis / Writerly Theory

  • Writing becomes a cyborg practice—a combination of body, machine, and social resistance.
  • “Writing… is a means of connecting, one that helped so many people around the world to make our way through lockdown” (p. 66).
  • Reflects on Helene Cixous’s “there-not-there” presence of women’s writing as resistance to invisibility (p. 65).
  • Creative labor is framed as both work and play—with the risks of being commodified: “All work and all play is a dangerous game” (Haraway, p. 161; cited on p. 66).

🏛️ Critical University Studies

  • Challenges hierarchical academic identities by encouraging affinities over divisions: “Identities at work… can give way to affinities built across the classes created by the neoliberal university” (p. 64).
  • Advocates unionization, solidarity with outsourced workers and students, and rethinking institutional community through cyborg ethics.
Examples of Critiques Through “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring
📘 Work / Text🧠 Cyborg-Theoretical Critique (via Baker & Ring)
🎬 Metropolis (1927) by Fritz Lang & Thea von HarbouThe iconic female cyborg Maria is reframed as an anti-essentialist symbol who navigates both purity and jouissance, embodying the cyborg’s wayward identity (p. 60). Challenges fixed gender binaries.
📖 Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments by Saidiya HartmanHartman’s account of Black and queer women’s unruly lives serves as a historical precedent for cyborg resistance to domestic control and gendered labor (p. 60). Demonstrates cyborg as dual agent.
📘 Elective Affinities (1809) by Johann Wolfgang von GoetheGoethe’s metaphor of chemical attraction is reinterpreted as a model for post-identity solidarity. Baker & Ring use it to propose experimental household reconfiguration via cyborg ‘affinities’ (pp. 63–64).
🖊️ “Coming to Writing” by Hélène CixousWriting is seen as cyborg praxis, enabling connection amid lockdown isolation. Cixous’s “there-not-there” female voice supports cyborg resistance to invisibility and disembodiment (p. 65).
Criticism Against “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring

️ Class Privilege and the ‘Cybourgeoisie’

  • While the chapter critiques privileged remote workers (the “cybourgeoisie”), it also implicitly centers their experience, potentially under-representing those without stable jobs, housing, or tech access.
  • “We, in the new cybourgeoisie, adjusted to these new ways of working…” (p. 63) — the authors acknowledge their own privilege but focus much on the academic context, risking elitism.

🧩 Partiality and Perspective Limitations

  • Though Baker and Ring emphasize “partial connection” (p. 65) and non-total knowledge (Haraway, p. 179), they do not always fully explore how their own social locations (race, ability, geography) shape their theory.
  • The chapter concedes this when stating: “We acknowledge the partiality of our perspective” (p. 61), but this caveat may not be sufficient for a work tackling global, intersectional crises.

🏠 Idealization of Affinity and Fluid Community

  • The invocation of affinities (p. 64) and “fluid flexibility” of relationships (p. 65) may be criticized as utopian, particularly when structural forces like capitalism, racism, and patriarchy resist such transformation.
  • The metaphor of the “vulnerability of a bubble” (p. 65) could be seen as underestimating the durability of systemic violence and identity-based oppression.

📡 Underplaying Surveillance Risks of Technology

  • While the chapter resists technophobia and affirms tech as a means of pleasure and resistance (Haraway, p. 180), it might be too optimistic about the possibilities of “least-worst” platforms (p. 65).
  • Critics may argue that digital tools—even “two-way” ones—carry inherent risks of data extraction, commodification, and surveillance that aren’t deeply explored here.

🧠 Overextension of the Cyborg Metaphor

  • The cyborg figure is applied broadly—from keyworkers to writers to Zoom-users—which, while inclusive, may dilute the political potency of the concept.
  • Using the cyborg to encompass almost all technologically-mediated human experience risks turning it into a vague or totalizing metaphor.

✍️ Artistic Creation Framed as Resistance – But for Whom?

  • The chapter positions writing and creativity as vital modes of resistance and community (pp. 65–66), yet doesn’t fully examine who is excluded from such artistic access under conditions of poverty, grief, or oppression.
  • As the authors ask: “Does [writing] create new forms of invisibility for those without access?” (p. 66) — the question is crucial, but not fully answered.
Representative Quotations from “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring with Explanation
💬 Quotation📖 Explanation
“The Cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” (p. 150).A foundational claim from Haraway that defines the cyborg as a political identity. Baker and Ring build on this to interpret lockdown life as cyborgian.
“We argue that cyborg ‘affinities’ open up new ways of challenging the deadly atomisation…” (p. 59).Suggests that solidarity based on affinity, not identity, can resist the isolating effects of neoliberalism during the pandemic.
“The cybourgeoisie… is actually a newcomer class” (p. 60).Introduces a critical term for remote, privileged workers, contrasting them with frontline, underpaid keyworker-cyborgs.
“There is not even such a state as ‘being’ female…” (p. 172).Cited from Haraway to reject gender essentialism; supports the authors’ critique of domestic gender roles revived during lockdown.
“The household has landed back on us with such an almighty conservative thump” (p. 61).Cites Claire Hemmings to criticize the reassertion of the patriarchal household under pandemic conditions.
“Protective equipment… as a prosthesis that enables, rather than blocks, human connection” (p. 60).Reclaims PPE not as dehumanizing but as a tool of care and connection in the cyborg framework.
“We acknowledge the partiality of our perspective” (p. 61).A reflexive moment recognizing that their theory comes from a position of privilege within academia.
“All work and all play is a dangerous game” (p. 161).Quoting Haraway to show how capitalist systems co-opt even play and creativity; writing can resist but is also vulnerable to commodification.
“Writing… helped so many people around the world to make our way through lockdown” (p. 66).Affirms writing and art as forms of cyborg connection, resilience, and meaning-making during isolation.
“This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia” (p. 181).Ends by celebrating multiplicity, partiality, and co-created meaning — the cyborg’s way of knowing and resisting fixed identity systems.
Suggested Readings: “Now are we cyborgs? Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns” by Emily Baker and Annie Ring
  1. Baker, Emily, and Annie Ring. “Now Are We Cyborgs?: Affinities and Technology in the Covid-19 Lockdowns.” Lockdown Cultures: The Arts and Humanities in the Year of the Pandemic, 2020-21, edited by Stella Bruzzi et al., UCL Press, 2022, pp. 58–67. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2hvfjf7.13. Accessed 23 Aug. 2025.
  2. Kline, Ronald. “Where Are the Cyborgs in Cybernetics?” Social Studies of Science, vol. 39, no. 3, 2009, pp. 331–62. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27793297. Accessed 23 Aug. 2025.
  3. Kline, Ronald. “Where Are the Cyborgs in Cybernetics?” Social Studies of Science, vol. 39, no. 3, 2009, pp. 331–62. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27793297. Accessed 23 Aug. 2025.
  4. Melissa Colleen Stevenson. “Trying to Plug In: Posthuman Cyborgs and the Search for Connection.” Science Fiction Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, 2007, pp. 87–105. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4241495. Accessed 23 Aug. 2025.

“Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison: Summary and Critique

“Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison first appeared in 2004 in Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body and Culture (Volume 8, Issue 4, pp. 461–475).

"Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments" by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison: Summary and Critique
Introduction: “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison

“Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison first appeared in 2004 in Fashion Theory: The Journal of Dress, Body and Culture (Volume 8, Issue 4, pp. 461–475). The article explores the transformative potential of emerging technologies—such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and digital innovations—in redefining garments as extensions of the human body, aligning with the concept of the “cyborg” as articulated by Donna Haraway and others. It posits that garments, traditionally seen as mere clothing, are evolving into dynamic, interactive systems that integrate with the body’s biological and sensory functions, challenging conventional boundaries between technology, fashion, and identity. Key ideas include the notion of “cybernetic garments” that respond to environmental or physiological stimuli, the potential for living garments grown from tissue, and the redefinition of the body itself as a site of fashion through nano- and biotechnological interventions. Its importance in literary and cultural theory lies in its contribution to post-human discourse, particularly in how it extends Marshall McLuhan’s idea of media as extensions of the body and Katherine Hayles’ concept of the post-human, offering a framework to analyze fashion as a critical site of technological and cultural evolution. The article’s speculative approach, grounded in collaborations with the Symbiotica lab, underscores the ethical and practical implications of these advancements for the fashion industry and societal perceptions of identity and embodiment.

Summary of “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison
  • Introduction to Cybernetic Garments 🌸
    The article introduces the concept of garments evolving through new technologies, envisioning clothes that “change color, display changing patterns, react to sound, light, heat, and the closeness of other people” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 461). It explores bio-, nano-, and digital technologies, drawing from work at Symbiotica, and posits that garments are becoming extensions of the body, challenging traditional fashion paradigms.
  • Redefining Garments as Technology 🌸
    Garments are reframed as technologies that extend human capabilities, with the authors noting, “Clothes are, arguably, the most central technology to articulating human attributes” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463). The term “cybernetic garments” is introduced to describe clothing integrated with advanced systems, moving beyond traditional fabric improvements to include communicative and functional roles.
  • Cyborg Concept and Human Dependency 🌸
    Building on Donna Haraway’s cyborg metaphor, the article argues that humans are already cyborgs due to their reliance on technology, stating, “The few of us who are not already ‘borged’ through immunisations, interfaces, or prosthetics are embedded nonetheless in countless machinic/organic cybernetic systems” (Grey, 2001, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 464). This includes everyday items like clothes and keys, which shape identity and social interactions.
  • Digital Variability in Fashion 🌸
    The article highlights the digital aesthetic’s emphasis on variability, noting that new technologies enable garments to change dynamically, such as “fabrics that can change color, or even display changing shapes” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 466). Innovations like International Fashion Machine’s “Electric Plaid” suggest practical applications for responsive, everyday wear.
  • Biotechnology and Living Garments 🌸48
    Biotechnology’s potential to create living garments is explored, with possibilities like growing fur “sentient free” in bioreactors, which could redefine fashion ethics and aesthetics (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469). Advances in tissue culture, such as spraying skin grafts, indicate a future where garments could be biologically integrated with the body.
  • Nanotechnology and Body Augmentation 🌸
    Nanotechnology offers possibilities for subtle body modifications, with the article suggesting that “nano-bots” could enable gradual changes like a face-lift over a month, aligning body shape with fashion trends (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 470). This aligns with Rei Kawakubo’s idea that “body becomes dress becomes body” (Quinn, 2003, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469).
  • From Flesh to Garment Cyborgs 🌸
    The distinction between “flesh cyborgs” (with embedded technology) and “garment cyborgs” (with external devices like cell phones) is clarified, noting that current technology favors the latter due to safety and practicality: “There is no infection risk, no surgery cost or recovery time” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471). This underscores the seamless integration of technology into daily life.
  • Ethical and Social Implications 🌸
    The article warns of the risks of new technologies, citing examples like Botox and silicone implants, and questions societal willingness to adopt dangerous practices for fashion: “Western society has a poor track record of allowing and even endorsing this kind of dangerous practice” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471). It calls for designers to rethink garment design to navigate these challenges.
  • Conclusion and Future of Fashion 🌸
    The article concludes that new technologies will make garments part of the “media/information-scape of modern life,” enriching designer-consumer relationships but requiring new design approaches (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 473). It emphasizes fashion’s role in fulfilling desires for novelty and variability, heralding a new phase of “cyborg dress.”
Theoretical Terms/Concepts in “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison
Term / ConceptExplanationExample from the Article
CyborgA hybrid of organism and machine; used to describe how humans integrate and depend on technology in everyday life.“The few of us who are not already ‘borged’… are embedded nonetheless in countless machinic/organic cybernetic systems.”
Cybernetic GarmentsClothing that interacts with the environment or body, acting as responsive, communicative, or functional systems.“Smart clothing makes the rationale for fashion increasingly an issue of practicality and comfort…”
Post-humanA condition where humans are fundamentally altered or extended through digital, genetic, or mechanical technologies.“Hayles… uses the term ‘post-human’ to describe an individual and societal dependence upon not only technology, but on digital information and telecommunications.”
Extension of Man (McLuhan)Technology as an extension of human capabilities and senses, including clothing as a communicative interface.“The garment becomes an information medium that extends the function of the skin…”
Garments as MediaClothing acts as a medium that conveys meaning, identity, and information, much like traditional media.“Garments… may explicitly and literally make everyday garments part of the media/information-scape of modern life.”
Biotech GarmentsGarments created or enhanced using biotechnology, potentially involving living tissue or genetically engineered materials.“The radical idea of the living mask made from a person’s own skin…”
Flesh CyborgA person whose body is technologically modified from within through implants, gene therapy, or nanotech.“The human body itself [becomes] a variable, changeable, fashion ‘garment.’”
Variability (Digital Aesthetic)The digital principle that promotes change, flexibility, and customization, applied to clothing and identity.“Variability is one of the key attributes of the digital aesthetic…”
Living GarmentsGarments grown or made from living tissue that respond dynamically to environment or wearer needs.“Growing a wearable, living garment from tissue samples is currently not practical… but… these problems [may be] solved in the near future.”
Body as GarmentReimagining the human body as a modifiable object or fashion medium itself, subject to technological and aesthetic changes.“The body can be described as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate.”
Information Devices as GarmentsDevices like phones, credit cards, and keys are considered garments because of their constant presence, personalization, and communicative function.“They can be considered as garments, along with clothes and accessories.”
Garment CyborgA person whose identity or function is extended by wearable or carried technologies, rather than embedded ones.“Cell phones, credit cards… are also inside our cyborg bodies, safe, secret, but easily accessible.”
Invisible TechnologyTechnologies that become so integrated into daily life they are no longer seen as “technology.”“We do not usually consider ourselves to be dressed in technology… This is indicative of how involved we are with it.”
Nanotechnology in FashionUse of nano-scale engineering in garments to alter fabric properties such as waterproofing, reflectivity, or self-cleaning capabilities.“Clothes that shed water… fibers interfere with the wavelength of light…”
Garment RedefinitionExpanding the definition of garments beyond clothing to include all functional or communicative items closely associated with the body.“Makeup is unlike other accessories… but shares key communicative functions with garments.”
Contribution of “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison to Literary Theory/Theories
  • Posthumanism 🌸
    • The article significantly contributes to posthumanist theory by exploring the dissolution of boundaries between human and machine through garments, aligning with Katherine Hayles’ concept of the posthuman as an entity dependent on technology: “Hayles (1999) uses the term ‘post-human’ to describe an individual and societal dependence upon not only technology, but on digital information and telecommunications” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 465).It extends the notion of the body as a prosthesis, suggesting that garments, as technological extensions, redefine human identity: “The human body can be described ‘as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate’” (Hayles, 1999, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469).
    • By proposing garments as part of the “media/information-scape,” it supports posthumanism’s view of blurred distinctions between biological and technological systems (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 473).
  • Cyborg Theory 🌸
    • Building on Donna Haraway’s cyborg manifesto, the article redefines humans as “garment cyborgs,” emphasizing the integration of technology in everyday life: “In the mid-1980s, Donna Haraway used the term ‘cyborg’ to invoke the science-fiction/cyberpunk image of the robot/flesh creation as a metaphor to illustrate how less obvious technologies had already impacted human lives” (Haraway, 1985, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463).
    • It expands cyborg theory by including garments and accessories as cybernetic extensions, arguing, “Clothes are, arguably, the most central technology to articulating human attributes” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463).
    • The distinction between “flesh cyborgs” and “garment cyborgs” enriches cyborg theory by highlighting practical, non-invasive technological integrations: “Currently, people are ‘garment cyborgs’” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471).
  • Media Theory 🌸
    • The article engages with Marshall McLuhan’s media theory, particularly his idea of media as extensions of the body, by framing garments as information mediums: “Instead the garment becomes an information medium that extends the function of the skin, actualizing a concept proposed in the 1960s” (McLuhan, 1964, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 462).
    • It applies Lev Manovich’s concept of digital variability to fashion, suggesting that garments can embody dynamic media aesthetics: “Variability is one of the key attributes of the digital aesthetic, according to media theorist Lev Manovich” (Manovich, 1999, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 466).
    • This contribution reframes fashion as a communicative medium, aligning with McLuhan’s notion that “everything is a medium with meaning” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 466).
  • Technocultural Studies 🌸
    • The article advances technocultural studies by examining how new technologies like biotechnology and nanotechnology reshape cultural practices in fashion: “The most potent [developments] are in fact likely to emerge from combinations of what we now think of as separate techniques” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 467).
    • It draws on Neil Postman’s idea of technology’s invisibility to argue that garments, as normalized technologies, shape social interactions: “Clothes are visible but their ‘invisible’ is often obscured” (Postman, 1992, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463).
    • By exploring ethical implications, such as the risks of nano- and biotechnologies, it contributes to discussions on technology’s societal impact: “Western society has a poor track record of allowing and even endorsing this kind of dangerous practice” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471).
  • Feminist Theory 🌸
    • The article intersects with feminist theory through its engagement with Haraway’s cyborg as a feminist metaphor, challenging traditional gender norms in fashion and embodiment: “The term ‘cyborg’ is now being used to describe our dependency on technology to articulate our physical being” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463).
    • It explores how technologies like cosmetic surgery and gene therapy, often tied to gendered beauty standards, could redefine bodily expression: “The purpose of cosmetic surgery, of course, is to change the physical appearance, and change is the very essence of fashion” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469).
    • By citing examples like Orlan’s body art, it connects to feminist discussions on bodily autonomy and technological intervention (Botting & Wilson, 2002, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469).
  • Fashion Theory 🌸
    • The article redefines fashion theory by proposing garments as dynamic, technological systems rather than static objects, stating, “Fashion, then, may be entering a new phase of cyborg dress offering technical garments on technical bodies for new times” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 473).
    • It draws on Bradley Quinn’s work to argue that fashion is a site of technological innovation, quoting Rei Kawakubo’s philosophy: “body becomes dress becomes body” (Quinn, 2003, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 469).
    • By integrating concepts from Symbiotica’s bio-art practices, it expands fashion theory to include ethical and practical challenges of living garments, such as those grown from tissue (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 468).
Examples of Critiques Through “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison
NovelAuthorCritique Through Farren & Hutchison (2004)
Frankenstein 🌸Mary ShelleyAlignment with Cybernetic Garments: Shelley’s Creature can be seen as a proto-cyborg, assembled from organic parts, resonating with the article’s concept of garments as extensions of the body: “Instead the garment becomes an information medium that extends the function of the skin” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 462). The Creature’s stitched-together body parallels the article’s idea of garments as constructed artifacts that redefine bodily boundaries.
Cyborg Identity: The Creature’s lack of a natural origin aligns with the article’s discussion of cyborgs as challenging traditional boundaries: “The ‘post-human’ or ‘cyborg’ condition is a departure point for considering the speed with which once new technological extensions to our biological bodies… have become normalized” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 462). However, the Creature’s tragic isolation critiques the article’s optimistic view of cyborg integration, highlighting societal rejection of unnatural bodies.
Critique: The novel lacks the article’s focus on dynamic, responsive garments, as the Creature’s body is static and non-technological. It also emphasizes horror over the article’s speculative enthusiasm for bio- and nanotechnology.
The Ship Who Sang 🌸Anne McCaffreyAlignment with Cybernetic Garments: The novel’s protagonist, Helva, a human brain integrated into a spaceship, embodies the article’s vision of cybernetic systems: “Cybernetics is the study of control and communication in self-regulating systems” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463). Helva’s ship-body acts as a garment, extending her sensory and communicative functions, akin to “garments considered in this article [that] challenge these early experiments and apply far more radical technologies” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463).
Cyborg Identity: Helva’s hybrid existence supports the article’s idea of humans as cyborgs due to technological dependency: “The few of us who are not already ‘borged’ through… prosthetics are embedded nonetheless in countless machinic/organic cybernetic systems” (Grey, 2001, cited in Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 464). Her agency challenges gender norms, aligning with the article’s feminist undertones.
Critique: The novel predates the article’s focus on biotechnology and nanotechnology, limiting its engagement with living garments. Its romanticized view of cyborg identity contrasts with the article’s caution about risks, such as “the potential for discomfort, disfiguration and death” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471).
Neuromancer 🌸William GibsonAlignment with Cybernetic Garments: Gibson’s cyberspace and neural implants reflect the article’s concept of garments as information mediums: “The garment becomes an information medium that extends the function of the skin” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 462). Characters’ technological enhancements, like Case’s neural jacks, function as cybernetic garments that integrate with the body.
Cyborg Identity: The novel’s characters, augmented by digital tech, embody the article’s notion of “garment cyborgs”: “Far from disqualifying the relationship from being genuinely cyborg, this ‘momentary’ nature of wearable, hand-held devices… is already a vastly more sophisticated arrangement than surgical embedment” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 471). It aligns with the article’s view of digital variability in fashion (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 466).
Critique: Neuromancer focuses on digital rather than bio- or nanotechnological garments, diverging from the article’s emphasis on living tissues. Its dystopian tone questions the article’s speculative optimism about technology’s societal integration.
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 🌸Philip K. DickAlignment with Cybernetic Garments: The androids’ synthetic bodies can be seen as garments that mimic human skin, aligning with the article’s idea of garments extending bodily functions: “While the skin defines the physical difference between a single human and the rest of the world… it is also a visually conspicuous surface” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 464). Androids like Rachael blur human-machine boundaries, akin to the article’s cybernetic garments.
Cyborg Identity: The novel explores the cyborg condition through androids’ near-human identities, supporting the article’s claim that “the term ‘cyborg’ is now being used to describe our dependency on technology to articulate our physical being” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 463). It questions human exceptionalism, resonating with the article’s posthuman framework.
Critique: The novel’s androids lack the article’s focus on responsive, variable garments, as their bodies are fixed constructs. Its ethical concerns about artificial life contrast with the article’s enthusiasm for biotech possibilities, such as “growing a wearable, living garment from tissue samples” (Farren & Hutchison, 2004, p. 468).
Criticism Against “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison

🔹 Over-Reliance on Speculative and Hypothetical Scenarios

  • Much of the article is grounded in future possibilities rather than current, empirically verified developments.
  • Speculative examples (e.g. living skin garments, face-swapping bioreactors) lack technological feasibility at present.

🔹 Lack of Empirical Evidence or Case Studies

  • The article doesn’t offer real-world examples, user testing, or fashion industry data to support its claims.
  • Absence of interviews or design outcomes from practicing fashion designers or technologists.

🔹 Blurred Lines Between Science Fiction and Design Theory

  • The piece often blends sci-fi imagery with critical fashion theory, which can confuse rather than clarify its theoretical contributions.
  • Use of metaphors (e.g. “garment cyborgs” and “flesh cyborgs”) sometimes prioritizes provocation over clarity.

🔹 Limited Engagement with Ethical and Societal Implications

  • Ethical concerns around biotechnology, surveillance, and body modification are mentioned but not deeply examined.
  • No discussion of accessibility, equity, or social justice related to wearable technologies.

🔹 Narrow Cultural Scope

  • The focus is primarily on Western technological contexts, overlooking non-Western perspectives on body, fashion, and technology.
  • Fails to address how culture, gender, or class may mediate the adoption and interpretation of cybernetic garments.

🔹 Fashion Function vs. Fashion Aesthetics Oversimplified

  • The argument leans toward functionality (smart, responsive, technological garments) without fully accounting for the continued dominance of aesthetics, symbolism, and identity in fashion.

🔹 Underdeveloped Discussion of Consumer Behavior

  • The article overlooks how consumers might resist, adapt to, or reject these technologies.
  • Assumes future users will adopt body-enhancing or biotech garments without questioning comfort, cost, or psychological effects.

Representative Quotations from “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison with Explanation
QuotationPageExplanation
“Imagine clothes that change color, display changing patterns, react to sound, light, heat, and the closeness of other people.” 🌸461This opening statement introduces the article’s speculative vision of garments as dynamic, responsive technologies. It sets the stage for exploring how advancements in bio-, nano-, and digital technologies could transform fashion into an interactive medium, aligning with the article’s focus on redefining garments as extensions of the body and challenging traditional fashion paradigms.
“Instead the garment becomes an information medium that extends the function of the skin, actualizing a concept proposed in the 1960s (McLuhan 1964: 119).” 🌸462This quotation connects garments to Marshall McLuhan’s media theory, framing them as extensions of the skin that transmit and receive information. It underscores the article’s argument that garments are not just clothing but cybernetic systems that integrate with the body, supporting the concept of humans as cyborgs in a posthuman context.
“Clothes are, arguably, the most central technology to articulating human attributes.” 🌸463This statement redefines clothes as a fundamental technology, more integral to human identity than devices like cell phones. It highlights the article’s contribution to posthuman and cyborg theory by emphasizing garments’ role in shaping social and personal identity, extending the notion of technology beyond mechanical devices.
“The few of us who are not already ‘borged’ through immunisations, interfaces, or prosthetics are embedded nonetheless in countless machinic/organic cybernetic systems.” 🌸464Quoting Chris Hables Grey, this passage supports the article’s argument that humans are inherently cyborgs due to their reliance on technology, including garments. It situates everyday items like clothes within the cyborg framework, expanding Donna Haraway’s metaphor to include non-invasive technologies.
“While the common definition of the term garment is ‘an article of clothing,’ the original source is ‘garner,’ meaning ‘to equip’ (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language 2000).” 🌸464This quotation redefines garments as tools that equip the body, broadening the term to include accessories, cosmetics, and digital devices like keys and cell phones. It supports the article’s innovative terminology, which challenges conventional fashion theory and aligns with technocultural studies.
“Variability is one of the key attributes of the digital aesthetic, according to media theorist Lev Manovich (Manovich 1999: 36).” 🌸466By invoking Manovich, this quotation ties the digital aesthetic’s variability to fashion, suggesting that garments can dynamically change appearance, as with “fabrics that can change color” (p. 466). It connects the article to media theory, illustrating how digital technologies enhance garments’ communicative potential.
“Growing a wearable, living garment from tissue samples is currently not practical, for two reasons. First, the tissue would dry out and/or become infected from lack of a protective covering.” 🌸468This quotation highlights the speculative yet grounded discussion of biotechnological garments, such as living tissue grown in bioreactors. It reflects the article’s exploration of biotechnology’s potential and limitations, contributing to ethical debates in fashion and technocultural studies.
“The human body can be described ‘as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate’ (Hayles 1999: 3).” 🌸469Citing Katherine Hayles, this quotation frames the body itself as a garment subject to technological manipulation, aligning with posthuman theory. It supports the article’s vision of nano- and biotechnologies enabling dynamic body modifications, blurring the line between body and fashion.
“Currently, people are ‘garment cyborgs.’ This limitation of current technology means that there are not the craft skills to safely and routinely implement direct body augmentations.” 🌸471This statement distinguishes between “garment cy
Suggested Readings: “Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments” by Anne Farren and Andrew Hutchison
  1. Farren, A., & Hutchison, A. (2004). Cyborgs, New Technology, and the Body: The Changing Nature of Garments. Fashion Theory, 8(4), 461–475. https://doi.org/10.2752/136270404778051618
  2. Kline, Ronald. “Where Are the Cyborgs in Cybernetics?” Social Studies of Science, vol. 39, no. 3, 2009, pp. 331–62. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27793297. Accessed 20 Aug. 2025.
  3. Penley, Constance, et al. “Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna Haraway.” Social Text, no. 25/26, 1990, pp. 8–23. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/466237. Accessed 20 Aug. 2025.
  4. Melissa Colleen Stevenson. “Trying to Plug In: Posthuman Cyborgs and the Search for Connection.” Science Fiction Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, 2007, pp. 87–105. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4241495. Accessed 20 Aug. 2025.